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THE CAMPAIGN OF LIAO-YANG

CAMPAIGNS AND THEIR LESSONS

TIRAH, 1897

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IN PREPARATION

CAMPAIGN OF 1871 AFTER SEDAN

By Major L. H. R. Pope-Hennessy

CAMPAIGNS AND THEIR LESSONS

EDITED BY COLONEL C. E. CALLWELL, C.B.

THE CAMPAIGN OF LIAO-YANG

BY

MAJOR H. ROWAN-ROBINSON, R.A.

106947

WITH MAPS AND PLANS

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INTRODUCTION

THE campaign of Liao-yang—that is to say, the period of the great struggle in the Far East between Russia and Japan, which ended with the defeat of the Russians in the first great battle on land between the contending forces—has been selected as illustrating warfare under modern conditions when it is being conducted in a theatre of operations lacking in communications and offering considerable difficulties to the movement and the feeding of great masses of men. It illustrates also in striking fashion the advantages which a belligerent enjoys where adequate preparations have been made for a contest against an unready foe. It further illustrates the perils which are likely to be incurred by a Government which entrusts a soldier with a difficult task, and which then interferes with him as regards the mode in which he proposes to carry out the duty. The war in Manchuria also illustrates the interdependence between maritime and land operations in the case of a campaign where the army of one side has to be transported across the sea to carry out its mission, and where the other side at the same time possesses formidable naval forces; but this volume does not treat of the conflict on the waters except in so far as is necessary to make the narrative intelligible.

From the moment that their antagonists by a deft and sudden stroke secured command of the sea, the Russians were operating under exceptional difficulties. They were conducting a campaign at an enormous distance from the home country, with which the army in the field was linked by only a single line of railway about 4000 miles long. Their military authorities on the spot had been misled by the reports of the sailors, who had expressed confidence that they would be able to retain command of the sea and that such a land campaign as actually developed would therefore be virtually impossible. Their troops were unprepared in many respects for a conflict with armies trained up to a high standard of tactical efficiency, officers and men had scarcely realised how formidable were the hostile forces with whom they were about to engage in a desperate contest, and the information at the disposal of the staff with regard to the organisation, the designs, and the methods of the enemy was lamentably incomplete. The Japanese, on the other hand, had been getting ready for this war for several years. Their troops were highly trained, their organisation was in full working order, and the task of their intelligence department had been admirably performed. When it became apparent that the enemy had secured command of the sea and contemplated a determined offensive campaign in Manchuria, the Russian commander-in-chief perceived that the proper course to pursue would be to draw back his advanced forces and, in a retired position, to await the reinforcements which were bound to reach him gradually from Europe, so as to enable him to bring superior numbers to bear against his opponents. This, however, involved the

abandonment of much territory and an acquiescence in the isolation of Port Arthur, and pressure was therefore brought to bear on him to maintain a forward position. Recognising the danger of such a course, he adopted the expedient of doing neither one thing nor the other whole-heartedly, with the result that his troops had already been exposed to a number of minor reverses before he considered himself strong enough to fight a general action; and perhaps the most valuable lesson to be learnt from the campaign of Liao-yang is the danger of a policy of half-measures in war.

The authority chiefly made use of in compiling the volume has been the Russian Official Account (French translation), a work which has been compiled with meticulous care[1] and which is remarkably frank in its admissions of the failings of Russian leaders and of Russian soldiers. Considerable use has also been made of our own Official History, compiled by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Many other works bearing on the operations have been consulted, of which a list is given in Appendix IV.

In a volume of this kind, the tactics employed by the contending sides in the numerous engagements that took place can only be touched on lightly, and where they seem to illustrate some important principle. For a detailed study of each action the Russian Official History with its fine maps can be recommended, as well as our own, part of which was written before the publication of the Russian work. As few places as possible have been mentioned in the text,

[1] Except as regards figures, which are involved and sometimes incorrect.

place-names in the Far East presenting special difficulties to Western readers. The system of transliteration which has been adopted in our Official History has been adhered to; but, to avoid confusion, the nomenclature Ta-ling has been made use of when referring to the most westerly of the passes over the hills which bear the name of Fen-shui-ling. Most of the maps and plans have been copied from those issued with the Russian Official History; but in the case of the combat of Chiao-tou the plan is reproduced, by permission, from a sketch of the battle-field recently executed on the ground by Captain G. L. Blair, 36th Sikhs, and Captain Nevile Wyatt, R.F.A.

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CAMPAIGNS AND THEIR LESSONS

LIAO-YANG

CHAPTER I

THE PRELIMINARIES OF WAR

THE causes of any great modern war may be ascribed to the conflict of the national aspirations of the peoples concerned. When the coveted ends have been attained or their achievement has been definitely frustrated, the relations between the countries resume their normal course. The desire of France for the conquest of Europe accounted for centuries of warfare with England, whose security was dependent on the balance of power on the Continent. The disappearance of French ambitions with the fall of the Second Empire led up to the cordial friendship now established between the two nations. The rivalry of Prussia and Austria for the hegemony of the German States resulted in the Seven Weeks' War; once the claims of the aspirants had been settled by the sword, a community of interests, both racial and geographical, drew the warring nations into the bonds of an alliance. The war of 1870 was the natural corollary to that of 1866. Prussia could only hope to bind the other States under her leadership by a striking display of power and by a decisive defeat of the nation that had so often devastated Germany. France, on

the other hand, seeking to control the destinies of Europe, saw that the consolidation of a strong German Empire on the banks of the Rhine would be a perpetual bar to her aspirations. It has but lately been seen how the efforts of the Powers availed nothing to prevent the long-threatening storm in the Balkans.

In the Far East, there had for some years been forces at work driving Russia and Japan on courses certain to result sooner or later in war. Admiral Alexiev gives us the Russian point of view. "A war with Japan," he says, "is inevitable. . . . It may be postponed, but it cannot be prevented. It is the logical outcome of the incompatibility of the great historic mission of Russia on the coasts of the Pacific with Japanese ambition." It was the statement of Livy over again, that Rome conquered the world in self-defence. The point of view of Japan was that she was driven to war to secure her own safety; but there were other factors at work. Two effete empires lying almost within a stone's throw of her shores offered splendid outlets for an expanding population and trade and a strong temptation to acquire territory. Moreover, ever since Japan had been opened up to foreign intercourse, the proud and sensitive nature of the people had been constantly wounded. Bearers of the white man's burden in haste to exploit a new country treated her with contumely and insult. A spirit of revenge and of wounded pride soon bred the desire to arm and to show the world that the Japanese, though Orientals, would not brook affront. Thus Japan's quarrel lay at first with the white race as a whole, and it was only the proximity and aggression of Russia which exposed that nation to the blow which had been so long in preparation.

The policy of Russia had for many decades been directed to the acquisition of an ice-free port on the open sea. Shouldered off from Norway, Turkey, and Persia, she turned

her attention to a back door on the Pacific. The cession, by China, of the Maritime Province, gave her Vladivostock, but that harbour was closed for three months in the year, and the issues to the open sea lay in Japanese hands. An attempt, made in 1861, to seize the island of Tsushima at the southern exit of the Sea of Japan was frustrated; but the exchange, in 1875, of the Kurile Group for the lower half of the island of Saghalien secured an outlet to the north-east. The acquisition proved, however, of no great value, for the passage was not permanently ice-free; and the high-handed methods of Russian diplomacy raised great hostility in Japan. That nation had been viewing the gradual approach of a great Power with growing concern. Her interests on the mainland, and especially in Korea, had always been considerable, and now, with a population and trade that were rapidly increasing, she could, less than ever, afford to disregard them. There was a possibility that China might cede Korea to Russia, as she had ceded the Maritime Province; and such an event would have been fraught with the gravest danger to the island kingdom. To avert this peril she decided to direct her endeavours towards rendering Korea an independent State. Such a policy naturally brought her into conflict with the suzerain Power, and a series of agreements and disagreements with the latter culminated, in 1894, in the Chino-Japanese war.

This campaign, which lasted eight months, and resulted in the complete defeat of the Chinese both by land and sea, is interesting mainly from the fact that it foreshadowed in its course the operations of the greater war that was to follow. One Japanese army landed in Korea, forced the passage of the Yalu, and advanced into Manchuria as far as Hai-cheng; a second army landed on the Liao-tung peninsula, captured

Chin-chou, and took Port Arthur by assault; the two armies then joined hands at Yin-kou and decisively defeated the main Chinese army at the Liao-ho. The treaty of Shimonoseki followed, by the terms of which the independence of Korea was recognised and the Liao-tung peninsula ceded to Japan. The execution of this treaty would have been a signal blow to the aims of Muscovite diplomacy. Before its ratification, Russia, in concert with France and Germany, presented a note of "friendly counsel" at Tokio, in which it was made clear that "the occupation by a foreign Power of the Liao-tung would constitute a menace to the integrity of China, would render illusory the independence of Korea, and would thus become a permanent obstacle to the maintenance of peace in the Far East." The Mikado, feeling that he was not strong enough to resist, accepted the friendly counsel, but his people were bitterly disappointed. A humiliation such as this at the moment of victory was not likely to be forgotten; and from that moment began serious preparations for a war of revenge. Before three years had passed each of the three Powers that had been so anxious to secure the integrity of China had managed to obtain large slices of Chinese territory, Russia's share being the lease for twenty-five years of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, which she occupied in March, 1898.

Meanwhile, the Siberian Railway, begun in 1891, was being pushed on vigorously, and in 1896 had arrived at a point five hundred miles east of Lake Baikal. By virtue of a contract with China, a company was formed, towards the end of this year, to construct a line from China through Manchuria direct to Vladivostock, instead of following, as had hitherto been intended, the devious course of the Amur to Khabarovsk, between which place and Vladivostock a line had already been built. With the lease of Port Arthur, Russia also obtained permission to unite Port Arthur with

the Siberian Railway at Harbin, and trains were already running to Liao-yang when, in 1900, the Boxer Rebellion occurred. The spread of the outbreak to Manchuria, the destruction of railway stations, and the massacre of missionaries forced Russia to intervene. She mobilised a large force and, meeting with but little resistance, was, by the end of September, in effective occupation of the greater part of Manchuria. She was still there in 1902, although by that time the international contingents, which had relieved the Legations at Pekin, had been withdrawn from China.

Japan now began to take decisive steps. She had already succeeded in awakening China to a distrust of Russian aims and had signed an agreement in which, by a quaint turn of the wheel, she stood as the guarantor of the integrity of China, receiving in return the promise of a sympathetic attitude in the event of a war with Russia. Her next move showed a still more acute perception of the value of alliances. On the 30th January, 1902, she signed an agreement with Great Britain, by which each Power contracted, in the event of either becoming involved in a war with a third Power in defence of its interests of the Far East, to maintain strict neutrality and to use its endeavours to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

In the following April appeared the text of a treaty between Russia and China in which the former Power agreed to evacuate Manchuria while the latter undertook to protect Russian subjects and their interests. The withdrawal was to be completed in eighteen months, a certain section of territory being handed over at the close of each period of six months; and, at the end of the first period, the necessary conditions were fulfilled. In place, however, of executing the second part of the contract Russia presented

a demand for further concessions in Manchuria. The representatives of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan lodged energetic protests; and in April, 1903, China, stimulated by such strong support, rejected the Russian demands.

As no change took place in the situation in Manchuria, and as Russian activity in Korea was becoming more pronounced, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg was instructed in July to make representation to the effect that the permanent occupation of Manchuria and the condition of affairs in Korea were creating a situation dangerous to the interests and even to the security of Japan. The suggestion of a treaty having been accepted by the Russian Government, the Tokio Cabinet forwarded proposals recommending a mutual agreement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires and the reciprocal recognition of the special commercial interests of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Korea respectively. This first proposition was presented on the 12th August; the Russian reply was received on the 3rd October—that is, after a delay of fifty-two days. The main point urged in these and other counter proposals was that all mention of Manchuria must be omitted, that being an affair between Russia and China alone. The independence and territorial integrity of Korea was to be respected, but not that of the Chinese Empire.

Japan's second proposals, in which she acceded to Russian demands previously put forward that no military works should be built which would interfere with free passage in the Straits of Korea, and for the creation on the Yalu of a neutral zone, were presented on the 30th October; the reply to them was received on the 11th December—a delay of forty-two days. For the reply to a third note Japan had only to wait nineteen days. To a fourth note of the 13th

January, 1904, no answer having been received by the 31st of that month, the Japanese Minister insisted on the date of the reply being fixed. Count Lamsdorf returned an evasive answer. It was known that Russia was strengthening her naval and military position in the Far East, so, after waiting till the 4th February for the Russian response, the Mikado summoned his Council of Ancients.

At this time the Japanese, according to their official account, were in possession of the following information concerning the Russians :—

Two battalions had left Port Arthur for the Yalu. Horses and vehicles were being purchased in large numbers. Drafts were leaving Russia to bring units in Manchuria up to war strength. The Russian fleet had left Port Arthur, destination unknown.[1] Arrangements were being made for the dispatch as required of large reinforcements from Russia.

The 9th East Siberian Rifle Brigade was to be converted to a division and a new brigade formed.[2] The Viceroy, Admiral Alexiev, who had been entrusted with full powers, had determined on war, and was only waiting for the arrival of Virenius' squadron and the completion of the new organisation to make the formal declaration.

It was while the Council was sitting that news arrived of the movement of the Russian fleet. A decision was instantly arrived at to take advantage of the opportunity and to declare war. The Japanese Minister was instructed to sever diplomatic relations. He received the telegram on the evening of the 5th and informed Count Lamsdorf of its contents at 4 p.m. of the 6th. War was, however, only declared by both countries on the 10th February, by which

[1] It anchored in Ta-lien-wan Bay on the night of 3rd February and returned to the roadstead at Port Arthur next day.

[2] At this time the 9th E.S.R.B. was itself in process of formation and there was no intention of forming a new brigade.

date, three naval actions had been fought and Japanese troops had already reached Seoul.

For the sake of relatively insignificant economic interests in northern Korea, Russia allowed herself to be drawn into a great war for which she was unprepared. After the occupation of Port Arthur an armed conflict was hardly to be avoided; but it lay within the power of Russia to postpone the outbreak of hostilities, and the decision to evacuate Manchuria was an act of statesmanlike prudence. Had that policy been continued—and its continuance was strongly advocated by the War Minister—general confidence would have been restored, and aggressive action on the part of Japan would not have met with sympathetic support from Great Britain, America, and China. Time would have been available for the reinforcement of the fleet, for the rearmament of the artillery, for the development of the railways, and for the completion of the fortifications of Port Arthur. The aims of Russian expansion might then have been achieved either by a process of peaceful penetration, or else, and with vastly improved prospects, by a resort to arms.

CHAPTER II

THE CONDITIONS OF THE WAR PROBLEM

The theatre of operations.—A general map of the theatre of war will be found at the end of the volume. Also a map of the hilly country east of the railway between Kai-ping and Liao-yang, in which a number of distinct actions, illustrated by plans in the text, took place.

The numerous and excellent harbours of Japan, well equipped with docking accommodation and coaling facilities, furnished admirable naval bases and provided ample space for the accumulation of transports. Manchuria and Korea were not so well provided; the best harbours from west to east being—Yin-kou, Port Arthur, Dalny, Chi-nam-po, Che-mul-po, Ma-san-po, Fu-san, Gen-san, and Vladivostock. Yin-kou could take ships up to 17 feet draught, and its facilities for disembarkation were to exercise considerable influence over the campaign. From there China could be tapped by rail for supplies, and a Japanese army could advance thence up the Liao-ho into Manchuria or else could strike at the main railway at Ta-shih-chiao, cutting off all hostile troops in the peninsula. It was unfortified at the beginning of the war, but a few 6-inch guns were mounted there later. At Port Arthur were docks for cruisers, but the anchorage for large vessels was limited and the process of taking ships in and out was slow; there was room, however, for the greater part of the Russian fleet, and some protection was afforded

in the roadstead outside by the guns of the fortress. The port of Dalny could accommodate ships up to 30 feet draught, and was well equipped; a large amount of money had been expended upon it, for it was designed to deal with the vast trade anticipated from timber concessions on the Yalu. It was, however, unfortified, and was destined to furnish an excellent base for operations against Port Arthur and along the eastern railway. The position of Ta-ku-shan at the inner end of the Liao-tung is worthy of note, although it offered a bad landing-place. Mas-an-po, with its first-class harbour on the Korean Straits, was strategically the Gibraltar of the naval operations, and, close by, Fu-san, although more exposed, was a convenient port. The coast north of a line through Pi-tzu-wo and Che-mul-po is ice-bound for three months of the year. The foreshore, generally flat and muddy, shelves so gradually that landing is difficult and ships have to stand many miles out to sea. These conditions prevail at Che-mul-po and Chi-nam-po, except that the former is not often ice-bound, and thus these ports, although suitable from a strategic point of view for the invasion of Northern Korea, present many inconveniences to the disembarkation of troops. At Vladivostock there is ample accommodation for the whole Russian fleet, but it is ice-bound in winter and ice-breakers have to be employed to keep a channel open.

The peninsula of Korea—about 500 miles in length—is a rough and mountainous country inhabited by an uncivilised, unwarlike race. Wide and treacherous rivers, execrable roads, and a scarcity of supplies render it ill-suited to operations on a large scale. Along the northern boundary runs the Yalu, and north and west of that river lies a tumbled mass of mountains with bare and rocky summits and slopes covered with woods or cultivation.

The main ridge, known as the Fen-shui Range, reaches an altitude of 5000 feet at its north-eastern extremity and gradually diminishes in height as it trends south-westwards. The main passage over the eastern portion of the range is by the Mo-tien-ling, which is traversed by the Imperial road from Pekin to An-tung. As this is the best road, and as its gradients at the pass exceed eight degrees, it furnishes a fair gauge of the difficulties of transport in this region. The remaining roads, or rather tracks, are so bad that in wet weather country carts avoid them and take to the fields; and the local farmer has to expend much labour in digging ditches across his property to prevent their incursions. The road over the Mo-tien-ling, shortly before reaching the pass, throws off a good track towards Muk-den, thus enabling a force advancing by it from Korea to threaten the communications of an army at Liao-yang. Two indifferent tracks leading from the harbour of Gen-san—one by Sai-ma-chi to Liao-yang and the other more to the east towards Muk-den—were of considerable importance, as their existence made the Russians constantly afraid of having their eastern flank turned from that direction. The shape and size of the Liao-tung require attention, because like every peninsula it presents a well-defined salient to a hostile Power which controls the sea.

The division of the theatre of operations into mountain and plain is strongly marked, but the mountains throw out occasional off-shoots to the west as far as the railway, furnishing natural positions covering Liao-yang from the south. Broadly speaking, however, the western portion of the theatre consists of a vast plain, well watered, thickly peopled, and highly cultivated. Here are grown immense quantities of kao-liang, a species of millet which reaches a height of 15 feet and which the roads traverse as by lofty corridors. From a military point of view it could swallow

up an army, conceal movement, or when cut down and entangled, act as an obstacle. It often interfered with the field of fire from Russian positions, and its effect must be borne in mind by the student of Manchurian battles.

The wet season occurs in July, August, and early September. After a short period of great heat comes a storm of tropical violence, and that is followed by a deluge lasting, with short intervals, about three weeks. During this time road-transport comes to a standstill; but it can be resumed very soon after the rain ceases, for the soil dries quickly. The hottest months are July and August, though the heat is seldom excessive. The winter, on the other hand, is intensely cold, the country being ice-bound from November until March.

Influence of geography on the operations.—From this short survey of the features and climate a few points bearing on the strategy of the campaign stand out prominently:

(*a*) Owing to limited anchorage Port Arthur could not contain the whole of the Russian fleet. Vladivostock during the winter could only provide accommodation for four cruisers. Consequently the Russian fleet must be dangerously dispersed.

(*b*) If the Japanese should obtain command of the sea, any field troops in the Liao-tung would be liable to have their retreat cut off. This point should be borne in mind when considering the possibilities of resisting landing operations in the peninsula.

(*c*) Disembarkation north of the line through Pi-tzu-wo—Che-mul-po would be impossible before the end of March. Unless, therefore, Port Arthur or Dalny could be seized by a *coup de main*, the invasion of the Liao-tung was not to be expected till April. Seven months would then be available for operations before

the arrival of winter would entail a pause in the operations. The fact that this pause might be turned to profit by Russia in the transport of large reinforcements from Europe, imposed quick and forceful action on Japan if she wished, before being outnumbered, to achieve decisive results in the vast region between the coast-line and Harbin. Whether Japan aimed at decisive results or set a lesser limit to her early ambitions, is a point that will be considered later.

(*d*) Operations through the Korean and Manchurian mountains would be slow and laborious, while those along the railway would meet with no great natural difficulties except during the rainy season.

Supply and communications.—The command of the sea is to provide the Japanese with a short and sure line of communications and to enable them to transport their troops, at will, to any point on the coast. Based immediately on the home-country, and with the world-markets at their disposal, supply to the mainland will be a simple affair, and their troubles will only begin with an advance into the interior. In the mountains, roads and supplies are lacking; but away to the west they will find three possible lines of advance :—

(*a*) Along the main railway, in the defile between the mountains and the Liao-ho.

(*b*) By the Liao-ho.

(*c*) Still further to the west by the railway to Hsin-min-tun.

The Russians, on the other hand, must suffer from the enormous disadvantage of being bound to their base by a single line of railway, 4000 miles in length, with a break at

Lake Baikal. Moreover, the vast extent of the Viceroyalty and the lack of good roads, must act as a bar to rapid concentration, and many weeks must elapse before some of the units, stationed in the Far East, far from the railway, could arrive upon the scene of action. Fortunately for the Russians, the vast Sungari plain furnished a supply of flour amply sufficient for their needs. Sheep, too, were plentiful in Mongolia and cattle in Siberia. This was to have important bearing on the campaign, for it allowed the carrying power of the Siberian railway to be devoted mainly to the transport of troops and munitions of war.

Organisation, training, and equipment.—Details of the numbers of troops available on either side and of their organisation are given in the Appendices. The Japanese organisation was complete and in working order. But, on the Russian side, new army corps were being formed, unformed, re-formed; there were new commanders and new staffs; new battalions were being built up by collecting companies from regiments all over Russia; everything was in a state of flux, and the exigencies of the moment were the ruling factors in the distribution of troops. Moreover, the necessity of rendering secure two fortresses, 1600 miles of railway, 400 miles of coast-line, and the Korean frontier was turning the army into a police force.

For many years past the Russian army had been permeated by the influence of two great men of markedly different views—Tolstoy and Dragomirov. The former by his writings had evoked a strong prejudice against war which only the fervour aroused by some great national cause could remove. The latter waged a continual campaign against the increase of luxury and what he considered to be the general decadence of the age; a disciple of Suvarrov, he placed entire faith in the bayonet, in solid formations, and in the value of morale. He had a violent,

almost a fanatical scorn for modern inventions and he regarded with abhorrence the invocation, for the achievement of victory, of mechanical means instead of brute force and courage. His theories were widely accepted. Manœuvres became theatrical displays—army corps in mass bristling with bayonets, cavalry charging, galloping batteries; and the inevitable lesson at the close that in morale lies the whole secret of war. It was a good horse, but ridden to death.

The Russians were thus trained to act in masses, to place great faith in the bayonet which was kept fixed even when firing, and—somewhat out of harmony with their theories of morale—they were impressed with a belief in defensive positions. The cavalry, which consisted largely of Cossacks, was, though numerous, badly officered and but little practised in dismounted action or in musketry. The artillery was only trained in the direct-fire method and could not make use of concealed positions.

The Japanese, educated in a more modern school, were imbued with the offensive spirit, were taught to obtain superiority of fire as a preliminary to the assault and to move in extended lines. The geography of Japan rendered their superiority to the Russians in mountain warfare certain. Their cavalry was deficient in numbers and poorly mounted, and the troopers were indifferent horsemen though fair horsemasters. The artillery understood the use of indirect fire, but its training was not of a high standard.

As regards armament, there was but little to choose between the combatants. The Japanese rifle was somewhat deficient in killing power, which accounts for the large number of wounded Russians who were able to rejoin the ranks. The Russians were the possessors of a field gun distinctly superior to the Arisaka weapon; but the troops

from Europe had not been trained in its use, and some units were still equipped with very obsolete guns. They suffered, moreover, from a lack of mountain batteries, in which their opponents were particularly strong. On neither side was the proportion of artillery to other arms up to the accepted European standards.

Morale and discipline.—The Japanese soldiers were inspired by patriotism, by hatred of the Russians, by a desire to wipe out past insults, and by intense fidelity to the Mikado. Educated from early youth in an iron discipline, the relic of a feudal system turned to profit by an autocratic Government, they might be expected, when patriotism, enthusiasm, and hatred had ebbed away, still to answer to the spur and to make that last effort by which alone victory can be snatched in a desperate extremity. The Japanese have been described as a race easily influenced and as easily depressed, as deficient in perseverance and desirous of immediate success, as lacking in patience in adversity, as possessed of an almost inconceivable vigour for a period when their passions are aroused but rapidly becoming inert and lifeless when condemned to passivity; as daring in attack and weak in defence. These qualities, as will appear in the sequel, were well understood by the leaders.

The Russian soldier was of a very different type. Unimaginative, patient, obstinate, and enduring, traditionally addicted to the defence, a stolid fighter who did not easily recognise defeat, his military virtues were of a nature calculated in a long-drawn campaign to wear down those of his more brilliant adversary. He loved his Czar, but not the Government. The war had no interest for him; it was fought, he believed, for pecuniary interests in which he could not participate. In the home-country there were revolutionaries abroad who distributed seditious pamphlets

to the troops going to the front. The officers in the lower ranks were lacking in intelligence and initiative; not a few of them, as has been stated, were impregnated with the peace propaganda of Tolstoy. In the higher ranks promotion went by court favour rather than by merit; and heavy drinking was prevalent among both officers and men.

Leadership.—We must anticipate somewhat in dealing with the question of leadership. Marshal Oyama is appointed commander-in-chief of the Japanese army with Baron Kodama as chief of the staff. The character of the Japanese leader is somewhat shrouded in mist. Whether he is the puppet or the man who pulls the strings is uncertain; he stands before us only as the central figure of the great General Staff. That is perhaps the guise a modern leader will generally assume, for the machinery of war is now too complicated to be manipulated by one man alone. The leader must exercise a general supervision, and be responsible for the great decisions; but he is dependent, far more than formerly, on the loyal co-operation of his staff and subordinate commanders. If he has a strong personality and can impress it upon the army, he will be a powerful asset; but a nation may not depend for the attainment of its ends on the advent of a great commander, but rather upon adequate preparation. General Kuroki is given the 1st Army, and Generals Oku, Nogi, and Nodzu the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Armies respectively. These officers prove loyal and capable commanders; and there is no evidence of friction in the high command or between the high command and subordinate leaders.

Far otherwise is the case with the Russian leadership. Friction occurs between Alexiev and Kouropatkin when the latter is Minister of War. War breaks out and Kouropatkin is appointed—not Commander-in-Chief of the forces

in the Far East, but Commander of the Army in Manchuria, and, as such, under the control of the Viceroy, to whom he is senior in rank. "You will direct the operations," runs the Imperial rescript, "according to your own views, taking for guidance the general indications furnished by the Viceroy." He has been Chief of the Staff to the brilliant Skobelev and is known to be an able administrator, but he has yet to prove the possession of the strength of character necessary for high command. Pending his arrival, General Linievitch, the commander of the troops in the Amur and Maritime Provinces, assumes temporary command of the Manchurian army.

Finance.—The immensity of the internal resources of Russia enables her to borrow money on comparatively easy terms. This is not the case with Japan. Prior to 1894 her finances had been in a deplorable state. The indemnity from China improved matters, however, enabled her to enter the ranks of the gold-standard countries, and provided part of the funds necessary for preparation. At the outbreak of war Japanese Four per Cents were quoted in London, and in London only, at 76; whereas Russian Four per Cents were at 94. Fortunately for Japan, however, her Government was practically supreme in domestic as well as in international finance, because all the banks were semi-official, and she was thus well placed for securing accommodation from abroad. Moreover, the subtle enlistment of British and American sympathy was certain to prove of advantage in this respect. Russia, with all her wealth, dealt out money for preparation with a niggard hand. Japan, not bankrupt but at a low financial ebb, poured out gold freely for the equipment of her forces. Scarcity of money was, however, one cause of the slow and gradual mobilisation of her army. The excessive caution displayed in the early stages of the war may, moreover, have been

partly due to the conviction that defeat would render the flotation of foreign loans on anything like reasonable terms almost an impossibility.

Summary.—To summarise the situation: A small island nation, with an army and navy admirably organised and equipped for the task in hand, lay ready to strike a great continental Power, which had vast potential resources, but which was unready and unorganised and which would require many months to bring equal forces into play. On the one hand, soldiers thirsting for battle and for their nation's glory; on the other, soldiers driven to war in which they had no interest. Contemporary military judgment, outside of England, favoured the prospects of the Russians, but matters are clearer now. In reality, the chances of success in the early stages of the war were all in favour of the island power. Yet there was one grave doubt, and it must have oppressed the Japanese leaders. For centuries no Oriental nation had successfully withstood a European Power. Was that record to be broken?

CHAPTER III

THE SOLUTIONS OF THE STRATEGICAL PROBLEM

The value of preparation.—Modern war is a complicated affair. Its roots lie deep in the national life and draw strength from all its functions—from patriotism, religion, education, discipline, from national aims, from the systems of government, political economy, and finance. Where these are sound and strong, and where unity of purpose pervades a people, the weapons of war will be efficient. The temper of the weapons is the measure of the deserts of the nation. But these weapons cannot be forged in a day or a year, for the requirements of national forces are vast. There is thinking to be done, and a deal of it. This work is for the General Staff both of the Army and Navy—not to be attempted in water-tight compartments, but in co-operation one with the other, and with other departments of the State. There is discipline, the enforcement of which changes the mob to an army, and by which alone the supreme effort can be wrung from the soldier. There is armament, and the best is needed, lest physical inferiority produce a sense of moral depression. There is training both of first line and reserves in the use of arms and in the application of fire. There is the cult of physical fitness both in man and beast. There is organisation, without which the army cannot be led. There are mobilisation schemes to enable it to strike early, and transport arrangements that it may move and be supplied with food and ammunition.

All this requires prevision, money, and time. Prepara-

tion is a heavy premium for insurance against the losses of war. The premium is in money, but the insurance covers more than the loss of funds, for unsuccessful war lowers national prestige, weakens the national character, and may even lead to national atrophy. There are but few nations which could display the recuperative power shown by France after 1871, and it is to be noted that it is just those nations whose wealth permits of generous expenditure upon their armed forces which will suffer most severely by defeat and will find it most difficult to retrieve their losses.

These preliminary arrangements have acquired such importance that preparation of force is now a factor of higher value than application of force; that is to say, it will exercise a more potent influence on the campaign than will the strategy and tactics adopted after the initial deployment. The reason for this is clear. A quicker mobilisation, an earlier deployment on the frontier, a higher collective mobility, and a more efficient intelligence system will endow a belligerent with initiative and will enable him to destroy the independent will and freedom of action of his unready adversary. He is then in a position to carry out those plans which have been carefully elaborated in peace as most likely to conduce to the successful prosecution of the campaign. Victory must set the seal on preparation, but preparation increases the chances of success and lessens the penalties of defeat.

Russian preparation.—The first postulate for the successful prosecution of war is a definite national policy carried out unswervingly by the heads of the State acting in unison. At St. Petersburg this condition was not fulfilled. The desire for expansion and the disinclination to incur the expenses which expansion must entail caused repeated fluctuations of purpose. General Kouropatkin, the War Minister, was concentrating his energies on rendering efficient the army

on the western frontier, where his country might at any time become involved in a life-and-death struggle. He had a wholesome respect for Japan, inculcated on his visit to the Far East in 1902, and he was opposed to activity in Manchuria as tending to weaken the forces available for the main issue. When the quinquennial supplementary budget of 1904–9 allotted only seven out of a hundred and thirty million roubles to the army in the Far East he was as pleased as with a victory, although at the time of its passage news of an alarming nature was arriving. "I have succeeded," he wrote in his diary, less than two months before the outbreak of war, "in recalling our attention from the Far East to Russia in Europe." Because he himself was opposed to the Government policy, he refused to take cognisance of the fact that it must lead to war, and so neglected the necessary precautions.

On the other hand, we have Bezobrazov—late State Councillor—not a minister himself, but with great influence over the Foreign and Finance Ministers. He cares nothing for the western frontier. His business is a Timber Company and he wishes to further its interests. He manages to have the harbour of Dalny built at an expense of twenty million roubles; and to have Alexiev appointed to the Viceroyalty in the Far East and to the command of the naval and military forces there—a post not under the Minister of War. And all this is done without reference to Kouropatkin, who is nearly concerned and naturally annoyed; so much annoyed, indeed, that he sends in his resignation, which is not accepted.

Then the Foreign Minister, Count Lamsdorf, having become anxious about the results of his policy, orders a council to assemble in Port Arthur to consider preparations for war without regard to expense. Bezobrazov is on the council. He carries proposals for reinforcements of fifty

thousand men and a large expenditure on supplies and on the improvement of the railways. These proposals are forwarded by Alexiev. They are referred to Kouropatkin, who cuts down the money grant and reduces the reinforcements. So at headquarters there is no unity of aim. All are at cross purposes, and between Alexiev and Kouropatkin that friction has already arisen which is to exercise such a baneful influence on the Russian operations.

Not much political preparation is possible beyond *rapprochements* with Germany and Austria, and a tightening of the bonds with France. The policy of Japan has already roped in a ring, in which the two combatants must fight alone. Yet one effort Russia makes to enlist general sympathy. Alexiev and Lamsdorf arrange between them that the onus and discredit of the rupture of negotiations are to fall upon Japan. A cardinal error this in national strategy—willingly to discard the initiative. "Any middle course," says von Moltke, "leads to destruction; only the most absolute offensive to the goal."

Some of the reinforcements arrive before the outbreak of war, but they are at peace strength. Their reservists are in Europe; they have no transport; the batteries have but four obsolete guns and four wagons apiece. It is not business. Meanwhile the navy in Eastern waters has been gradually increased, till it is equal, on paper, to the Japanese navy. The Russian Intelligence Department too has not been idle. Large areas of Manchuria and Korea have been reconnoitred, but the maps and reports have been marked "Secret" and pigeon-holed; and, no arrangements having been made for their distribution, most of the Russian commanders have to take the field without them. No supply reconnaissances have been made, hence it is not known that there is ample food for man and beast in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Eastern Siberia, and supplies are conse-

quently brought from Western Siberia and Europe, thus burdening an already overtasked railway. Large numbers of four-wheeled wagons, quite unsuited to the country, are also sent out from Russia.

There is no secret service worthy of the name, and there are but few interpreters. The naval and military attachés at Tokio have indeed reported matters of common knowledge, such as the number of warships, number, distribution, and ostensible strength of divisions; but the reserve units and depot troops on which reliance is placed for expansion and replacement of casualties escape notice. Colonel Adabach, who was in Japan in 1903, mentions these formations; but his reports being of an unpleasant nature and at variance with those of the military attaché are discredited without any attempt at verification. The Russian plans of campaign, which have been carefully elaborated every year in accordance with the strength and distribution of the Russian forces and the estimated resources of Japan, are based therefore on false premises.

The Russian plans.—It was computed that at the opening of hostilities, the Japanese would only have available some 125,000 field troops, which might be expanded later to 400,000, whereas the figures should actually have been 280,000 and 750,000 respectively. The qualities of leadership of the generals and the efficiency of the troops were also underrated, and the martial and patriotic spirit that pervaded the nation was almost overlooked. The calculations of the naval experts were equally at fault. The chief of the military staff at Port Arthur, wishing to gauge the time that would be available for the concentration of the troops, put two questions to Admiral Vitgeft, the chief of the naval staff, regarding the possibility of Japanese landing operations. The reply was as follows: "Provided that our fleet is not destroyed, the two operations—that

is, disembarkations in the Gulf of Korea and at Yin-kou, are (except for small detachments landed from cruisers) absolutely impossible. But I think, personally, that, given even the present relative strengths, our fleet cannot be beaten either in the Gulf of Korea or in the Yellow Sea." Alexiev's military staff based their plans therefore on the expectation that hostile disembarkation could take place only on the southern and eastern coasts of Korea. They credited the Japanese with three possible plans of operations, that they would—

(*a*) Limit themselves to the solid occupation of Korea.

(*b*) Advance through Korea to Port Arthur.

(*c*) Attack Vladivostock and move on Kirin.

It was considered that the second operation would most probably be attempted, and measures were accordingly taken to circumvent it. It was decided to garrison Port Arthur with 12,000 troops and Vladivostock with 7000, to push forward a detaining force of some 18,000 troops to the Yalu, and to concentrate the remainder about Liao-yang and Hai-cheng. The position of the latter on the flank of the Japanese advance along the littoral should force the enemy to turn northwards against it. The Russian main army would then retire slowly, avoiding any decisive engagement, till the end of the seventh month, when the arrival of reinforcements would enable it to take the offensive with superior numbers.

Neither Linievitch nor Kouropatkin had a hand in these proposals. They took a less optimistic view of the situation, would have preferred to have dispensed with the detachment on the Yalu, to have concentrated as far back as Tieh-ling or Harbin, and there to have awaited the arrival of reinforcements. They urged, moreover, that Port Arthur should either be abandoned or very strongly garrisoned;

otherwise anxiety as to its security would certainly exercise a malign influence on the operations of the field army.

Comments on the Russian plans.—The plan of the Russian staff was in accordance with the traditional Russian policy of wearing down the enemy. It was, however, vitiated from the outset, not only by an underestimation of the material and moral strength of the Japanese forces, but also by a belief in the superiority of their navy and by the false conception of the value of a "fleet in being." But, even starting with these premises, was it logical to assume that the Japanese would push over 100,000 men through a roadless, mountainous, and inhospitable country, a distance of between 500 and 700 miles, carrying their own supplies and unable to form fresh bases on the coast? Was it not far more probable that they would limit themselves for the first year to the solid occupation of Korea, that they would build railways, accumulate supplies, and prepare for a fresh campaign in Manchuria? The chances of success would then depend on the number of Russian troops their action would draw into the theatre of operations.

Japanese preparations.—For nearly a decade after the treaty of Shimonoseki, the mind of the Japanese people had been bent on a war of revenge. No hardship was too severe, no sacrifice too great in pursuance of this end. Patriotism and discipline were inculcated in the schools, where, incidentally, the Russian language was very thoroughly taught. Military service was held in high honour, and the enlistment of a young Japanese was made the occasion of a feast in his family. In his diary after the war Kouropatkin wrote: "I cannot repeat it too often; the great element in the Japanese victory was the high morale of the people." National preparation was therefore an easy matter; the Government had merely to control the war-

spirit until the instrument was ready and the opportunity favourable.

The navy was built up on the British, the army on the German model, and both worked in close co-operation. At the outbreak of the war the new organisation was complete, the scheme of mobilisation had been worked out, and transport by land and sea had been calculated to the last ton. A quantity of supplies had already been dispatched to Korea and depots formed along the line Fu-san—Seoul. The press was controlled and great secrecy maintained, the result of which on the Russian plans has already been indicated. There were Japanese spies in every Russian station, and the whole of the probable theatre of operations had been reconnoitred and mapped. According to their Official History, the Japanese gauged very nearly the strength of the Russian forces in the Viceroyalty, but they underestimated the supplies available in Manchuria and the carrying capacity of the Siberian railway. Consequently, in the second period of the campaign, finding themselves opposed by greater forces than they had expected, they had to enrol 120,000 more conscripts. This was, however, written after the event and it would appear, from the exaggerated respect that they displayed for their unready adversary in the early land operations, that they had in reality considerably overestimated his strength in the Viceroyalty and had underrated his difficulties of mobilisation and concentration in that vast region.

The Japanese plans.—The appreciation of the situation made by the General Staff prior to the outbreak of hostilities may be deduced from the plan of campaign[1] outlined in their Official History of the War. It probably read as follows :—

[1] Translation, "Army Review," October, 1912.

1. The mobilised strength of the Russian forces in the Far East, exclusive of fortress artillery and engineers, amounts to 96 battalions, 75 squadrons, and 230 guns.

2. Bearing in mind the necessity of keeping a large force on the western frontier, the existing unrest in Russia, the paucity of supplies in Manchuria, and the limited carrying capacity of the Siberian railway, not more than 250,000 Russian troops (that is a force approximately equal to the Japanese Field Army) can be maintained in the theatre of operations.

3. There are two courses open to the enemy :—

(*a*) To concentrate the whole army at Harbin and advance south on completion of concentration.

In reply to this we must also concentrate and drive the enemy back.

(*b*) To collect the reinforcements only at Harbin, to utilise the troops now in the Viceroyalty to prevent our troops from overrunning Southern Manchuria, and to delay our northward advance till the army at Harbin is sufficiently strong to take the offensive.

This is the more probable course, and, as a counter-move, we must endeavour to overwhelm their covering forces.

4. The solution of the land problem must, however, depend largely on the result of the naval engagements.

At present the rival fleets are practically equal, but the Russians may receive reinforcements, whereas we can build no more ships. The Russian fleet may—(*a*) assemble in Port Arthur and await the arrival of reinforcements ; or (*b*) seek a decision at once ; or (*c*) await a favourable opportunity.

As (*a*) will be the least favourable to us we may expect its adoption.

In order to carry out a decisive campaign on land the security of our communications is essential, and this can only be obtained with the permanent command of the sea. The demands of naval strategy are therefore paramount, and hence we must be prepared to declare war at any moment in order to take advantage of any false move on the part of the Russian fleet, even though the season be unfavourable for land operations.

5. If the enemy allows us no good opening we must be content at first with the occupation of Korea. Our fleet and fortresses can control the Straits of Korea, and we can therefore safely land a division at Fu-san and march it on Seoul, where it can certainly anticipate the arrival of equal or superior Russian forces. We shall then have obtained the advantage of a secure footing on the continent and a gain in territory which the enemy cannot lightly wrest from us.

6. Beyond this point we can only define a course of procedure to be adopted should we obtain command of the sea.

In that event we should complete our occupation of Korea by landing two more divisions and marching the army constituted by the three divisions to the Yalu. On the right bank of that river it will be in a position threatening the railway by Liao-yang and Muk-den, and it will thus indirectly cover the disembarkation of our other armies on the Manchurian littoral.

7. The points to be chosen for disembarkation of the latter will depend on the residual power of offence of the defeated fleet, which may be expected to take shelter in Port Arthur. If this power be still considerable we must land the 2nd Army at Ta-ku-shan—that is, as far from the danger point as possible. If negligible, we might utilise the

mouth of the Ta-sha-ho or even Ta-lien-wan Bay. In either case the 2nd Army must form a base on the south-east coast of the Liao-tung which can be quickly linked up with the railway.

The 3rd Army will disembark at this point and will observe Port Arthur. Should there be any considerable number of Russian warships in the harbour, the fortress must be captured. The 4th Army will disembark between the 1st and 2nd Armies or about Yin-kou, and then the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Armies will advance in close co-operation on Liao-yang.

If operations begin in the spring Liao-yang should be captured in the autumn. This would close the first period of the campaign. The army would winter north of the Liao-yang, rest and refit. In the following spring operations would be renewed and the enemy sought out and crushed.

Comments.—It is difficult to know how much credence to attach to a history written by the winning side at a period when most of the principal actors are still living, or how far the victors in any great war will disclose the methods by which they achieved success.

The operations in the first period were carried out almost entirely in accordance with the plan given in the history, but it is possible that in some points conception followed execution. Whether or no the Japanese staff saw so far into the future is, however, not a matter of profitable discussion. In considering any war problem prior to the opening of hostilities imaginative forecasts have no great value, the two main points to strive for in this respect being :—

(i.) To have a workable scheme ready to put into instant operation, suited to the situation and to the means available

(ii.) To have a staff so well trained that at every change of the situation they can frame a plan to meet the altered conditions and quickly work out the necessary staff arrangements for its execution.

Moltke has never been blamed for failing to foresee Sédan; but the German General Staff have been severely censured for their handling of the great Right Wheel west of Verdun. The most unconvincing part of the Japanese plan is that which relates to the siege of Port Arthur. They believed, as already stated, that the whole Russian fleet would remain in Port Arthur awaiting the arrival of reinforcements, yet they strive to explain that the siege was not really part of the original plan, but was an unfortunate necessity, which affected deleteriously the operations of the field armies.

It would almost seem that the Historical Section of the Japanese Staff was disturbed by the criticisms levelled by military writers against Oyama's supposed faulty strategy in disobeying, by the simultaneous pursuit of a double objective, the grand principle of concentration of effort. Reasoning without the aid of the Official History, it would appear that Korea, which could be occupied without obtaining the command of the sea, was the first objective. Then, as soon as the naval situation would allow, Port Arthur was to be captured in order to ensure the permanent command of the sea, without which the Japanese field armies might die of inanition. Russia was unlikely to surrender these territories lightly, and battles would consequently ensue. On the result of these, new plans would have to be framed, of which the general idea of a converging movement on Liao-yang would form the basis.

The general situation.—Consequent upon the preparations and plans on either side, the general situation immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities was as follows:

The Russian main fleet in Port Arthur, four large cruisers in Vladivostock, a cruiser and a gunboat in Chemul-po. The Japanese battle fleet concentrated at Sasebo.

The Russian army, strength about 120,000, widely dispersed over the viceroyalty and undergoing a process of reorganisation and redistribution.

The Japanese field army, strength on mobilisation about 260,000, in its home stations. A division in Formosa and a few companies on police duty in Korea. Shipping available for the transport of five divisions at a time.

CHAPTER IV

THE OPENING PHASES OF THE CAMPAIGN

The outbreak of war.—At 9 a.m. on the 6th February—that is to say, seven hours before Count Lamsdorf receives notification of the rupture of negotiations—the Japanese fleet in Sasebo weighs anchor and detaches a small squadron to convoy transports carrying four battalions at peace strength to Korea. Early on the 9th this detachment is landed at Che-mul-po and two battalions are railed at once to Seoul. The two small Russian warships in the harbour, left there for political purposes, and without warning of the impending struggle, are sunk.

On the night of the 8–9th Admiral Togo sends a destroyer flotilla to attack the fleet lying at anchor in the Port Arthur roadstead. The affair is not well managed. It may be that the crews are over-excited. It is certain that a large number of torpedoes fail to explode, possibly owing to mechanical faults; but nevertheless, three battleships are torpedoed, and with this one stroke Japan obtains the command of the sea. The blockade of Port Arthur begins.

Fresh Russian plans.—The defeat of the Russian fleet creates a new situation. Alexiev adheres to his belief in the value of a "fleet in being" and is averse to a change of plan. He would like to hold the Yalu obstinately, and he insists that the continued occupation of Southern Manchuria is necessary from a political, even if it be dangerous from a military, point of view.

Kouropatkin would prefer to concentrate at Tieh-ling,

but, later, modifies his views to meet those of the Viceroy, and suggests :—

(*a*) The reinforcement of the garrison of Port Arthur

(*b*) A demonstration by one brigade with cavalry on the Yalu.

(*c*) A detachment of one brigade to watch the Yin-kou littoral.

(*d*) A central group about Liao-yang.

Eventually the decision is arrived at to bring the troops in Kuan-tung up to thirty battalions and to form two advanced guards, to be named respectively the Southern and Eastern Detachments, and each to consist of eighteen battalions, one about Yin-kou and one to demonstrate on the Yalu.

Rumours.—The early days of the war are "characterised by an abundance of fantastic rumours." On the 12th February alone official reports are received at Russian Headquarters that landings are taking place at An-tung, Ta-ku-shan, Yin-kou, Kai-ping (all ice-bound at this season), and at Shang-hai-kouan, and that Japanese patrols have been seen north of Hsin-min-tun. Then, on the 15th, a report from one Captain Potoulóv, "40 miles to the west of the Yalu, in the direction of Hai-cheng, in a narrow défile in the mountains, the enemy has laid some mines ; near the electric exploder a single Japanese is seated in the mountains." On the 16th a correction follows : "The mines are on a plain, near some old Chinese trenches ; the Japanese is seated on the plain ; he will see the movement of the column "—and presumably will blow it up. If these be samples of official reports, what of the unofficial ? The Russian Intelligence Department is having a bad time.

The attitude of China causes some anxiety. On the

18th she declares her neutrality, and a neutral line is defined running along the railway from Yin-kou by Kou-pang-tsu to Hsin-min-tun and thence up the Liao-ho and along the Mongolian-Manchurian frontier. Repeated rumours of her probable intervention are, however, prevalent, and the advance towards the frontier of some 20,000 regular troops, under General Ma, lending colour to the reports, necessitates the detachment of a force to the Liao-ho. There is also a constant fear of a combined Japanese and Chinese advance against the Russian right flank from the Gulf of Liao-tung by Hsin-min-tun on Muk-den. The European, and particularly the British press, fosters the idea, and the Japanese further it by landing a small detachment at Shang-hai-kouan with the ostensible object of preparing for this operation. The Russian Embassy too at Pekin reports that the Japanese Government has warned China to remove the population of Yin-kou in view of the approaching conflict there.

Then a squadron makes an apparently futile bombardment of Vladivostock, with the result that a division due for Liao-yang is retained by the Viceroy at Harbin, ready for dispatch to the Maritime Province if required. Kouropatkin objects—he wants his army in Manchuria to be as strong as possible—but he is overruled. Mitschenko from Korea fixes the strength of the 1st Japanese Army at four divisions. The formation of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Armies is ascertained, and conjecture is rife as to their composition and destinations. Kouropatkin, almost distracted, sends a piteous appeal to St. Petersburg begging that, to obtain information, money may be lavishly expended on secret agencies.

Six possible Japanese plans and the necessary countermoves are debated in a council at Muk-den. Students of Jomini and Clausewitz are there in plenty, and make full

use of the old catch-words: they will act on interior lines; they will retire and gain freedom of action; they will manœuvre for an opening; they will operate on both banks of a river, etc.; but, with scarce an item of sure information on which to build, the conference ends in confusion of thought and uncertainty of purpose. Intrenchments are everywhere thrown up; bridges and bridge-heads built; roads to all points of the compass made or improved; and of all this labour a great quantity must go to waste. Defeat at sea, the loss of the initiative, and the lack of an efficient secret service are taking a heavy toll in penalties.

Japanese operations in Korea.—On the 6th February orders are issued for the mobilisation of the Guard, 2nd and 12th Divisions. On the 15th, the 12th Division sails from Nagasaki and, by the 21st, has completed its disembarkation at Che-mul-po. The original intention had been to land this division at Fu-san and to march it on Seoul, and supply depots had been formed before the war along the route. The success at Port Arthur makes such a procedure unnecessary. Troops are dispatched to occupy Ma-san-po, Fu-san, and Gen-san, and on the 23rd the cavalry of the 12th Division reaches Ping-yang. By the middle of March there is a strong outpost line on the Che-chen river and the main body is north of Ping-yang. By the 29th the Guard and 2nd Division have landed at Chi-nam-po, which is now ice-free.

Kuroki arrives on the 17th March and issues orders for the bridging of the Ta-ing and Che-chen rivers. A strong advanced guard is pushed northwards, but supply difficulties necessitate its reduction in strength and the formation along the coast of supply depots, notably at Ri-ka-ho. The advanced guard is in some danger; it has to be maintained in its isolated position, not to protect the army, but

to cover the disembarkation of guns and stores at Ri-ka-ho. Practically no opposition is met with and, by the 13th April, the advanced guard (3 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 12 guns) is concentrated at Wi-ju. There it lies for five days unsupported and at the mercy of a force treble its strength on the far bank of the Yalu; but the Russians let slip this favourable opportunity of drawing first blood.

Meanwhile the main body moves heavily forward. The single possible road is a morass, and carts sink to the axles. A storm on the 9th stops movements for two days; the bridge over the Ta-ing is swept away; Japanese soldiers, working all night up to their necks in ice-cold water, pile huge stones on the Che-chen bridge and, by thus sinking it, save it from destruction. Eventually the whole force, with the exception of a flank-guard to the north-east, concentrates near Wi-ju on the 20th April; and the most careful measures are initiated to bring about the destruction of the Russian force about An-tung.

Mitschenko's operations.—General Mitschenko's force to oppose the Japanese advance consists at first of two regiments of Cossacks. One regiment is left to watch the coast from Pi-tzu-wo to An-tung; the other pushes patrols across the Yalu on the 15th February. On the 22nd, on the arrival of an additional regiment and field battery, a reconnaissance is made towards Ping-yang. The battery is sent back owing to the difficult nature of the country, and an application made for mountain guns is refused. Ping-yang is found to be occupied, but no attempt is made to pass east or west of it towards Seoul and Che-mul-po and, consequently, no information of value is obtained.

On the 25th Kouropatkin becomes anxious on account of Mitschenko's advanced position and tells Linievitch to order him to withdraw to Wi-ju. Alexiev has not been consulted and is annoyed at the retirement—another cause

of friction. By the 6th March the main body is back at Wi-ju. A few reconnaissances are executed later by three or four squadrons towards An-ju. One small skirmish takes place, but, as a rule, the Japanese cavalry flatly refuses an encounter, and either entrenches itself in the villages, whence it cannot be driven out without gun-fire, or keeps line with the infantry. Cossack patrols ride up to the limit of rifle range of the advanced troops but can get no further. Only one piece of exact information is gained, and that from an American missionary. It concerns the strength and distribution of the 12th Division. On the 2nd April, two days before the arrival of Asada's cavalry at Wi-ju, Mitschenko withdraws his force across the Yalu to join the eastern detachment which has been slowly assembling on the right bank.

Comments on the Korean operations.—The Japanese advance, impeded by immense natural difficulties, was slow and laborious. It would have been much slower if serious opposition had been encountered. Had the Russians formed bridge-heads on the Yalu and made arrangements for bridging the stream on the break up of the ice, they would have imposed greater caution on Kuroki and would have made certain of Mitschenko's safe withdrawal across the river, anxiety as to which had set limitations to his undertakings.

The Cossacks showed neither enterprise nor cunning. The very difficulty of the country lent itself to surprise and to the independent action of adventurous patrols. Their lack of enterprise may, however, be ascribed in part to faults of leadership. Mitschenko was warned by Linievitch to be prudent and was accused by Alexiev of overcaution. He advanced boldly, only to be ordered to retire. It is an old platitude, but none the less true, that indecision at headquarters is quickly communicated to subordinates.

Naval actions.—During this period the Japanese have been making gallant but ineffectual efforts to block the entrance to Port Arthur. Admiral Makharov—the new Russian naval chief—arrives from Europe and inspires his sailors with fresh life. He leaves the harbour and tries to entice the Japanese fleet to battle under the guns of the fortress. But Admiral Togo is taking no risks; he sows the Russian cruising ground with mines, one of which the flagship strikes and goes down with the gallant Makharov and 600 men.

Alexiev is then appointed to the temporary command of the fleet, and transfers his headquarters from Muk-den to Port Arthur. He, who was formerly content with a weak garrison for the fortress, becomes, now that it is his own particular province, almost painfully solicitous for its safety. He insists on reinforcements, and informs Kouropatkin that if Port Arthur is besieged it must be relieved at all costs.

Admiral Kawamura with a small squadron is seeking the Vladivostock cruisers, but they manage to evade him; they sink a transport and cause some consternation along the coasts of Japan. That their action, however, occasions no real anxiety for the safety of the sea communications is shown by the fact that about this time the 2nd Army is transported to Korea.

The general situation at the end of April.—The Japanese have carried out their plans so far without a hitch. They have obtained the command of the sea, and Korea is wholly in their hands. Near Wi-ju, Kuroki has concentrated 39,000 men, to be supported if required by 40,000 under Oku, now in transports at Chi-nam-po. The dispersion of the Russian troops has been accentuated by the new naval situation and by the "abundance of fantastic rumours." They are distributed in five main groups—

20,000 about Yin-kou, 27,000 in the Kuan-tung, 23,000 on the Yalu, 23,000 about Vladivostock, and some 30,000 only in the zone of concentration about Liao-yang. The mobilisation and reorganisation of the Far Eastern units are, however, nearly complete, and the Russian army may be said to have weathered without much buffeting a dangerous phase of the campaign.

Comments.—The uniform success of the Japanese has to a great extent disarmed criticism ; but it must be admitted that their initial operations were decidedly slow, more especially when the importance of the time factor is borne in mind. It has been pointed out (page 18) that the state of the finances was to a certain extent responsible for this. A poor country, Japan had to get full value for her money ; and every unit mobilised before required must entail useless expenditure. But it may be assumed that, if their plans had required it, they would have mobilised their troops as quickly as shipping for transport became available. They had poured out gold too freely in preparation to justify a contrary belief. We must therefore look elsewhere for the origin of their lack of enterprise. Japanese contemporary writers show clearly that the rank and file of the army were permeated with an intense desire to close at once with the enemy. But how was it with the leaders ? They had confidence in their navy, for Japan is an island nation, and the Russian fleet had proved at its last manœuvres to be inefficient and of low mobility. At sea the Japanese had been greatly daring but on land almost dilatory, although their secret service had given them good intelligence of the enemy's difficulties.

The war has lasted close on three months and, though the command of the sea has long been assured, only three divisions have been landed. With them, Kuroki is making very careful preparations to attack a force known to be

less than half his strength. But the leaders are not yet happy. This great white nation may take no account of numbers; so Oku is dispatched to Chi-nam-po to be at hand in case of defeat. Yet could matters have been hastened? At Pi-tzu-wo and to the south, the coast has been ice-free for a month. Ta-lien-wan Bay and the Port of Dalny are permanently ice-free, and were unprotected for some weeks by mines or forts. Might not troops have been landed at or near Dalny early in February, and Port Arthur seized by a *coup de main?* The defences at that time were but slight. Surprise is a great asset, and the garrison, about 16,000 strong, distributed about the Kuan-tung, might have been cut in two. Kouropatkin, whose military judgment was eminently sound when far from the scene of conflict, expected such an event. The advantages to be gained were obvious: the capture of the Russian fleet; a solid base for further operations along the railway; facilities for an advance, possibly to Harbin, before Russian reinforcements could arrive in large numbers from Europe. There were grave risks; but great results are seldom obtainable without. Granting, however, that the success of such an operation was dependent too much on chance, troops could still have been landed a full month earlier near Pi-tzu-wo or Kai-ping; and time was all important. But no! All was to be made sure for the first battle—an excellent precept in some cases, but here perhaps carried too far. Beyond the 1st Army no troops were to be risked ashore till that battle was decided. The truth is that the leaders in Tokio were very much afraid of the Russian soldier, and it was long before this fear wore off.

CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE OF THE YALU

The Valley of the Yalu.—A sketch plan of the battle-field will be found on page 51. The Yalu is a broad and deep river, quite unfordable in its lower reaches except at a point a few miles above An-ping-ho, where the Japanese turning column crossed in 1894. Opposite An-tung and Chiu-lien-cheng the valley is 4 to 5 miles wide and "consists of a sandy plain broken up into many islands," which facilitate greatly the passage of troops. The right bank dominates the left, but, on the other hand, the Hu-shan Mountains command the hills on the right bank of the Ai-ho. Further north, rugged spurs running down to the right bank of the Yalu interfere greatly with lateral communications and render the task of cavalry watching the river arduous and exhausting. Here also some rough tracks converge on Kuan-tien-cheng (see Map I), whence a road runs through Sai-ma-chi, furnishing the shortest route from the Yalu to Liao-yang.

The Yalu position.—The position taken up by the Russians, from An-tung by Chiu-lien-cheng to Chin-kou, is one of exceptional natural strength. Along its front the field of fire is unbroken except by low scrub and a few low sand ridges on the islands. The main stream of the Yalu is here about 400 and the Ai-ho about 90 yards in width; and the latter is fordable only in the neighbourhood of islands. The position suffers, however, from some serious defects. The ridges, instead of

following the course of the stream, shoot out a series of rough spurs perpendicular to it, thus interfering with lateral communication and denying to the artillery good positions, for guns when using direct fire must either be too much exposed or have a limited arc of fire; communications within the position are few and bad; the line of retreat to Feng-huang-cheng follows a single road passing through a defile at Ha-ma-tang. To this point from Chin-kou runs a valley road which it is important to guard in order to secure a safe retreat through the defile. A rough track running from Chin-kou to Liu-chia-kou furnishes a line of retreat to troops manning the left section of the defences.

There is a second position with a good field of fire along the right bank of the Han-tu-ho-tzu facing east, but it can have no value against an enveloping attack unless the ground north of Ha-ma-tang be held. At the fork of the two rivers, joined by a col to the Hu-shan Mountains, stands a prominent feature called Tiger Hill, from which, if in Russian possession, the Japanese movements may be closely watched and their bridging operations interrupted, but which in an enemy's hands may furnish an excellent pivot for the attack. Generally speaking, the Yalu position is strong, but owing to the breadth of the obstacle and indifferent internal communications is suited only to a purely passive defence. A scheme for its fortification, drawn up in January, still after ten weeks' occupation awaits execution. The trenches are shallow, clearly visible, and ill-sited, unprovided with head-cover and untraversed against enfilade fire. These matters indicate contempt of the enemy and carelessness or lack of strength in the commander, and will reap a retribution as sure in war as in other spheres of human activity. Frozen ground might furnish an excuse till the end of March, but in the

succeeding month the Russians do less spade work than their opponents accomplish in two days.

The Russian Eastern Detachment.—Towards the end of April the Eastern Detachment, comprising some 15,000 infantry, 600 mounted scouts, 2500 cavalry, with 62 guns, is distributed from Pi-tzu-wo by Ta-ku-shan and An-tung toward the upper reaches of the Yalu for a distance of about 170 miles. On the 22nd April, General Zasulich, its new commander, arrives. The mission given him is "to retard the enemy in his passage; to determine his strength, dispositions, and lines of march; to retreat as slowly as possible into the mountains," there to renew an obstinate resistance. Later directions from Kouropatkin enjoin firmness combined with prudence in opposing the passage, and warn Zasulich to avoid a decisive battle with superior forces.

The situation before Zasulich is by no means clear. Kuroki's main body is known to be about Wi-ju, but the presence of a considerable body of Japanese troops is reported as far north as Chyang-syang (see Map I), in which neighbourhood two small mixed detachments have crossed the river. This lends colour to the report from the Russian secret-service agent that Kuroki intends to leave a masking force near Wi-ju and to march the rest of the 1st Army by Kuan-tien-cheng and Sai-ma-chi on Liao-yang. Then also a number of junks are being collected by the Japanese at the mouth of the Yalu, and a small flotilla there is making constant demonstrations. The attack may therefore fall on right, centre, or left. On the 26th, Zasulich decides on the following distribution of his troops:—

(*a*) At An-tung, 3 battalions, 400 mounted scouts, 8 guns, and 8 machine-guns, under General Kashtalinski.

(*b*) At and north of Chiu-lien-cheng, under General Trusov, 6 battalions, 16 guns, and 200 mounted scouts.

(*c*) At Tien-tzu, in reserve, 6 battalions and 16 guns.

(*d*) At and near An-ping-ho, under Colonel Trukhin, 1¼ battalions, 11 squadrons, and 8 mountain guns.

(*e*) Further to the north, Madritov's detachment of 2 squadrons and some mounted scouts.

(*f*) On the right flank, as far as Ta-ku-shan, under General Mitschenko, 2½ battalions, 8½ squadrons, and 14 guns.

In order to make clear his intention of fighting a prudent battle, Zasulich dispatches some of the second-line transport to the rear, thus reducing the food supply available, and informs Kashtalinski and Trusov that, should the Japanese succeed in crossing the river, he has no intention of employing his reserve, as he wishes to keep it fresh for further combats, and that they must therefore retain strong local reserves.

Japanese preparations for the attack.—On the Japanese side the 1st Army concentrates near Wi-ju. Great precautions are taken to maintain secrecy. Screens of kaoliang and brushwood are erected to conceal the strength and dispositions and movements of troops. No such application of forestry to war has been seen since Birnam Wood advanced on Dunsinane. Orders are issued that any soldier, except a sentry, who shows himself is to be shot. A flank guard (3 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 12 guns) under General Sasaki is lining the Yalu some miles north of An-ping-ho to repel any attempt on the part of Russian patrols to cross the river. Kuroki is in no hurry. He has been told to force a passage about the 30th, and that then he may have to wait a month before the 2nd

Army is ready to combine with him from the Liao-tung in offensive operations. Careful reconnaissances are therefore made, and result in a very close approximation to the enemy's strength and distribution. The Russians, it is true, afford every facility, both by showing themselves freely, by constructing the most visible of trenches, and by letting off their guns at every tempting target.

On the 26th, Ky-uri and Kin-tei islands are captured, hostile scouts being driven helter-skelter off them; and the loss of these islands leads the Russians to evacuate Tiger Hill. This important point is promptly occupied by their opponents, and its possession enables the latter to send patrols into the Hu-shan Mountains, who report that the ground, though difficult, can be traversed by a force of all arms. On the 26th and 27th a bridge is thrown between Wi-ju and Kin-tei island. It is intended as a blind and succeeds, for the Russians think it the prelude to an attack on their right flank. Ten bridges in all are built, four of which—A, B, C, D (see Plan)—are completed by the 28th.

Kuroki now issues his orders for the attack. The 12th Division is to cross on the night of the 29th opposite An-ping-ho, then to swing to its left through the mountains and, throwing out a flank guard westward, is to form on the line of the Ai-ho, facing south. On the 1st May it is to ford the river and to attack the left of the Russian position. The 2nd Division, moving by bridges C, A, E, F, is to take up a line on Chu-ko-dai, leaving its artillery to come into action on Ky-uri. The Guards, following the 2nd Division, are to form up between it and the 12th Division. Twenty 4·7 howitzers are to be moved on to Kin-tei. The reserve is to take post on O-se-ki and on Kin-tei. All troops are to be in position at dawn on the 1st May.

On the 29th, Sasaki's flank-guard, which has moved south, attacks the small Russian detachment at An-ping-ho. The latter falls back north-west—that is, away from Zasulich—for the bogey of a Japanese advance on Saima-chi is still troubling the minds of the Russian leaders. During the night the river is bridged near An-ping-ho. The 12th Division from Wi-ju crosses and, moving in two columns, reaches its allotted positions unopposed by nightfall on the 30th.

Preliminary actions.—On the 29th a small force of Russians suddenly seizes Tiger Hill, but evacuates it again on the 30th on the approach of the 12th Division, whose advance they are the first to discover. On the morning of the 30th two Russian batteries open fire in succession and, for the first time, draw a reply from the Japanese guns and howitzers, by which they are successively and quickly silenced, one gun being disabled. The howitzers are so well concealed that the Russians believe them to be firing from Wi-ju, and do not discover their error till the publication of the British accounts of the battle.

Towards evening the Japanese artillery bombards the positions about Chiu-lien-cheng for two or three hours, and, though causing no loss in the trenches, is fortunate enough to drop some shell into a bivouac, killing or wounding over seventy Russians. During the night all the bridges are completed, and, by dawn on the 1st May, the 2nd Division lies entrenched within 2000 yards of the Russian position. On its right the Guards reach their allotted posts by 5 a.m. and likewise entrench.

The Russian final dispositions.—Meanwhile the Russians, leaders and men, have been suffering in morale. Rumours multiply: Mitschenko anticipates a crossing on the right, Trukhin magnifies the forces on the left; Trusov keeps his men three days and three nights in their trenches, begs

permission to retire, and repeatedly calls for reinforcements. On the 28th he and Trukhin are relieved of their commands, and Kashtalinski takes charge of the whole front of battle from An-tung to Chin-kou. Leaving the largest group still at An-tung, he disposes the remainder as follows :—

Right Section. From Chiu-lien-cheng to Yao-kou : 4 battalions, 1 battery.

Left Section. From Ma-kao through Po-te-tien-tzu to Chin-kou, under Colonel Gromov : 3¼ battalions, 1 battery.

After the cannonade on the 30th, Kashtalinski applies for permission to retire to the position on the right bank of the Han-tu-ho-tzu. Zasulich, however, suspects another case of loss of nerve and refuses. He anticipates another day's bombardment before the assault, and has been told by Kouropatkin that every day is precious. On the left all contact with the enemy has been lost, and no reports have been sent in. After slight actions at and about An-ping-ho 11 squadrons, 1¼ battalions, and 8 guns retire towards Sai-ma-chi and disappear from the scene of conflict. Thus there is not a Russian trooper available for reconnaissance or for battle.

On the evening of the 30th the machine-guns and some mounted scouts are sent to the local reserve behind Chiu-lien-cheng ; otherwise no change of dispositions is made, although, during the night, the rumbling of wheels is distinctly heard, and Kashtalinski again asks for permission to withdraw to the second position. Thus the whole force of the attack of some 30,000 troops, ably led and inspired with confidence, is to fall upon 5000 hungry and demoralised men, who are distributed over a front of some 6 miles and are to expect no reinforcement from the reserve. It requires no spirit of prophecy to forecast the issue of the conflict.

The battle.—At 5.20 a.m. on the 1st May the batteries on Kin-tei open fire on the Chiu-lien-cheng position and bombard it for twenty minutes. Then silence reigns till about 7 a.m., when infantry and guns at Ma-kao open fire on the troops on Chu-ko-dai. The Russian guns are at once silenced; and this success induces Kuroki, who had intended to wait till the pressure of the 12th Division should make itself felt on the Russian left, to order the advance of the Guard and 2nd Divisions.

No rifleman could want a better target than blue coats against a yellow ground; yet the gallant Japanese cross the fire-swept zone with comparatively few casualties. The Ai-ho is breast-high; in places even up to the neck; nevertheless, by 9 a.m., the Guard and 2nd Divisions are on the right bank. The Russian troops of the right section are withdrawn with some difficulty to the right bank of the Han-tu-ho-tzu, where they succeed in repelling a further advance.

Further north, Gromov holds out about Po-te-tien-tzu till 9 a.m., when his right is turned by the Guard at Ma-kao and his left, and line of retreat on Ching-kou, threatened by the advance of the 12th Division. He then arranges to fall back to a second position, but his guns, for some unknown reason, gallop off towards Chiu-lien-cheng and are captured, while the infantry retreats in disorder in all directions, the majority being collected later at Lao-fang-kou.

Thus, at 9 a.m., the first Russian position has been captured, and two and a half Japanese divisions, including the general reserve and a couple of batteries, which have crossed to Chiu-lien-cheng, are on a line extending from that village to and beyond Po-te-tien-tzu. According to some authorities, Kuroki at this hour issues the first order for the pursuit—the 2nd Division on An-tung, the Guard

on Ha-ma-tang; but the Han-tu-ho-tzu position looks formidable and cannot be reached by artillery from the islands, so a long halt takes place.

At 9.30 a.m. Zasulich directs the troops at An-tung to retire, and, at 10 a.m., dispatches two battalions of the 11th Regiment and a battery to the Han-tu-ho-tzu to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the troops from that position. About this time Kashalinski hears, quite by chance, that Gromov has been routed. His left is uncovered; troops are seen advancing towards Lao-fang-kou. He immediately orders the two battalions of the 11th Regiment to hill 570, sends back the battery that was with them, and, picking up a stray company of Gromov's, places it on the northern slopes of hill 570 facing north to cover the valley road from Chin-kou. A quick and soldierly decision this; but, unfortunately for the Russians, the company abandons its post at once and the battalions of the 11th Regiment are forestalled in the occupation of the hill by a Japanese company.

The northern portion of the battlefield now claims our attention. At 10 a.m. the right of the 12th Division attacks Chin-kou, and the battalion and two guns, posted there, fall back in good order to join Gromov at Lao-fang-kou. That officer, in pursuance of his instructions to retire by Liu-chia-kou, sends off four companies in that direction, but, on an order from Zasulich, recalls them and retires westwards across the mountains to the main road. Gromov's command has not distinguished itself, but it manages, nevertheless, to exercise a strong and peculiar influence on the battle. Retreating from Po-te-tien-tzu, it draws the left of the 12th Division towards the west and north-west. Then the right of the same division spies the companies moving towards Liu-chia-kou, and, thinking a large force of Russians is trying to escape in that direction,

Plan III.

THE BATTLE of the YALU
1st. May 1904.



endeavours to cut off its retreat. The result is that the division, already worn out by hard marching since the 28th, becomes still more exhausted by these pursuits in a hilly country and, moreover, finds itself deployed in a direction neither contemplated in the general scheme nor useful for bringing about a rapid decision. The independent action of the 5th Company of the 24th Regiment, which marches south and seizes the north-western spur of hill 570, alone saves the Japanese plans from miscarriage and prevents the Russian force from being withdrawn unpenalised for mistakes.

Kuroki arrives at Chiu-lien-cheng about 11.30 a.m. and repeats his orders for the pursuit; but the Japanese advance does not begin before 2 p.m. Shortly before that hour Kashtalinski evacuates the line of the Han-tu-ho-tzu and, while the 11th Regiment is attacking the 5/24th Company, pushes his force through the Ha-ma-tang defile to the Feng-huang-cheng road. The batteries are, however, unable to escape and remain to assist the rearguard. All efforts to dislodge the Japanese company prove fruitless. That gallant little band, though suffering heavily, holds on till portions of the Guard and general reserve, in their converging advance, relieve it of its duties and encircle the devoted rearguard. The latter fights desperately till 5 p.m. before surrendering, and by its gallant resistance gains time for the withdrawal of the whole of Zasulich's force, including the An-tung detachment.

The Russian casualties in the battle amount to 2190, and they lose also 22 guns and 8 machine-guns. The Japanese casualties number 1036.

After the battle.—There is no attempt at pursuit. The Japanese remain for several days in the captured position. Then their cavalry, pushing ahead, enters Feng-huang-cheng on the 6th May, followed by the bulk of the 1st Army

on the 10th. There they remain for a considerable period, collecting transports and supplies. On the 12th a small detachment occupies Kuan-tien-cheng (Map I). The Russians have meanwhile been retreating in all haste. The troops from An-tung cover the retreat and retire in good order. But further to the rear a rumour of the approach of Japanese cavalry causes a terrible panic among the trains. Wagons are abandoned, the drivers galloping away; troops fire in all directions at imaginary enemies and Cossack posts fly off without even saddling up. Some semblance of order is restored at Feng-huang-cheng, and then the retreat is continued. Another panic takes place further north; the troops fire into one another and cause many casualties. Eventually on the 7th May the force reaches the East Fen-shui-ling pass (Map II), 70 miles north of the battle-field, without having been disturbed by the enemy *en route*.

The greater part of the cavalry on the right and left fall back to Feng-huang-cheng, whence Mitschenko and Kartsev are dispatched to the front again, the one towards Ta-ku-shan and the other to cover the route to Sai-ma-chi.

Strategical comments.—The problem before the Russian commander was essentially one of time and space. He estimated that six months was required for the concentration of sufficient troops to enable him to take the offensive with superior forces. He must, therefore, either calculate the furthest limit attainable by the enemy in the required period and fix his zone of concentration north of that point, or he must fix the zone to the south and gain the necessary time by the use of advanced detachments. Kouropatkin—the soldier—inclined to the former method, but was overruled by Alexiev—the politician—who preferred to risk almost certain defeat rather than abandon territory. Having

agreed somewhat unwillingly to the Viceroy's wishes, Kouropatkin fixed his zone about Liao-yang, and insisted that the force on the Yalu should do nothing but demonstrate. Alexiev would have preferred resistance, but ultimately concurred.

Now, "demonstrate" is one of those dangerous semi-military terms which may or may not have a particular meaning. A demonstrating force must have great mobility in order to be able to show itself at many points and to withdraw hastily if required. Obviously, therefore, a mounted force is indicated. But an active adversary will soon discover that he is opposed only by cavalry, and will brush it aside. If it be known, however, that infantry is present, he will proceed more cautiously—that is, he will spend more time over his advance. Clearly, then, infantry is required. But again, infantry, pushed forward far from support, must be in considerable strength or it may be overwhelmed. It would seem, therefore, that a large force of infantry is necessary. Thus Kouropatkin apparently reasoned: first cavalry only; then cavalry and one division; finally cavalry and two divisions—in all, about 20,000 men.

The detachment of so large a force is, however, open to grave objections. In the first place, the Commander-in-Chief is apt to expect from it something more than a mere demonstration. He will not be distressed even if it inflicts a serious check upon the enemy. Kouropatkin's instructions to Zasulich have already been quoted (page 44). They are as clear as a subordinate may usually expect; and, later on, Zasulich in his defence allows this, but adds that a better than he was required for their execution. His was no light task, indeed, for in executing such orders the most prudent leader will find that the more firmly he resists the more likely he is to become engaged with superior forces.

Then, again, the commander of the detachment is probably enjoying his first command in war and is proud of it; and to retreat without striking a blow will require a large measure of self-abnegation. The troops also are burning "to have a knock" at their opponents; and it requires a strong man to restrain them. Thus the demonstrating detachment contains all the elements of a fighting force. Now, if this force fights, it renders itself *ipso facto* liable to be beaten; and it is noteworthy that in war these detachments nearly always are beaten. Moreover, defeat 150 miles from support may easily spell annihilation. Had the worst happened to the eastern detachment, the Manchurian field army would have been reduced in strength by nearly 30 per cent. But defeat of any kind in the first serious encounter has an influence on the course of the campaign that cannot be measured in percentages. The loss on the one side and gain on the other in morale, prestige, and trust in leadership are incalculably great; and in this case greater even than usual, for the victor is an Oriental nation, a nation doubtful as yet of its own power, and whose troops the Russian soldier had regarded with contempt.

It is not intended to convey the impression that advanced detachments should never be used, for there is no rule in war except that every man should do his best. Much depends on the commander—a Ney may succeed where a Zasulich fails—and much on national characteristics and the training of the troops. Twenty thousand Boers on the Yalu would have given Kuroki ample food for thought The Russian foot-soldier is, however, a dogged fighter whose virtues shine brighter in resistance than in demonstration; and of the Cossack it may be said that he has neither the qualities of the regular trooper nor those of the good partisan.

On the subject of detachments it is curious to note a remark made by the Czar early in the war: "Above all, let us not divide our forces, lest they be beaten in detail." Alexiev, Kouropatkin, and Linievitch, in various dispatches, each enunciated the same principle. Yet here we have a divided force, and a portion thereof being beaten in the first action. War, on paper, is a very simple matter.

No confirmation can be found of the oft-repeated statement that Alexiev pressed Zasulich to fight to a finish. The Russian official account, which minimises in no way the friction in the high command, makes no mention of it, nor does Zasulich urge it in his defence. The Viceroy did, indeed, write to the Czar on the 30th advocating a strong resistance, but in that he was within his rights.

The wide turning movement on Sai-ma-chi and Liao-yang was a dreadful bogey to Russian headquarters. Forty thousand men were to make a flank march across the front of half that number of undefeated troops, to leave the coast whence alone they could draw their supplies, and plunge by a wretched track into a barren and mountainous region. And fourteen squadrons with infantry and guns were employed to prevent this movement, with orders to retire away from, not towards, the probable field of battle, where not a single troop of cavalry was available! Like the generals opposed to Napoleon, the Russian leaders saw too many things at once.

The disclosure of the Japanese intentions by the bombardment on the 30th was a grave error. Had Zasulich withdrawn that night he would have escaped scot-free, and his action would be cited for all time as a model in the handling of detachments. On the one side, time gained and a force undiminished ready to repeat the process further north; on the other, sixteen days of careful preparation, and a blow in the air. What would the Japanese

troops have thought of their leaders? But Zasulich deemed it his duty to show the adversary that the Russian troops were not afraid; and the opportunity passed away.

Tactical comments.—Kuroki's deployment, deliberately conceived and finely executed, gave promise of decisive success; yet the expectation was not fully realised. The straying of the 12th Division was due to circumstances beyond his control, but so also was the brilliant handling of the 5/24th Company. Chance must always exercise a great influence in battle; and to draw profit from unexpected opportunities or to minimise the effect of unmerited misfortunes rests usually with the initiative of subordinate leaders. It is for the commander, however, to disregard minor incidents and to stamp the impress of vigour upon the whole operation.

Kuroki began well. It was a daring move to cross that wide, open valley, even though the troops were straining at the leash. When, however, the *élan* of the attack was expended and the troops were held up at the second position, then was the time for the commander to intervene. A combined flank and frontal attack with an overwhelming superiority of numbers, costly though it might have been, could have had only one issue. But the subordinate leaders made the usual excuses: the troops needed rest and food; artillery support was lacking; the advance of the 12th Division would soon cause the Russians to retire; and Kuroki suspended the forward movement till 2 p.m., thus allowing the An-tung detachment to escape. Then, again, it was only 5 p.m. when the Russian rear-guard was captured, and several hours of daylight still remained; the Guard and 2nd Divisions had been long afoot, but had executed no long marches; the cavalry had not been engaged; the losses of the 1st Army amounted only to 3 per cent; yet the commander had not the force of

character to insist upon a pursuit. Victorious troops are satisfied when they have captured a position, and imagine then their duty to be accomplished and their energy to be expended. Beaten troops, on the other hand, show an altogether wonderful mobility, and, unless the pursuit be instantly undertaken, will certainly escape. As a motive power fear has a higher value than enthusiasm, therefore the latter quality as it wanes must be replaced by discipline enforced by a vigorous commander.

It is interesting to remember that there has been no great pursuit in modern war since Waterloo; and the reasons usually ascribed for this are: the disorganisation consequent upon the assault, and the necessity for replenishing food and ammunition. But peace-training is also largely responsible. The procedure in pursuit is, indeed, laid down in the manuals. At all manœuvres, however, the operations close with the spectacular capture of a position. Officers and men know that the ridge marks the end of their labours; there food is provided and thence lies the homeward road; and ideas sown in peace ripen in war.

The Japanese were always sparing of their cavalry. It seems, however, that the five squadrons held in reserve might, bad as was the country, have been more usefully employed with the right flank-guard of the 12th Division. This detachment, whose rôle it was, presumably, to guard against Kartsev's Cossacks, was well placed for action against the Russian communications. We have seen how the very rumour of the approach of cavalry caused a terrible panic on the line of retreat; its appearance and its action might have produced still more fatal consequences. The part played by the 5/24th Company was one that would ordinarily fall to the lot of cavalry, and indicates the important rôle, which the defensive power of the modern

rifle has conferred on the mounted arm. With such opportunities ahead, who can say that its day is past, even though the thunder of charging squadrons may seldom shake the battle-field of the future?

The absolute lack of organisation within the Yalu position and its inadequate fortification render it difficult to criticise the actions of Zasulich on the day of battle or to suggest an altered course of procedure. No roads made or improved; no signalling arrangements in a country eminently suited thereto; a scarcity of orderlies; no plan of concerted action in the event of attack; nothing, in fact, definitely laid down except that the general reserve was to remain untouched, and, in the event, a large portion of it was used. In the front line the trenches were such that no troops could have held them under artillery fire, and reinforcements would but have added to the death-roll. The guns, moreover, emplaced in the open against four times their number, concealed and entrenched, were predestined to certain destruction. Had the defence been properly organised, the trenches been well constructed, and the whole of the available guns been posted in concealed positions, then, as soon as the direction of the main attack had been ascertained, Zasulich might with advantage have pushed forward his general reserve and replaced it by the An-tung detachment. In these circumstances the Japanese might have received a severe check, or the Russians might at least have held out till nightfall and then withdrawn. Conjecture of this nature is, however, of no great value, for we cannot allow an altered procedure to the one side without granting a similar liberty to the other.

CHAPTER VI

EVENTS FROM THE YALU TO THE BATTLE OF NAN-SHAN

Effects of the battle of the Yalu.—The retreat of the Eastern Detachment 70 miles north of An-tung entirely transforms the time and space problem, for Kuroki's army is now free to advance to the Fen-shui range—the last barrier covering Liao-yang from the south-east. And how does Kouropatkin view the new conditions? He remains wonderfully calm, thanks Zasulich and his gallant army for gaining a whole month on the Yalu, and endeavours to inspire them with fresh courage. He sends Mitschenko back towards Ta-ku-shan, and Kartsev away to cover the left flank, and at the same time pushes reinforcements into the Fen-shui-ling. He thinks it may be necessary to retreat from Liao-yang and prepares for that eventuality. Matters have, after all, only turned out much as he expected. When Minister of War he had stated in Council that in the event of hostilities with Japan 300,000 men would be required, and that the campaign would last eighteen months. In so long a period reverses are to be expected; and matters may yet be righted when his prophecy as to numbers is fulfilled. He objected to the advanced detachment, and was overruled; the exposed force had met the fate that commonly falls to such detachments, and he is not much surprised at the result.

The cavalry is soon busy again, and it is apparent that defeat has furnished it with magnifying glasses of the highest power. Kartsev reports a brigade at Kuan-tien-cheng, and

later a division with forty guns advancing on Sai-ma-chi. Mitschenko affirms that 12,000 men are advancing on Hsui-yen. He believes them to be the advanced guard of the 1st Army; in reality, he has seen nothing but requisitioning parties, while in front of Kartsev there has never been more than one battalion and one squadron. In a week's reconnaissance Kartsev's casualties are one Cossack and one horse wounded, Mitschenko's are four Cossacks wounded. The cavalry operations do not appear therefore to be characterised by excessive boldness.

All this is rather hard on Kouropatkin. Having no effective secret service, the failure of the cavalry throws him back upon divination, which is not his strong point. He now sends a force to block the Ta-ling, and orders Rennenkampf, with 3 battalions, 20 squadrons, and 14 guns (inclusive of Kartsev's detachment) to Sai-ma-chi to guard the left flank. This general is made of sterner stuff than his predecessors. He pushes forward to Kuan-tien-cheng and, finding it unoccupied, is advancing further south when he is drawn back to Sai-ma-chi by a false report that two Japanese battalions with cavalry and guns have cut his communications with Liao-yang. In reality nothing has happened but an attack on one of his posts by a band of Khunguses. At Sai-ma-chi we must leave him for the time being, making vigorous reconnaissances which, if otherwise not very effective, cause Oyama to reinforce the 1st Army with a Kobi Brigade.

Kouropatkin has at present no thought of gaining time by resistance, and he warns Zasulich that the Fen-shui range is only to be held as a line of observation; a few troops in the East Fen-shui-ling and Mo-tien-ling passes, and the remainder in reserve at Lang-tzu-shan. This is the position of affairs on the 12th May, on which date the Southern Advanced Guard, now consisting of the 1st

Siberian Corps under General Stackelberg, is in the triangle Yin-kou—Ta-shih-chiao—Kai-ping, and the general reserve still in Liao-yang.

The landing of the 2nd Japanese Army.—On hearing of the victory on the Yalu, Admiral Togo makes further efforts to block the harbour at Port Arthur, but fails. Thinking, however, that he has been successful, he reports the exit closed to all except small vessels. Oku then sails from Chinam-po with a fleet of eighty transports to effect a landing near Pi-tzu-wo. The greatest precautions are taken. To prevent interference by Russian warships, mines and booms are laid between the Elliot Isles and the mainland, and sixty torpedo craft are set to watch Port Arthur. The transports are anchored in such shallow water that, even if sunk, their decks will remain uncovered. To distract Russian troops from the point of disembarkation, reports of an immediate advance by Hsui-yen on Hai-cheng are circulated, and a naval demonstration is made towards Kaiping.

On the 5th May a covering party of 1000 sailors is landed, and then 8½ battalions. On the 6th a gale springs up, and a safer anchorage is found about 4 miles to the south, where the disembarkation is continued on the 7th, though under great difficulties. The whole of the fighting troops of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions are ashore by the 13th. There the army remains grouped round the point of disembarkation awaiting the arrival of land-transport.

Russian countermoves.—The appearance of the transports causes Alexiev, on the 5th May, to dispatch from Port Arthur to resist the landing, all the mounted scouts, a battery, and, from Pu-lan-tien, a battalion under Colonel Rantsev. They report the disembarkation of about 10,000 Japanese. On the 6th, Rantsev is back in Pu-lan-tien, where he is attacked by three Japanese

companies and immediately withdraws his battalion and mounted scouts towards Wu-chia-tun, reporting at the same time that the assailants deployed three battalions in first line. Forty-two men of the Frontier Guard, whose commander refuses to retire, are left in the old fort and hold out for some hours till ordered to retreat by General Zikov. This officer, with 4 battalions, 1 squadron, and 4 guns, had been railed to Wu-chia-tun with orders from Kouropatkin to demonstrate against Oku. He is inclined to make a night attack on Pu-lan-tien, but Rantsev's report has created the gravest anxiety at headquarters for Zikov's safety, and he is consequently hurried back to Te-li-ssu, with orders to burn the station at Wu-chia-tun *en route* and to withdraw all posts on the railway. Then Colonel Spiridinov of the railway service appears, and, hearing that Pu-lan-tien has been evacuated by the enemy, drives an engine there to reconnoitre. Finding the report true and not much damage done, he sets about repairing the line. The work is completed on the 9th and, during that night, he pushes an important train full of ammunition, machine guns, and electric lights into Port Arthur—a brilliant achievement. On the 14th two Japanese battalions with two squadrons occupy Pu-lan-tien, and communication by land with Port Arthur is permanently severed.

Comments.—Landing operations on a large scale are of especial interest to this country, in view of the possibilities of invasion. General Oku succeeded in disembarking 35,000 troops of all arms in nine days at a bad landing-place, in unfavourable weather and within 60 miles of a fleet in being. The arrangements made and the precautions taken have been indicated, and provide an admirable model for imitation.

Lack of enterprise and organisation on the part of the

Russians had, it is true, much to say to Oku's success. The neighbourhood of Pi-tzu-wo, where the Japanese landed in 1894, had long been marked as the probable zone of disembarkation. For several days the process of barring the passage past the Elliot Islands had been observed from Port Arthur. Pu-lan-tien on the railway was only 15 miles distant from Pi-tzu-wo, and Nan-shan 32 miles. A larger force might have been kept at Pu-lan-tien, and mobile detachments might have been held in readiness at Nan-shan and Te-li-ssu for dispatch there by rail. There was no grave danger in such procedure, for Port Arthur was now safe against a *coup de main*, and the forces at Yin-kou and at the Ta-ling rendered the railway secure for many days to come. Had action been taken immediately the transports were sighted, these troops might have arrived in time to attack the covering party while it was yet weak in numbers. The Japanese were certainly much surprised at the inaction of the Russians. A policy of observation and demonstration, such as that adopted, can effect no useful purpose; the only chance of success is to attack at once with the troops immediately available, to throw each fresh unit into the fray as it arrives, and to go on attacking until the position is won.

It may be pointed out incidentally that peace manœuvres do not furnish a true indication of the possibilities of a disembarkation. Transports cannot be risked in shallow water, equipment must not be damaged, troops must not be permitted to ruin their clothing by wading long distances to the shore; nor are feints or the circulation of false rumours likely to prove of much value.

Russian plans.—On receipt of news of the landing of the 2nd Army, Kouropatkin suggests to Alexiev the withdrawal of the 1st Siberian Corps from the Yin-kou littoral to Liao-yang and, in case of pressure, a general retirement

to or beyond Muk-den. On the 5th May Alexiev leaves Port Arthur, and on the 6th has an interview with Kouropatkin at Liao-yang. The Viceroy, trying to reconcile their divergent views, allows that the army is not yet strong enough to relieve Port Arthur, but suggests the formation of a small detachment to demonstrate against the rear of the besieging forces. He still insists on the necessity of holding Liao-yang, alleging that retreat beyond that point will certainly cause China to declare war. Kouropatkin, however, maintains his original views and embodies them in a dispatch to the Minister of War. In reply two telegrams, dated the 10th and 11th, are received by Alexiev and Kouropatkin respectively. In the former this sentence occurs, "There is no reason to protect Port Arthur, for it can hold out temporarily with its own resources." In the latter, "It is no longer a question of supporting Port Arthur, but of relieving it."

Accepting the latter as the final view, we have therefore three distinct opinions held respectively by the Minister of War, by Alexiev, and by Kouropatkin, of whom the last-mentioned, it will be remembered, has been told to work out his own plans, "following the general indications furnished by the Viceroy." Alexiev had already seen the impossibility of the system of command, and had, on the 17th April, offered to resign. His resignation had not been accepted, but it had drawn upon Kouropatkin a reprimand from the Emperor, couched in polite terms indeed, but warning him to display more tact. The exercise of tact is a little difficult for a leader who believes that a modification of views may entail disaster to his army.

Alexiev at this time has a great idea of forming a force in the Maritime Province to operate in Northern Korea, and he turns off two cavalry regiments, which were destined for Liao-yang, from Harbin to Vladivostock, to take part

in the movement. It is a small matter, but it gives insight into the Viceroy's ideas on strategy. By all means make every use of the Vladivostock force! But to divert troops from the main army at a critical moment for a subsidiary movement which cannot become operative for many weeks, and which at best has an ill-defined objective, marks a mind of no high quality. Nor does the omission to ask Kouropatkin's opinion, or even to inform him of the transfer, furnish a good example of tact.

Meanwhile the concentration proceeds. The Southern Detachment, consisting of the 1st Siberian Corps under General Stackelberg, is withdrawn to Hai-cheng, and outposts are left at Yin-kou, Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, and the Ta-ling. During the latter half of May reinforcements come pouring in, and Kouropatkin asks his staff to consider the possibility of a limited offensive against any forces that may land about Yin-kou. At the same time, the Viceroy's staff is working out details for the relief of Port Arthur. Both come roughly to the same conclusion as to numbers, namely, that about sixty-five battalions will shortly be available for an offensive movement.

On the 23rd May the Viceroy gives Kouropatkin the choice of two operations :—

(*a*) To attack Kuroki, leaving a force covering Liao-yang.
(*b*) To attack Oku, leaving a containing force facing the 1st Army.

Just at this time certain news arrives of a Japanese landing at Ta-ku-shan. Kouropatkin, inferring therefrom a big movement by Hsui-yen on Hai-cheng, determines to give the defence of the Fen-shui range a more serious character and, by the demonstration of a few battalions in front of the eastern passes, to endeavour to prevent Kuroki from moving westwards on Hsui-yen. He therefore sends a brigade to Count Keller, who has re-

placed Zasulich, at the same time withdrawing from him two and a half battalions, which had been detached from various regiments. This brings the Eastern Detachment to a strength of twenty-seven battalions, but naturally reduces the number available for the offensive operations against Port Arthur.

Kouropatkin, however, asks his quartermaster-general and chief staff officer for a detailed examination of the Viceroy's proposals. He is furnished in reply with two able minutes showing clearly that the first operation is out of the question, mainly because of lack of transport, the short time available before the rainy season, and the possibility that, in the event of the retirement of the 1st Army behind the Yalu, it may result in a blow in the air. With regard to the second alternative, the necessity of securing the communication with Russia and providing flank-guards would reduce the force available for the offensive to twenty-four battalions. The rôle of so small a force must be purely demonstrative and therefore ineffective.

Kouropatkin fully concurs; and, in informing Alexiev of his objections to the latter's proposals, adds that so far as is known there are five divisions and reserve formations still in Japan whose destination is unknown, and that he would prefer to be clear as to the direction of the main movement of the hostile armies before acting. He cannot push more than one corps to the south, and that corps would probably suffer the fate that befell Zasulich. His belief is that Port Arthur can hold out for a year. On the other hand, if it be true, as the Viceroy suggests, that the fortress cannot resist longer than two or three months, he must endeavour, even at a great risk, to draw a portion of the enemy's force northwards.

So acute are these differences of opinion that the Viceroy

asks for a decision from the Emperor, who wires approval of the Viceroy's views. On the 30th, therefore, Alexiev orders Kouropatkin to undertake immediately with at least four divisions the necessary measures for advancing to the succour of Port Arthur. Kouropatkin is willing to accept this decision provided that he can be reasonably sure that the enemy's main objective is Port Arthur. A report that Pi-tzu-wo has been evacuated and the news of the action at Nan-shan lead him to this conclusion. He accordingly forms a detachment of sixteen squadrons and a horse battery, under General Samsonov, to reconnoitre on the front Pu-lan-tien, Pi-tzu-wo, and, on the 27th May, orders Stackelberg to move to Kai-ping and prepare for an offensive movement with his corps.

Comments.—The Russian plans at this fateful crisis of the campaign have given rise to much discussion. It would seem at first sight as if either alternative proposed by Alexiev might have led to important success. There appears to be but little doubt, however, that a big movement against Kuroki was out of the question, but it is not so clear that the second alternative—an operation that lent far greater promise of decisive results than the first—was impossible. It was difficult certainly. Without the command of the sea the Liao-tung is a very terrifying salient to enter; but, on the other hand, Yin-kou—the worst danger point—was strongly guarded and its approaches mined.

The 1st Japanese Army might, in reply to the Russian offensive, have moved north or west. In the former case Kuroki would have been completely *en l'air*, and his prospects of success would have been doubtful, for the Eastern Detachment, with a rôle no longer of demonstration but of stout resistance, would have fortified the passes. Even after passing the mountains he would, with reduced numbers, with a lengthened line of communication and

enhanced difficulties of supply and transport, have scarcely dared to move forward unsupported. The move west by Hsui-yen on Hai-cheng, in closer connexion with the forces in the Liao-tung, with shorter communications and a less distant objective, was much more promising for the Japanese. Limited, however, to a few indifferent tracks which debouch into the Liao-ho valley by passes that could easily be rendered storm-proof, the march of over 40,000 men through this barren and mountainous region could hardly have been effected in time to interfere with Stackelberg's operations.

According to the estimate worked out in Appendix III, 50,000 Russian troops could have been directed against the 2nd Army, which numbered 35,000. Much depended, however, on secrecy and celerity, qualities which the Russian army had not yet shown. It must be remembered, too, that it would have been open to Oku in the last extremity to follow Napoleon's example at Mantua and to raise the siege of Port Arthur, supposing it to have begun. Then, considering the Port Arthur garrison as immobile, the preponderance of force would have been on the Japanese side.

On the whole, it may be said that the operation might well have led to decisive results, and that it did not entail more risks than usually have to be accepted in war. Kouropatkin, however, could not have been blamed if he had held to his original plans, which, though not daring, were eminently safe. But to send forward a single corps was, as his staff had pointed out and as he himself had recognised, merely to play into the enemy's hands; and it shows clearly that his character was now succumbing to the force of repeated blows.

The Japanese advance on Nan-shan.—The Nan-shan position stretches across the narrowest part of the isthmus

connecting the Kuan-tung and Liao-tung peninsulas. A sketch plan of it will be found on page 75. On the 16th May, General Oku drives a force from Port Arthur back upon it, and then places one and a half divisions towards Chin-chou, facing south, and one and a half divisions near Pu-lan-tien, facing north. On this date, in order to distract Russian attention from landings about to take place at Ta-ku-shan and Pi-tzu-wo, a naval demonstration is made towards Kai-ping and the coast is bombarded. This action produces an extraordinary effect, which is illustrative of the nervousness prevalent at the time among the Russians. An officer, observing the burst of a shell on a hill, mistakes it for the firing of a gun from the hill, and reports that the Japanese have landed and are advancing rapidly on Kai-ping. Kouropatkin thinks that this must be the head of the 3rd Army, and orders Stackelberg to evacuate Yin-kou; but, later in the day, the report is proved to be false, and the order is rescinded.

On the 19th, the 10th Japanese Division, under General Kawamura, begins to land at Ta-ku-shan; and, between the 15th and 23rd, Oku is strengthened by the arrival of the 5th Division, the 1st Cavalry Brigade, and his trains. At this time, according to the Japanese official account, Admiral Togo informs Japanese Headquarters that he cannot clear Ta-lien-wan Bay of mines unless Nan-shan be captured. Whether this be the motive of his action or not, Oku now decides to attack the position and, with this object, relieves the 3rd Division on the Ta-sha-ho (Map I) by the 5th Division and 1st Cavalry Brigade, and marches the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions towards the south-west.

The Nan-shan position.—The isthmus connecting the Liao-tung with the Kuan-tung lies 29 miles from Port Arthur. From sea to sea at high-water it measures about 2½ miles, but at low tide the uncovered sands increase this

distance to nearly 4 miles. Towards the west is a rough circle of hills, some 1500 yards in diameter and 300 feet in height, from which low spurs shoot out to the sea on either side. The hills present a strongly marked salient, the inherent weakness of which is mitigated by the possibility of sweeping the eastern and western fronts with flanking fire from ground in rear.

Much labour has been spent on fortification. Ever since February, Chinese coolies and Russian soldiers have been digging trenches, gun-pits, and redoubts, providing head-cover, erecting wire-entanglements, and laying mines. Only on the left flank have the defences been somewhat neglected owing to the belief that the main attack will certainly be delivered against the right. The armament consists of fifty-seven guns of calibres varying from three to six inches, and includes four 6-inch howitzers and fourteen 3·4-inch quick-firers. In rear of the position, and along the Ta-lien-wan promontory, are emplaced numerous field and heavy guns, but the former are posted too far away to be of much assistance.

Dispositions of the opposing forces.—General Fock, to whom the task of delaying the Japanese advance has been entrusted, has at his disposal 17,500 men and 131 guns. Of this force only about 3800 men are in the position, the remainder being distributed in detachments 2 to 8 miles in rear.

General Stoessel, the commander of the troops in Kuantung, is in favour of a determined defence, but he fails to impress his will upon his subordinate, who keeps his troops dispersed in the fear that a landing may be attempted between Nan-shan and Port Arthur. A message received from Kouropatkin on the 25th May is not calculated to stimulate resistance. "It is important," he says, "to seize the right moment for retiring Fock's troops to Port

Arthur. The guns should be withdrawn in time, otherwise the Japanese will obtain fresh trophies. . . ." Stoessel is anxious to obtain the co-operation of the fleet, but only succeeds in persuading Admiral Vitgeft to send one gunboat —the *Bobr*—to Hand Bay. An interesting point in connexion with this action is that no less than six commanders have a finger in the Russian pie: Kouropatkin, commander of the Manchurian Army; Stoessel, commander of the army corps; Fock, commander of the division; Nadyen, commander of the brigade; Vitgeft, as commanding the fleet; and finally, on the position itself, Colonel Tretyakov, commanding the 5th Rifle Regiment. All issue orders, though seldom through the official channel.

The Japanese line is extended against the whole front of the position—the 4th Division on the right, the 1st Division in the centre, and the 3rd on the left, one regiment being kept in reserve. Three great groups of artillery are formed, of 72, 36, and 90 guns respectively, all under a central commander to whom they are connected by telephone.

The battle.—The Japanese guns open fire at 4 a.m. on the 26th. At 5.20 a.m. Chin-chou village, which had successfully withstood two assaults on the previous day, is captured, the greater part of its garrison (400 men) escaping to the main position. At 6.30 a.m. four Japanese gunboats and some torpedo craft open fire from Chin-chou Bay, causing heavy losses in the trenches on the left of the position, which are not traversed against enfilade fire; all the Russian heavy guns are in the centre or right, and they are therefore unable to reply. Meanwhile the Japanese infantry is advancing and, at 10 a.m., is within 1000 yards of the trenches. By this time the Russian artillery in the position, controlled only by four officers, after firing wildly and rapidly for some hours, has expended most of its

ammunition (160 rounds per gun) and is almost reduced to silence. The opposing infantry are thus enabled to advance within 400 yards. On the left, the 3rd Division attempts an assault and is beaten back with heavy loss. The Japanese guns now move up in closer support, and two battalions of the reserve are sent to the 4th Division.

On the whole, however, the day is by no means going well for the assailants. The situation of the 3rd Division, held up by fire from the trenches and smitten in flank and rear by the guns of the *Bobr* and by those on the Ta-lien-wan promontory, becomes so critical that Oku reinforces it with the last battalion of his reserve.

At midday there is a pause in the operations, and the Russian leader wires a joyful report of victory to Port Arthur. But Oku's resolution is not so lightly broken. At 1 p.m. he orders the attack to be carried forward at all costs. A little more ground is gained; but the situation remains critical. A general assault delivered at 3.30 p.m. fails completely, gun ammunition is running low, not a man is left in reserve; but still no thought enters the mind of the Japanese leader, either of accepting defeat or of turning to the methods of siege warfare. At 5 p.m. he orders yet another assault and directs the guns to expend their last rounds in crushing the hostile machine guns.

On the Russian side, two companies on the left, unable to stand the fire of the gunboats, have abandoned their redoubts. The local reserves have been long since absorbed into the firing line. Request after request for reinforcements draws from Fock a promise of the dispatch of only two companies and these to be used solely for covering a retreat. On their arrival, half a company is sent to the right flank and the remainder held in reserve. Since 3 p.m. Fock has been sending pessimistic telegrams to Port Arthur, and receives in consequence

an order from Stoessel to retire if he cannot maintain his position. The order is gladly accepted, and instructions for the evacuation issued at 6 p.m. Just before the receipt of this order, the scout detachments occupying trenches in the centre abandon their posts and retreat. Tretyakov gallops off to stop them and, in his absence, Fock's order is delivered directly to the troops in the firing line on the left, causing them to retreat in disorder. The one and a half companies of the reserve ordered up to retake the abandoned redoubts arrive too late to be of use and join in the retreat. About this time the 4th Japanese Division, sweeping wide to its right through the sea and over the sands left bare by the ebbing tide, wheels inwards against the abandoned redoubts on the left of the position and, surging through the trenches, plants the flag of the Rising Sun on the summit of the hill. The defenders thereupon retire along the whole line. The other Japanese divisions charge forward; the guns are dragged up the slopes and shell the masses of retiring Russians with great effect. Then darkness falls and the battle ceases. There is no pursuit.

The Russian casualties, most of which occur in the retreat, number 1400 out of 4400 men actually engaged, a loss of 33 per cent. The Japanese lose 4200 out of 35,000, or about 12 per cent. Seventy-four guns fall into the hands of the victors.

On the 27th the Russians retire to Port Arthur, not without a few panics. Dalny, with its fine harbour, its quays and commercial docks, is abandoned, as are also the two naturally strong positions across the road to Port Arthur. On the 28th, finding that the Japanese are not pressing their advantage, the 4th E.S. Rifle Division moves out again to the position of the passes—a line about 12 miles east of Port Arthur. Dalny and Ta-lien-wan are,

PLAN IV.

The Action at NAN-SHAN 26th. May 1904.



however, occupied by the Japanese on the 30th May, and furnish bases for the 3rd and 2nd Armies respectively.

Comments.—The conflict of opinion as to the degree of resistance to be offered at Nan-shan has already been indicated, and the question at once arises :—If it was not intended to offer an obstinate resistance, was it worth while defending the isthmus at all ? In the Kuan-tung at this period a small gain of time would have profited the Russians but little. The defences of Port Arthur could not benefit much thereby ; most of the available supplies had been gathered in ; to retain the enemy an additional day north of Chin-chou would not appreciably affect the situation. On the other hand, the defeat certain to ensue from a half-hearted defence would seriously affect the moral and the material strength of the defenders of the fortress. In these circumstances, then, the question may be answered in the negative.

The proposition of an obstinate defence bears a totally different aspect. It was most important to prevent the Japanese from gaining possession of the well-equipped harbour of Dalny ; it was also desirable to prevent the investment of Port Arthur, lest the enemy should find a means of bombarding the ships in harbour. The position at Nan-shan was of exceptional natural strength, had been strongly fortified, and was susceptible of a prolonged defence by a comparatively small force. The main fear was that of a disembarkation in rear of the defenders. But was this a likely operation ? Even taking the conditions as they were on the day of battle, it could hardly be termed so. Many of the bays were mined ; the others could be strongly guarded ; the element of surprise would be lacking, for the approach of transports is difficult to conceal ; a landing in proximity to a hostile fleet and in face of opposition is a slow and dangerous process.

Apart, however, from the question of the degree of resistance to be offered, General Stoessel might well have detailed sufficient troops for the defence of the isthmus and have held himself responsible for their line of retreat to Port Arthur. The commander at Nan-shan could then have fought his action with an untroubled mind. As the battle was actually fought, however, it is impossible to absolve General Fock from the main responsibility for the defeat. Less than 4000 men held the position for fourteen hours, and, during that time, not even a feint of landing was made which could furnish an excuse for withholding reinforcements. Even granting that there was no hope of victory, it was clearly desirable to help the defenders to hold on till nightfall and to organise a second position in rear. Yet 13,000 men were kept idle while their comrades close at hand were decisively beaten. The lines—

> "Oh the little more and how much it is!
> And the little less and what worlds away!"

though applied by the poet to the other great factor in life, are also wonderfully true in war. A little less resolution on Oku's part; Russian reinforcements of two battalions instead of two companies—and the story of the battle might read very differently.

The Russians, however, might have done more than stave off defeat. Eleven battalions and six batteries could have been massed behind the right flank of the position before dusk and a fierce counter-stroke made then or after dark. Against an exhausted infantry, deployed and without reserves, and against guns short of ammunition, the stroke might well have been productive of victory. In marked contrast to the vacillation of the Russian commanders was the singleness of purpose that controlled the Japanese movements. The tenacity of the infantry, and the bold and close support of the artillery, are deserving

of the highest praise, but it was the indomitable will of the leader that alone made victory possible.

As might be expected in such a hammer-and-tongs battle, the tactics were of a simple and direct nature; but it is not clear why twenty-nine out of the thirty-two Japanese battalions engaged should have been deployed at once on such a narrow front of battle. It was, it is true, in accordance with the usual Japanese tactics to keep small reserves, but the object of such procedure is to obtain early the maximum development and envelopment of fire. In this instance converging fire could have been brought to bear on the salient without any undue extension of lines; and, elsewhere, it was precluded by the lie of the coast. A sufficient development of fire might have been obtained by the deployment of twenty battalions. Oku would then have had at his disposal twelve battalions with which "to teach the doubtful battle how to rage," using the reserve either to strike heavily against the weakest point or to give a fresh impulse to an exhausted and shattered firing line.

CHAPTER VII

THE BATTLE OF TE-LI-SSU

Views of the Russian intelligence department.—The Russian staff has long been in the dark as to the distribution of the hostile forces. Rumours of all kinds ceaselessly circulating render the differentiation of truth from fiction a troublesome task. Moreover, each Japanese army covers itself with an impenetrable screen. Kuroki arrives at Feng-huang-cheng, erects fortifications and, with small detachments of all arms, bars every approach. Oku does likewise in the Liao-tung. So close are the screens that even officers sent in pairs fail to penetrate them. The Cossacks are now being better handled, especially by Rennenkampf, and though they may still be lacking both in boldness and cunning, it is not easy to see how, without infantry or guns, they can break through these defensive rings. Guns there are, but no mountain guns, except a few of obsolete pattern and low ranging power. To employ small parties of infantry when the opposing forces are far apart is dangerous, for the Japanese habit is to answer attack by attack, and the slow-moving foot-soldier therefore cannot easily escape. Certainly when an army lies entrenched on an extensive line or in a large area, the only method, if a decisive offensive is not contemplated, is to mass a large force secretly and rapidly against a given point and drive home an attack. A reconnaissance-in-force is, however, a dangerous operation, requiring well-trained troops and most skilful leadership. It will rarely be

attempted except when the acquisition of intelligence is of vast importance and other means are not available.

The Japanese, dealing with a passive opponent, are more successful in their reconnaissances, but they depend for information chiefly on their secret service and nurse their cavalry carefully, never permitting it to engage with the opposing Cossacks without immediate support. This policy may be ascribed partly to its weakness in numbers and efficiency, but the main cause appears to lie in a determination to prevent the enemy from taking prisoners, to which end also the dead and wounded are always carried off the field. The result is, though it sounds almost incredible, that the Russians, up to the 29th May, have only made two captures—one long ago in Korea and one recently—a trooper of the 10th Cavalry—from whose uniform the presence of the 10th Division at Ta-ku-shan is deduced. Without an efficient secret service, and fighting against one extremely well organised; unable to penetrate the hostile screen or to capture prisoners, it can be seen that the Russian intelligence department has no light office.

Nevertheless, at the end of May it begins to see daylight, and issues a fair approximation of the distribution of the Japanese forces. It places them in two groups—the Eastern, consisting of the Guard, 2nd, 10th, 12th, and portions of the 6th and 9th Divisions, and the Southern Group, composed of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, and 11th Divisions—an estimate about 1½ divisions too high. The objective of the Southern Group is reckoned to be Port Arthur; that of the Eastern Group—to prevent, by menacing the Russian communications, the succour of the fortress.

Kouropatkin's appreciation.—Kouropatkin accepts the views of his intelligence department and anticipates, as a

result of Stackelberg's contemplated offensive, activity on the part of the Eastern Group, which to the north will be limited to demonstration, but to the west, by Hsui-yen on Hai-cheng, may be of a serious nature. Count Keller is therefore directed to continue his pressure on Kuroki with the object of preventing him from moving westwards; but as his action can only be indirect, Mitschenko is to be strengthened by six squadrons and the forces in the Phan-ling and Ta-ling increased to a brigade.

The Japanese fleet will probably demonstrate towards the Yin-kou littoral, but, knowing that coast there to be well defended, is unlikely to attempt a landing. One brigade should therefore suffice to render that region safe.

Japanese countermoves.—Kouropatkin is not far wrong. News of Stackelberg's projected advance reaches Japan as early as the 29th May. Kuroki and Kawamura are ordered to act at once so as to oblige the Russians to weaken the striking force by detaching troops against them. But Kuroki is not yet ready, for difficulties of supply and transport are as yet insuperable. He can use threats, however, and, anticipating his instructions, he seizes Sai-ma-chi, on the 29th, with a force estimated by the Russians in one report at three battalions and in another at a brigade. This appears to Count Keller, who is an active and energetic leader, to offer a fair opportunity for the annihilation of a detachment. He makes a forced and fatiguing march with 10,000 men, but finds his quarry has escaped. On retracing his steps he hears that the Japanese are demonstrating against all the passes along his front. On the 7th June Sasaki, with part of the 12th Japanese Division, captures Sai-ma-chi again, but evacuates it on the 9th and remains at Ai-yang-cheng, threatening the roads to Liao-yang and Muk-den. Meanwhile, on Kawamura's demand, a brigade of Guards, with two

squadrons and two batteries under General Asada, is sent by Kuroki to assist the 10th Division. On the 8th, the combined forces drive Mitschenko, not without difficulty, from Hsui-yen, and there remain till the 12th.

Stoessel's reports and their effect.—Ever since the disembarkation of the 2nd Army, General Stoessel, commanding the troops in the Kuan-tung, has been crying loudly for relief. On the 28th May, "there is meat for only fourteen days, projectiles are scarce, the defences incomplete, and the fortress open to assault." Then on the 3rd June, "the fleet will be ready in a fortnight to break out towards Vladivostock and will take with it 9000 sailors, reducing his garrison to 28,000. Unless by then three to four divisions are sent to his relief he will force his way out." At this time, however, an officer arrives at Russian headquarters from Port Arthur and gives a different account. According to him the garrison, exclusive of sailors, numbers 36,000; there are meat rations for eighty days and bread rations for a year.

Kouropatkin tries at first to inspirit Stoessel by pointing out that at Nan-shan one regiment had nearly defeated three divisions, and that, therefore, seven regiments should be able to hold off forces but little, if at all, superior to them. Later he warns Stoessel that the gravest danger to the beleaguered fortress lies in the lack of confidence exhibited by the Commander, and urges him not to communicate his fears to the troops. "I attribute," he concludes, "the depression of your moral force to a temporary indisposition." Alexiev, however, accepts the despairing statements, and with Stoessel's brush paints the situation for the Czar. The answering dispatch closes with the sentence, "Let General Kouropatkin know that I hold him entirely responsible for the fate of Port Arthur."

The state of affairs in Russia at this period is partly

responsible for the anxiety of the Emperor with regard to Port Arthur. The unpopularity of the war, lack of success, and the increase in the cost of food, consequent upon the war, furnish the revolutionaries with an opportunity of forwarding their political aims, of which they are quick to avail themselves. The fall of the fortress may produce a climax. On the other hand, interference with a leader may, by sowing the seeds of defeat, lead to equally pernicious results. It is the duty of a Government either to trust a commander, or else to remove him.

When the Japanese staff first hear of the projected movement for the relief of the fortress they can scarce credit the news. "The incapacity," says Gibbon, "of a weak and distracted Government may assume the appearance, and produce the effects, of a treasonable correspondence with the public enemy. If Alaric himself had been introduced into the Council at Ravenna, he would probably have advised the same measures, which were actually pursued by the ministers of Honorius."

Friction between Kouropatkin and Alexiev.—It was pointed out in the last chapter that Kouropatkin accepted the orders of the Viceroy regarding the relief of Port Arthur. Since doing so, however, his correspondence with Alexiev has been full of doubts and misgivings, and he has taken no decisive steps to initiate the operation. On the 6th, therefore, after the receipt of the Czar's new dispatch, the Viceroy repeats his orders in a more peremptory form. There are now only two justifiable courses open to the Commander: either to obey the order and execute it loyally, or to resign. The latter course was unhesitatingly adopted by Napoleon and by Stonewall Jackson in similar circumstances. Their resignations were not accepted, and they were permitted to make war in their own fashion. MacMahon, ordered to Sédan,

adopted the former course and sacrificed his army. Either course is defensible, in that the soldier is the servant of the State; but to resign rather than lead an army to disaster is clearly the higher part.

The action of Kouropatkin, however, seems indefensible. He has neither the strength of mind to resign nor the loyalty to execute faithfully an uncongenial mission. He tries, though unsuccessfully, to deceive Alexiev, by including, in his four divisions, three brigades allotted to protective duties on the flanks and rear; and he makes no effort to impress upon the enterprise that resolution, celerity, and secrecy which alone can lead to its success. He engages, moreover, in an acrimonious correspondence with the Viceroy, continually pointing out the dangers of the movement, and driving home the fact that had his original advice as to the garrison of Port Arthur been followed, this unfortunate situation would never have arisen. This is true enough, but does not help matters; and Alexiev closes the discussion with the remark that polemics have no place in war.

Stackelberg's mission.—On the 6th June Stackelberg is informed that a prompt offensive with the 1st Siberian Corps and the 2nd Brigade, 35th Division, has been definitely determined upon. Kouropatkin evidently expects at first to have to deal only with a covering force, for, on the 7th, the mission of the striking force is thus laid down: "By an offensive towards Port Arthur, to draw upon itself the largest possible force of the enemy and thus weaken the army in the Kuan-tung." To attack fractions of the covering force, "but not to push matters to a decision with superior forces, and in no case to employ the reserve till the situation is clear. To capture Chin-chou and then move on Port Arthur."

Was ever a more impossible task allotted to a leader?

The one chance of success lay in rapid, daring action. To attack fiercely without count of numbers and without reckoning cost; to throw in the reserve early and fully to clear the situation by beating the enemy—so only could the way to Port Arthur be won. Any faults of execution on Stackelberg's part may be ascribed very largely to the confusion of mind engendered by such ambiguous instructions.

The 1st Siberian Corps is ordered to concentrate at Te-li-ssu after being relieved of its defensive duties about Yin-kou and the Ta-ling. But on the 13th June it is still short of seven battalions of the 9th Eastern Siberian Division; and on that date, Stackelberg's command consists only of 25½ battalions, 24 squadrons, and 98 guns. The defence of the flanks and rear is confided to General Zarubaiev, under whose orders the newly arrived 3rd Siberian Division provides one brigade to relieve the troops on the Yin-kou littoral and one brigade to act as general reserve at Hai-cheng, while a detachment under General Levestam (10 battalions, 1 squadron, 24 guns) occupies the Phan-ling and Ta-ling. From this distribution it is clear that Kouropatkin has never intended to give Stackelberg more than two and a half divisions and, by the day fixed for the concentration, even these are far from complete. Yet, until the 11th June, events are happening quite as he expected: the Japanese fleet makes a demonstration towards Kai-ping; Kuroki seizes Sai-ma-chi. Kouropatkin recognises the movements to be feints, and even the capture of Hsui-yen does not disturb him, for Mitschenkò and Levestam form a strong guard against action from that quarter. The fact is that he is not putting his heart into the operation, and so collects little more than half the force demanded by the Viceroy.

On the 11th June Kouropatkin hears from Stoessel that

two divisions are attacking Port Arthur, that two are on the line Pi-tzu-wo—Pu-lan-tien, facing north, and two in reserve. He tells the Viceroy that Stackelberg will now have to deal with four divisions, a task beyond his strength, and that no more troops can be spared to him. On the 13th, certain news arrives that Oku has undertaken an offensive movement. It will be remembered that Kouropatkin only consented to the advance provided it was clear that the sole objective of the Japanese was Port Arthur. This hostile forward movement makes it certain that the Russian field army also is now an objective. The chief tie, therefore, that bound Kouropatkin to this undesirable operation has snapped. But nevertheless he lets matters take their course.

The offensive of the 2nd Japanese Army.—By this time the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 11th Japanese Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Brigade, and the 1st Artillery Brigade have landed in the Liao-tung, and of these the 1st and 11th Divisions form the 3rd Army under General Nogi for the siege of Port Arthur. The remainder, under Oku, constitutes the 2nd Army, which, in concert with the 1st and 4th Armies, is destined to operate against the Russian field forces.

On the 29th May, Oku sends forward General Akiyama with the 1st Cavalry Brigade, supported by infantry. On the 3rd June a skirmish takes place at Te-li-ssu in which shock action is employed for the first and only time in the campaign—a Japanese squadron being charged by two Cossack squadrons and roughly handled. Daily reconnaissances are carried out on both sides till the 12th June. On the 6th June, the Russian cavalry is strengthened by four squadrons, and General Simonov takes command. On the 10th, Stackelberg sends forward General Routkovski with an advanced guard (6 battalions, 1 squadron,

8 guns) to Wa-fan-tien. Small skirmishes take place daily, the net result of which is that each side suspects that the other is about to undertake the offensive.

On the 13th Oku begins his march in three columns—the 3rd Division on the right, the 5th in the centre, and the 4th to the left. Akiyama's Cavalry Brigade, with one battalion and a mountain battery, is in advance of the right flank. At 7 p.m. orders are issued for the approach-march on the 14th: The 5th Division is to advance on both sides of the railway, the 3rd on its right. The 4th Division is to make a wide detour to the west and halt near Fu-chou. Early on the 14th the advanced Japanese troops come in contact with Routkovski's advanced guard, which falls back on Te-li-ssu without offering much resistance.

The Russian preparations.—A sketch plan of the battle-field of Te-li-ssu will be found on page 93. Stackelberg had decided, in case the enemy should take the offensive before the 1st Corps was ready to march, to draw him towards Te-li-ssu, where on a chosen position he would offer a vigorous resistance and pass to the counter-attack at the favourable moment. It had always been intended to fortify a position near Te-li-ssu for use as a supporting point; and Stackelberg had selected for this purpose a line on either side of the railway just south of the station. Defensive works were begun on the 9th June, but, owing to the rocky nature of the soil and the scarcity of workers and tools, they were not far advanced by the day of battle.

The earliest news of the hostile advance is received at 6 a.m. on the 14th, and is of the first importance. It concerns a strong column moving towards Fu-chou. At 9 a.m. Simonov reports the approach of about 20,000 men against the Russian left and of about 7000 against their right, and, later, that three brigades are advancing to the east and one brigade to the west of and close to the railway.

No further mention is made of the column moving towards Fu-chou, nor is any effort made to gain touch with it. On receipt of Simonov's report, Stackelberg decides to accept battle at Te-li-ssu, and orders the 1st Corps to occupy the selected position, the 9th Division west, the 1st Division east of the railway. The position is divided into three sections :—

Right section. Ridge running for 1500 yards north-west from railway; and hill, termed the Eagle's Nest (4½ battalions, 8 guns).

Centre section. The river valley (3 companies, 24 guns).

Left section. From railway to Wa-fang-wo-pu (12 battalions, 4 squadrons, 36 guns).

Covering the right flank is Simonov (16 squadrons, 6 guns), with orders to gain touch with a Cossack squadron at Fu-chou. In general reserve, at Te-li-ssu, is the 2nd Brigade, 35th Division, with 4 squadrons and 24 guns.

The Russian position, 4½ miles long, is held at first by 13,000 bayonets and 74 guns, with 6000 bayonets and 24 guns in reserve. It suffers from many defects. The sections echeloned southwards from right to left render it especially liable to converging fire. Great hills rising in front limit the field of fire and, by obscuring the view, permit the enemy to conceal his dispositions and to manœuvre unobserved. The steep and rocky nature of the ground renders lateral communication difficult, and is to cause much exhaustion to the troops burthened with a heavy equipment and marching and countermarching repeatedly under a burning sun. The right flank, which should have been extended so as to cover the Lung-kou valley, is particularly weak. In the left section the northern slopes are so steep that guns have to be lifted by hand, and, once emplaced, cannot easily change position. The main

line of retreat passes through a narrow defile north of Te-li-ssu, the only other available route being a track over the hills somewhat to the east, which is to be used by the troops of the left section. The Fu-chou-ho, about 150 yards wide, is everywhere fordable. The works executed by the Russians are of slight profile and easily visible. The gun-pits designed from the text-book are traced for the old-pattern gun, and are ill-adapted to the quick-firer with its longer trail. Stackelberg had advised covered positions, but the senior artillery officers have yet no faith in their dial-sights, and for the last time exercise a preference for direct laying.

The battle of Te-li-ssu: the 14th July.—The fighting on the 14th July is limited mainly to a determined attack on the part of the 3rd Division against the left section, commanded by Gerngross. The Russians are forced to deploy their local reserves, but the attack is repelled. Two detachments, the first of two battalions and four guns, and the second of one battalion and four guns, are sent up from the general reserve and are posted in echelon behind the extreme left. The 5th Japanese Division occupies the heights south of the river opposite the Eagle's Nest, but leaves the right section almost untouched. Akiyama about Sha-pao-tzu remains inactive. Of the 4th Division, a detachment is sent to capture Fu-chou, and the remainder bivouacks south-east of that city on the Fu-chou-ho. On the Russian right, Samsonov, now in command of the cavalry in place of Simonov, who has fallen sick, makes no attempt to gain touch with Fu-chou or to reconnoitre to the west. Towards nightfall he falls back to bivouac in a blind alley north of Lung-kou.

By 6 p.m. six more Russian battalions have arrived by train; and Stackelberg, who estimates the enemy at two divisions and believes the main attack to be directed against

his left, decides to move to the counter-attack. He dispatches General Glasko with seven battalions and three batteries to Tsui-chia-tun, and writes an operation order for the concerted action of his force on the morrow. This order is, however, not distributed, but a series of instructions are issued instead to individual commanders: Glasko is directed, after arranging matters with Gerngross, to attack the flank of the Japanese operating against Wa-fang-wo-pu. Gerngross is informed of Glasko's mission and instructed to take the offensive at daylight with eleven battalions and two batteries, arranging with Glasko that the two attacks may be simultaneous. It is clear from these instructions that a combined attack at dawn is intended, yet Gerngross, writing to Glasko to ask him to move on Wa-fang-wo-pu, says "*if* the army corps commander wishes to make an attack at dawn, etc." Glasko's aide-de-camp, however, who receives this note, is asked to impress upon his General the necessity of a night march to Wa-fang-wo-pu, so that a simultaneous attack may be made at dawn. Samsonov is ordered to assist the counter-attack by acting in a south-easterly direction against the enemy's flank and rear. During the night, for some unexplained reason, the battalion on the Eagle's Nest abandons its post.

After the dispositions for the counter-attack there remain in general reserve five battalions, a few squadrons, and twenty-four guns. Kouropatkin approves of Stackelberg's dispositions and, to ensure success, decides to send him the 9th Siberian Regiment and a horse battery, which, however, are to be returned after the battle.

The 15th July: the counter-attack.—At 6 a.m. on the 15th Gerngross deploys for the attack and then waits for Glasko, of whom there is no sign. He sends two urgent notes couched in the same strain. "Attack at once, I will support

you from the heights," and then towards seven o'clock, assisted only by the fire of four mountain guns, he advances alone. Glasko, in the meantime, unable to read in his instructions a clear order for the attack, assembles at dawn a council of war and, finally, at 6.40 a.m., decides to take the offensive. He reinforces his two advanced detachments which had been sent up on the previous night and then begins his march. Shortly afterwards Colonel Petrov, commanding the eastern advanced detachment, reports that he is unable to make headway; and just at this moment an order from Stackelberg arrives, a copy of which had been sent to each commander: "If the Japanese attack with superior forces against the centre of our position or in any other direction, the 1st Corps will retire slowly on Wan-chia-ling. In this case Glasko's detachment will maintain itself as long as possible about Tsui-chia-tun, to give time for the troops to the west to debouch from the defile north of Te-li-ssu."

Glasko, somewhat obtuse in apprehending the order to advance, is quick to read in this missive the command to retreat. He therefore withdraws to the position indicated, at the same time ordering his advanced detachments to retire. Hardly is he back when a definite order from Stackelberg sends him forward once more. On renewing his advance he is inveigled into an action with Akiyama in a direction extraneous to the main issue. Gerngross, all this time, has been attacking with such vigour that he forces Oku at 11 a.m. to send to the 3rd Division one of the two last battalions held in reserve. The two detachments on the left, after being ordered to retire and then again to advance, are also making fair progress. At 12.30 p.m. it becomes apparent to Gerngross that the troops on his right are falling back, but he still pursues his attack and forces Oku to put in his last battalion. At 1.30 p.m., however, the

retirement on the right becomes more defined, and he orders a retreat. It is at this moment that Glasko's main body, gradually reinforcing his advanced detachments, at last begins to make itself felt. At 2 p.m. it is on the point of making a serious attack, when an order from Gerngross arrives instructing Glasko to cover his retreat.

The Japanese main attack.—On the left of the 3rd Japanese Division, an overwhelming fire of artillery has been concentrated on the Russian right and centre, and the 5th Division has been attacking vigorously between the railway and Lung-kou. Samsonov, who had been ordered to make a vigorous reconnaissance round the enemy's left, is held up at the mouth of his blind alley and retires to the north. At 9.30 a.m. he reports the approach of a strong hostile column from the west. There is no evidence of the receipt of this message, but it is certain that Stackelberg received one of a similar nature from another officer at 10 a.m. Having had three men and two horses wounded during the day, Samsonov now withdraws his force to the railway north of Te-li-ssu.

The hostile column reported by Samsonov is the 19th Brigade of the 4th Division, which, starting at 6 a.m. and marching as shown in the sketch, comes into action at 10.30 a.m. against the Russian right flank. The 7th Brigade, making a wider detour to the north, arrives too late to take part in the battle. The Russian battalion, which abandoned Eagle's Nest, is sent forward early to reoccupy that point, but, in order to meet the enveloping attack of the 5th Division, its commander moves it more to the west to cover the Lung-kou valley. When the attack of the 4th Division begins, battalions are sent up successively from the reserve and, forming on the right of the battalion


Plan V
BATTLE of TELISSU
14th. and 15th. June 1904
7th.Brigade
19th. Brigade
FU-CHOU
Fu-chou-ho
4th.Division
Hilly
Lung-tang-ho
To Wan-chia-ling 8 m.
Fu-chou-ho
TE-LI-SSU
Tsui-chia-tun
Lung-kou
Eagle's Nest
Wa-fang-wo-pu
Hilly
Hilly
Sha-pao-tzu
Wa-fantien
Scale of Miles
0
4
8

from Eagle's Nest, succeed in holding the valley line till midday.

Stackelberg retreats.—Stackelberg about this hour receives a message from Samsonov to the effect that a Japanese battalion has debouched on to the railway north of Te-li-ssu. This report, together with the increasing pressure on his right, decides him, at 12.30 p.m., to issue orders for a retirement. There are now in reserve only two battalions of the 9th Siberian Regiment and a battery. These troops, which had arrived by rail at 11 a.m., are placed on a spur north-west of the station to cover the retreat. Meanwhile Samsonov has arrested the advance of the Japanese battalion by dismounting troopers along the Lung-tang-ho. There he is joined by the two remaining battalions of the 9th Regiment, which detrain close by, and the danger is averted.

When the order for the general retreat is given, the Japanese in front of the centre and right are still some 800 yards from the Russian trenches, and the 4th Division, worn out after its long march, is not pushing the attack with much vigour. Moreover, the Japanese field batteries, owing to the nature of the ground, experience great difficulty in moving to more advanced positions. The pressure exercised on the retreating troops is, therefore, not very great, and the retirement is greatly assisted by a terrific storm which breaks about 3 p.m.

On the Russian left, Glasko covers the retreat of the 1st Division without being pressed either by the 3rd Division or by Akiyama. In fact there is no real pursuit, and the Russian retirement, covered by a few batteries, one whole battalion, and various companies picked up at random, is continued without interference to Kai-ping.

The Russians lose 128 officers and 3435 men in the battle,

the Japanese 53 officers and 1137 men. Of the Russian artillery the four mountain guns are destroyed and thirteen guns fall into the hands of the victors.

Comments:—The operations for the relief of Port Arthur have thus resulted in complete failure, and the determination to avoid the defeat of detachments has for the third time come to nought.

General Stackelberg has been severely criticised for his conduct of the battle, and nowhere more severely than in his own country, where the favour accorded in high quarters to officers of German origin incurred for them popular dislike. The criticism on the whole lacks justification. It is true that, as a leader reaps the glory of a victory, so must he also bear the blame of a defeat; and if his subordinates fail, the responsibility lies with him. Trust them he must, however, in the ordinary execution of their duties, or he becomes liable to the charge of undue interference. From the instructions issued to Samsonov, he had a right to expect timely news of events on his right, and, from his orders for the counter-attack, concerted action on the part of Glasko and Gerngross. It is said that his later orders contained contradictions, but a close scrutiny fails to reveal them. It would no doubt have been more correct to have issued an operation order to the army for the action on the 15th, but the general intention was made clear in the notes sent to all commanders. Possibly Glasko was disturbed by the use of the word "if" by Gerngross. Had the two subordinate leaders acted simultaneously, and had the former, instead of being drawn into an action with Akiyama, moved against the flank of the 3rd Division, it is quite possible that the Japanese might have suffered a severe reverse. The success attained by Gerngross alone, supported only by four small guns, certainly points to that conclusion.

Stackelberg has also been criticised for failure to ensure the execution of his orders. There are three methods of doing this :—

(*a*) By personal observation. But if a commander posts himself at a particular part of a battle-field he becomes absorbed in the action immediately in front and ceases to rule the battle; witness MacMahon under his tree at Worth. Stackelberg remained, very sensibly, at Te-li-ssu, whence he might, with balanced judgment, control the fight; and not until the attack of the 4th Division had brought about a crisis on the right, did he leave his post to direct affairs in that quarter.

(*b*) By signalling, telephones, orderlies, etc. No telephones were laid; three heliographs were available, but were apparently not utilised; communication by orderly was slow and uncertain in this mountainous district.

(*c*) By attaching an officer of the headquarter staff, conversant with the situation, to each command. This plan, often adopted by the Japanese, was not favoured by the Russians. A leader is not unlikely to look upon such an adjunct as a spy upon his actions and regard him with disfavour. As communications were bad, a staff officer might, however, with advantage have been sent at intervals to report on the situation at various points on the battle-field.

Some writers urge that the reserve should have been pushed in on the first day. Certainly, as a general principle, the reserve should make the counter-attack early, otherwise the inevitable cries for support may entail its subsequent absorption in the firing line. But in this instance the force was not fully concentrated, and the temptation was great to await the arrival of the remaining troops before striking. Stackelberg was, moreover, hampered with

regard to the employment of the reserve by Kouropatkin's instructions.[1]

The following criticisms, however, appear to be justified :

(*a*) The conduct of the counter-attack should have been placed under a single commander.

(*b*) The wording of the orders for the event of retreat[2] was bad. It would have sufficed to have said, " Should the G.O.C. order retreat, the 1st Corps will retire, etc."

(*c*) As the ground in front of the main position hid the enemy's dispositions and movements from view, more use might have been made of the advanced guard, which was in an entrenched position, and of the advanced cavalry. They were both withdrawn as soon as the enemy got within 3000 yards, whereas, with a little less hurry, they might have forced him to deploy and have determined his strength and the direction of attack.

As regards the Japanese operations, it would almost seem that Oku would have done better to have awaited attack on the line Pi-tzu-wo—Pu-lan-tien. The time gained might have sufficed for the collection of the transport required for a prolonged advance and have enabled the 10th Division to operate on the rear of the hostile striking force. The penalties of defeat for the Russians, more deeply involved in the salient, would have been enhanced. But there were two objections to a passive attitude to be considered : the first, that the great advantage of the offensive would lie with the other side ; and the second, that the enemy's plans might change and a favourable opportunity for destroying a detachment might thus pass away. Napoleon, early in the 1812 campaign, had one chance near Vitebsk of bringing Barclay to battle ; he postponed the attack till the morrow and the enemy,

[1] See page 84. [2] See page 91.

retreating during the night, gave him no further chance till Borodino was reached, by which time even victory could not wring success from the Emperor's vast combinations.

The resolute offensive of the 2nd Army is therefore worthy of approbation; but Oku's plan of battle was not without its failings. On the night of the 14th–15th his army was stretched across 25 miles of mountainous country, while eighteen battalions were in close contact with a force which, during that night, reached a strength of twenty-eight battalions. The Japanese reserve (six battalions) was some 7 miles in rear, and assistance from the leading troops of the 6th Division, which had just landed, could not be expected till late on the following day. This method of endeavouring to surround an enemy before beating him is attractive but not often successful. Stackelberg might have been induced to hold his ground by postponing the advance of the 4th Division till the Russian advanced troops had been driven back, and then pushing it by a covered way against the Russian right flank. Victory might then have been achieved with less danger by the enveloping action of three divisions. That the march of the 4th Division remained so long undiscovered was due partly to fortune and partly to Samsonov's inaction. There were Russian posts south of Fu-chou and west of Wa-fan-tien, close to which it passed—so close that it is little short of marvellous that the march escaped observation. Was it worth while, in the presence of superior cavalry, to undertake such an elaborate and dangerous movement on the off-chance of not being discovered? Then, again, why dispatch the 7th Brigade so far to the north, and why keep Akiyama so far to the east? Armies have been badly beaten for fewer faults of leadership; and it is possible that if Stackelberg had issued the

operation order, written for a general offensive at dawn on the 15th, the 3rd and 5th Divisions might have suffered defeat before the intervention of the flank detachments.

Otherwise Oku's plan, both in conception and execution, was excellent. In this battle, as in all Japanese battles, we see the spirit of the offensive, the utmost development of fire both direct and converging and consequently the retention of but small reserves. On the 14th, the strong attack of the 3rd Division and the mild operations of the 5th Division kept Stackelberg's attention fixed on the left flank away from the real danger. Then on the 15th, the 5th Division, aided by a powerful artillery, shook the Russian centre and right and prepared the way for the decisive stroke of the 19th Brigade. But the crowning asset of the victors lay, as at Nan-shan, in the resolution of their commander and in his determination to put in his last reserve rather than acknowledge defeat. It is doubtful whether a pursuit would have achieved great results. The 4th Division was exhausted, the 3rd shaken, and the 5th badly placed. Akiyama's troopers had not shown much resolution. On the other side, neither Gerngross, Glasko, nor the 9th Siberian Regiment had been beaten; and they could be trusted to offer an obstinate resistance.

It is interesting to compare Stackelberg's operations with the movements of another detachment, likewise endeavouring to succour a beleaguered fortress—that of Richmond. The dangers of the Liao-tung salient were as nothing to those to be encountered by Stonewall Jackson in his advance on Winchester. Yet he unhesitatingly attacked his enemy, beat him, pursued, beat him again, and drove him north of the Potomac. Then, retiring, he withdrew his army with all its booty

through the small gap, which forces, vastly superior and marching from either flank to cut off his retreat, had not dared to close. Secrecy, celerity, and resolution: these are the weapons of war,—the rest is but the shield and buckler.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CAPTURE OF THE PASSES

Map II at the end of the volume serves to illustrate the strategical course of events in this and the following chapter.

Russian correspondence and plans.—At Russian headquarters there is writing without end, and the events at Te-li-ssu provoke a fresh outburst. Kouropatkin, in a voluminous dispatch to the Czar, exposes the causes of defeat. Alexiev makes it clear that his four divisions would have won success. His chief of the staff, Jilinski, writes to the Minister of War: he had favoured an attack on Kuroki. If only his advice had been taken,—and so on. The staff of the viceroyalty and the staff of the Manchurian army are both elaborating fresh plans; and even Mitschenko, in the midst of his reconnaissances, finds time to draw up a scheme for combined operations.

Rumours are still flying thickly: Kuroki is said to be at Hsui-yen with the greater part of the 1st Army. Six battalions and a battery are therefore withdrawn from Count Keller to reinforce the reserve at Liao-yang. On the 15th June, on the report of an impending attack on the Ta-ling, six more battalions and another battery are taken from the Eastern Detachment and, moving by forced marches, reach An-shan-chan on the 17th, only to be sent back on the following day. On the 26th the same troops begin again to go through the same performance. These endless marches and countermarches, without apparent

object, are unlikely to inspire confidence in the higher leading.

Mitschenko reports 50,000 troops advancing towards the Hsin-kai-ling. In reality he is opposed by only a few small detachments, Kawamura, with about 18,000 troops, being at the time on the northern road towards the Ta-ling. A Russian officer in captivity, well primed with false information, is allowed by the Japanese to send a full description of their plans and dispositions; but not much credence is attached to his letter, for the falsity is somewhat overdone. Samsonov, however, touches something more reliable. He kills and captures an enemy's horse—or did the Japanese leave it a purposeful prey? The markings are of the 7th Cavalry; hence the 7th Division has landed. In reality it is in Japan. So the play of wits goes on in even the tiniest details, and the Russians remain enveloped in the "fog of war."

Between the 16th and 20th June Count Keller, with $6\frac{3}{4}$ battalions and 12 guns, makes a demonstration towards Feng-huang-cheng, but discovers nothing. The Japanese let him come and go without striking. It has been suggested that the desire to conceal their dispositions rose superior to the wish to destroy a detachment. But this is improbable, for beaten troops do not carry away much information. Possibly they hoped to draw him still further into the toils before attacking and were disappointed at his rapid retreat. At the same time Rennenkampf attacks the Japanese force at Ai-yang-cheng and succeeds in gauging its strength with fair accuracy.

On the southern front, Alexiev suggests the delivery of a powerful blow against the force moving from Hsui-yen. Kouropatkin would concur were it not for lack of transport, which forbids movement off the railway. This transport question, indeed, is much in evidence throughout the

campaign. It has caused the Japanese, even with their pack animals, to remain almost idle for six weeks. Small wonder, therefore, that the Russians, much worse equipped, can undertake nothing. ' Kouropatkin eventually decides to 'dispose the 1st and 4th Corps so as to prevent the junction of the 1st and 2nd Japanese Armies, and to concentrate a strong reserve at Hai-cheng.

The naval situation.—Naval affairs are now affecting the land campaign strongly. About the middle of May, the Japanese fleet suffers severe losses: two battleships are blown up by mines and a cruiser is rammed in a fog. The disproportion of naval strength is therefore much reduced, and all this time the Russians have been busy repairing their damaged vessels. On the 23rd June, urged on by the Viceroy, the blockaded fleet makes a sortie, with the object of reaching Vladivostock. No secret has, however, been made of the intention, and, since the first issue of orders, several incidents have occurred to postpone the operations. It is therefore no matter for surprise that the Japanese battle-fleet is encountered soon after the start of the expedition. The Japanese admiral is for his part much concerned at the reappearance of the damaged battleships, but determines nevertheless to keep to his original plan—that of forcing the Russian fleet to remain in harbour until its destruction be entailed by the capture of the fortress. He therefore endeavours to head off his adversary, keeping at long range, so as to avoid a loss of ships which he cannot afford at this period. His tactics are successful.

As the day is closing Admiral Vitgeft, not relishing the thought that his fleet will be made a target for torpedoes during the night, puts about and heads again for the harbour. He thus acts exactly in accordance with Admiral Togo's wishes and throws away a good opportunity of

retrieving former misfortunes. Even if he had lost every ship in the battle, his action would have amounted in effect to a victory, for the Japanese would necessarily have suffered heavily; and, whereas the latter could not replace a single ship, the Russians would eventually be reinforced by the Baltic fleet, which, with all its faults, might well prove sufficient to mop up the remnants of the Japanese squadron. The lapse from passivity on the part of the Russian sailors is further manifested at this period by the action of the Vladivostock cruisers, which sink three transports in the Korean Straits. The combined effort is not so great, but the reappearance of the damaged battleships causes grave anxiety at Tokio and results in the limitation of the transport of supplies and in a suspension of the advance of the Japanese armies.

Japanese plans.—The general scheme of Japanese operations had provided for a simultaneous advance of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Armies. After the sortie of the Russian fleet, however, the 2nd Army is instructed not to advance beyond Kai-ping, and the Japanese commanders are notified that the contemplated battle of Liao-yang has been postponed till after the rainy season. The order concludes: "Arrange your operations accordingly"—a directive in marked contrast to the narrow limitations set to the independent action of Russian subordinates.

The 2nd Army remains stationary for a few days after the battle of Te-li-ssu, and then, moving north, reaches Hsiung-yao-cheng (Map I) on the 20th. There it stays for the present, immobile owing to lack of transport. But Kuroki and Kawamura, having made their preliminary arrangements for an advance, decide to capture the passes in front of them, so that they may obtain a wider foraging area, establish forward supply depots, and gain a better jumping-off line for further operations.

The action at the Ta-ling.—Kawamura begins his advance on the 25th. His force is divided into four columns and a general reserve. The right column, under General Asada (6 battalions, 1 squadron, 24 guns), after detaching two battalions to work along a valley on its right, is to attack the front of the Ta-ling position. The second column, under General Kamada (2 battalions, 1 squadron, 6 guns), is to attack the right flank. The third column, under General Marui (4 battalions, 1½ squadrons, 6 guns), is to execute a wide turning movement round the right flank in order to fall upon the rear of the position. The fourth column, under General Tojo, is to protect the Japanese left flank.

The Russian position, strongly fortified and lying across the road at the Ta-ling, is held by 8½ battalions, 8 squadrons, and 24 guns, under General Levestam, with two other battalions within supporting distance. About 12 miles to the south-west, Mitschenko (6 battalions, 13 squadrons, 10 guns) has taken up a position west of the Hsin-kai-ling to watch the roads from Hsui-yen to Kai-ping.

On the 26th, a Russian reconnaissance, made by one battalion and some squadrons, is beaten back with a loss of 100 men. On the other hand, Mitschenko repulses without difficulty an attack made by the left Japanese column. He contemplates a counter-attack; but instead of employing his reserve, attempts to draw companies from the firing line for the stroke, and so much time is wasted in this procedure that he ultimately abandons his intention. During the day a cavalry subaltern reports that he has counted twenty-seven Japanese battalions advancing towards the Ta-ling. Hitherto Kouropatkin has been expecting the main attack to develop against Mitschenko, but in the event of a serious onslaught on Levestam, the latter has instructions to hold his position firmly till reinforcements, amounting to sixteen battalions, can reach

him, when a strong offensive is to be undertaken. Now with two divisions advancing against the Ta-ling and forces of unknown strength engaging Mitschenko, the situation appears to require more cautious measures; and Levestam is accordingly ordered to avoid a decisive engagement with superior forces and to retire when he thinks fit on Hsi-mu-cheng.

On the 27th Asada makes an attack, but is beaten back, and then awaits the effect of the turning movements. On his left Kamada, hearing the noise of battle, hoists his battery on to a hill whence it can enfilade the Russian guns, while his infantry drives in two companies posted in the valley by which he is marching. Still further to the left, Marui, though opposed only by one battalion, spread over 5 miles of country, is making but slow progress.

At 8.30 a.m. Levestam decides to withdraw his artillery. It has not suffered much, but one battery has run out of ammunition and the other is of no great value, being armed with guns of old pattern. The companies posted beyond his right and left flanks have been driven in, the latter losing half its strength in retiring. An hour later, under no great pressure, he begins to withdraw his infantry, and at 2 p.m. his troops are clear of the pass and beyond the point at which Marui might have cut in upon their rear. On the right, Mitschenko, who has been reinforced by one battalion, again repulses Tojo with ease.

Kawamura, however, has accomplished his object, and that with but 200 casualties. Now, placing some 4000 troops in the passes from the Ta-ling to the Hsin-kai-ling, he withdraws the remainder of his force and goes into cantonments about Hsui-yen.

Comments.—In the two days' fighting the Russians lost nearly 500 men, and were driven in a few hours from a fortified position by a force but little superior in strength. The

main cause of the disaster may justly be ascribed to the exaggerated estimate made by a cavalry subaltern of the hostile forces. Had it not been for his report, Levestam would have been strongly reinforced and the Japanese might easily have suffered their first reverse. Certainly cavalry subalterns bear a heavy load of responsibility in war. The Japanese plan of attack was sound, but it was marred by lack of energy on the part of Marui. He ascribed his ill-success partly to a storm that blotted out his view, but no mention is made of the storm in the war diaries of the units engaged. This dilatoriness on the part of turning columns is a feature of mountain warfare; such detachments find themselves very much alone and, oppressed by the thought of imaginary dangers, feel their way with great caution.

The advance of the 1st Army.—Kuroki moves forward on the 25th in three columns; and, on the same day, Sasaki occupies Sai-ma-chi. On the 26th and 27th the whole of the passes of the eastern Fen-shui range are occupied without opposition.

Such a strange phenomenon demands explanation. On first hearing of the advance, Count Keller suspects a demonstration and issues orders that the passes are to be held at all hazards. Kouropatkin wires that, according to his information, the movement is a feint; and he desires Keller, if the situation should allow, to send back one brigade and a battery to Hai-cheng. Although, by this time, it has become clear that a serious attack is imminent, Count Keller sends off a regiment and a battery which he had just called up from his reserve. Shortly afterwards, believing the enemy to be in overwhelming strength, he decides to evacuate all the passes. On the 27th he dispatches another regiment to Hai-cheng and concentrates the remainder of his force at Ta-wan.

Rennenkampf, meanwhile, falls back by the N. Feng-shui-ling towards Chiao-tou. The 1st Army has thus secured, at the cost of a dozen casualties, the power of issue from the mountains against Liao-yang or Muk-den.

Comments.—The time and space problem to be solved by the Russian commander has already been indicated. Having selected a zone of concentration and, having calculated a period of six months to be necessary for the accumulation of superior forces within that zone for the decisive battle, he had, owing to the limited space separating the opposing forces, to make use of detachments to gain the necessary time. He saw clearly, however, that this practice might lead to the defeat of the detachments, and might thus weaken, both materially and morally, the forces available for the main issue. He therefore never failed to add a rider to his instructions to the effect that subordinate commanders were not to engage in decisive action with superior forces, and above all not to expose themselves to a partial defeat. His terminology was unfortunate. An army that has once suffered defeat will always magnify the number of its opponents and will believe itself to be arrayed against superior forces. The Russian commander would have been better advised if he had informed his subordinates of the object to be attained and had left the method of attainment to their judgment. Count Keller was gallant and energetic; and his only reason for abandoning the passes was, as he explained, his desire to avoid a partial defeat.

Another method of gaining time without severe loss would have been the solid fortification of positions about the Mo-tien-ling and Ta-ling, over which ran the only roads traversable by vehicles. Siege artillery could hardly have been brought up in the mountains; and the Japanese might have been reduced to the slow and laborious process of making roads over difficult passes.

The general situation at the end of June.—The net result of the Russian operations up to date is that, out of the six months required, nearly four have elapsed; and the Japanese have now conquered all the natural obstacles that stood between the adversaries. Moreover, in possession of the mountain crests, they have gained a better line of observation, and their power of concealed manœuvre behind them must add largely to the perplexities of their opponents. That the situation is not still more unfavourable to the Russians is to be attributed to the difficulties of the Japanese with regard to supply and transport rather than to any skill in Russian leadership.

The general distribution of the forces.—The opposing forces are now distributed as follows:—

The Russians. On the southern front—

The 1st Siberian Corps (28 battalions, 26 squadrons, 63 guns) at and north of Kai-ping. The 4th Siberian Corps (28 battalions, 23 squadrons, 72 guns, under Zarubaiev), comprising Mitschenko's force, covering the left flank of the 1st Corps, two brigades south of Hai-cheng and a detachment at Yin-kou. Levestam's detachment (16 battalions, 18 squadrons, 54 guns) about Hsi-mu-cheng.

On the eastern front—

The Eastern Detachment (12 battalions, 16 squadrons, 34 guns), main body at Ta-wan. Rennenkampf (4 battalions, 19 squadrons, 20 guns) near Chiao-tou. Madritov (1 battalion, 5 squadrons, 4 guns) at Hsing-ching, with outposts far to the south and south-east.

On the Liao-ho Kossagovski (1½ battalions, 7 squadrons, 4 guns) watching the river from Yin-kou to Hsin-min-tun.

At Muk-den and on various services, 5 battalions and 6 squadrons. The general reserve (33 battalions, 4 squadrons, 118 guns) grouped mainly about Hai-cheng.

In the Kuan-tung the Russians have been driven back, but Stoessel has become more hopeful of a prolonged defence of Port Arthur.

The Japanese. The 1st Army (35 battalions, 7 squadrons, 116 guns), comprising the Guard Division (less Asada's brigade), the 2nd and 12th Divisions, in the eastern passes, and a mixed Kobi Brigade in Feng-huang-cheng.

The 4th Army (24 battalions, 5 squadrons, 48 guns) under General Nodzu, comprising the Asada Brigade, the 10th Division, and a Kobi Brigade, at Hsui-yen and in the western passes.

The 2nd Army (48 battalions, 20 squadrons, 252 guns), comprising the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions, just south of Kai-ping.

The 3rd Army (36 battalions, 6 squadrons, 72 guns), comprising the 1st and 11th Divisions and two Kobi Brigades, operating against Port Arthur.

Excluding, on the Russian side, the frontier guards and the troops in the Maritime Province, the opposing forces are now approximately equal, each numbering about 160,000.

The beginning of July.—From the 27th June to the 5th July the rains fall heavily and exercise a marked and limiting effect on the operations. The roads become practically impassable; and Kuroki, owing to the consequent difficulty of supply, is almost forced to fall back on Feng-huang-cheng. Kouropatkin, who has some idea of

striking with two corps at Kuroki, whom he believes to be advancing from Hsui-yen on Hai-cheng, has to abandon the plan, as under such conditions it can only be carried out by the use of pack-transport, and none is available.

On the 4th July a reconnaissance-in-force is made by three Russian battalions against the Mo-tien-ling. It is beaten back with heavy loss, and the only information gained is that the 2nd Division is immediately behind the pass.

On the 8th July the 2nd Japanese Army occupies Kai-ping, and on the same day Marshal Oyama arrives at that town from Japan. On the 9th the 2nd Army drives a rear-guard out of a position north of Kai-ping. It then halts till the 23rd July, bringing up supplies, largely by sea, and making preparations for a prolonged advance. The Russian 1st and 4th Corps fall back to a fortified position covering the railway junction at Ta-shih-chiao.

During this period the remainder of the Russian 10th Corps arrives from Europe. The 9th Infantry Division is sent eastward, one brigade to Chiao-tou and one brigade to Lang-tzu-shan, while the 1st Brigade of the 31st Division is retained at Liao-yang.

CHAPTER IX

MO-TIEN-LING, CHIAO-TOU, AND TA-SHIH-CHIAO

Russian plans.—The Japanese plans, though slow of development, are marked by continuity of purpose; those of the Russians, on the other hand, fluctuate with every change in the situation. It is not that the Russian leaders are opportunists, for they neither seek nor take an opportunity; they merely modify their defensive system in accordance with the most credible rumours that arrive as to the enemy's strength and movements. That is to say, their independent will-power is in a fair way to destruction. At the close of the phase of the operations described in the last chapter, paper-warfare again rages among them. Alexiev and Kouropatkin are at variance—and it were strange if they were not. At Viceregal headquarters Floug, the Quarter-master-General, differs from Jilinski, the Chief of the Staff; and the latter not only differs from the Viceroy, but expresses his differences in secret telegrams to the Minister of War. It must be admitted that all these documents, as appreciations of complicated situations, furnish very interesting reading and testify to the high talents possessed by the writers. The trouble is that there are too many leaders and that the staffs are lacking in discipline.

Kouropatkin bases new proposals on the belief that the 2nd and 4th Japanese Armies together number 72 to 90 battalions, and the 1st Army 80 to 100 battalions. Before such a superiority of force he wishes eventually to retire and fight in the prepared positions round Liao-yang. For

the present he would hold on to Ta-shih-chiao—and hence also to Yin-kou—until seriously pressed, and would then fall back to Hai-cheng. He has no thought of attempting the offensive till the middle of September.

The Emperor concurs generally, but suggests falling back at once on Hai-cheng rather than risking a partial defeat further south for the sake of Yin-kou; on the arrival of the 17th Corps he would like the Russians to take the offensive. The Viceroy considers Kouropatkin's estimate of the hostile forces to be too high, and is anxious to retain Ta-shih-chiao and Yin-kou. The abandonment of the latter port, he maintains, will entail the cessation of correspondence with Port Arthur, a diminution of Russian prestige in China, and the gift to Japan of a good port and the navigation of the Liao-ho. He would therefore hold on obstinately at Ta-shih-chiao. At the same time, regarding the proximity of the 1st Army to the railway as the most pressing danger of the moment, he would strike a heavy blow at Kuroki and drive him back on Feng-huang-cheng; then, concentrating to the west, he would move to the relief of Port Arthur.

As the result of such general disagreement, and in the absence of any commanding personality, a policy of half-measures is naturally adopted. It is decided that the southern group shall fall back if pressed, and that Count Keller shall be strengthened with the object, not of acting decisively, but of recapturing by a partial attack some of the eastern passes. It is a curious situation. Count Keller, with only 28 battalions actually at his disposal, is to attack the 1st Army, said to contain from 80 to 100 battalions, while the 97 battalions of the southern group are to fall back before armies totalling at the highest estimate 90 battalions.

Kouropatkin's orders at this time for the movements of

troops are not in accordance with the plan decided on. It would almost seem, in fact, that he is hankering to fight a decisive battle at Ta-shih-chiao, for he issues instructions for the detrainment there of a division of the 17th Corps now arriving from Russia, and for the remainder of that corps to move to Hai-cheng in closer support. He makes no alterations, however, in his plans for the Eastern Detachment.

On the 13th July Rennenkampf is wounded in a skirmish. The command of his cavalry devolves on General Liubavin, and his infantry (2nd Brigade 9th Infantry Division), commanded by Hershelmann, is placed under Count Keller with the double task of co-operating with the Eastern Detachment and of defending, at Chiao-tou, the road that runs north by Pen-hsi-hu to Muk-den.

The action at Mo-tien-ling.—Count Keller's first plan for the execution of his attack on the 1st Army is to dispatch seven small columns, working in four groups, against seven adjacent passes, the main column (eight battalions) being directed against the Mo-tu-ling. Kouropatkin, however, disapproves of such dissemination, and would prefer fewer columns and a main column of at least twelve battalions, with the Mo-tien-ling as the principal objective. He warns his subordinate as usual to act with prudence, observing that at this stage it is more important to avoid a defeat than to gain a victory. Count Keller then submits a second plan which gains a modified approval. His chief remarks on it that only twenty-four out of forty-three available battalions are being utilised offensively, and that they may have to deal with a hundred battalions. True, the Russian armies have done wonders before and may repeat such performances now, but, etc. All this is not very encouraging to a lieutenant about to engage in a hazardous operation. The limitations as to numbers

are of Kouropatkin's own making, and he does not suggest a remedy.

The posts and garrisons of the Eastern Detachment having been relieved from Liao-yang, Count Keller is able, on the 16th July, to concentrate secretly, at and near Ta-wan, twenty-five and a half battalions and forty-two guns. On page 119 will be found a sketch plan of the Mo-tien-ling combat. Keller decides to make a night march and to attack at dawn on the 17th; and for this purpose two columns are formed. The main column (14½ battalions, 8 field and 4 mountain guns), under Kashtalinski, on the right, is to march down the main road from Ta-wan to the Mo-tien-ling; the left column (3 battalions, ½ squadron), which has been forming a connecting link between Count Keller and Rennenkampf, is to move north of the main road and attack pass W. A flank guard (1 battalion) is to cover the right, moving from Ta-wan towards pass X. A general reserve (7 battalions, 1½ squadrons, 16 guns) is to follow the main column. In a fortified position at Ta-wan, a garrison (3 battalions, 12 guns) is to guard against a possible counter-attack on the part of the Guard Division. The brigade at Chiao-tou is to co-operate by sending a detachment (2 battalions, 2 squadrons, 2 guns) towards Hsia-ma-tang. In view of the warnings as to prudence issued by his chief, Count Keller informs Kashtalinski that he will probably not be able to send him reinforcements from the general reserve until the second day, by which time the situation should be clear.

On the Japanese side, the headquarters of the 2nd Division is at Lien-shan-kuan, with outposts in all the passes north and west in the divisional zone. The numerous bivouac fires lighted by the Russians during their concentration at Ta-wan have been seen; and the Japanese troops are therefore on the alert. West of col X the

passes are held by the Guard Division. The 30th Regiment has one battalion on the Mo-tien-ling, with an outpost company on Rocky Hill and picquets at the Temples. The 4th Regiment has an outpost on pass X, with a picquet a couple of miles nearer Ta-wan.

At 12.30 a.m. the latter is driven in by the Russian battalion forming the right flank-guard. The alarm is thus given along the whole Japanese line; but each regiment remains in its own section awaiting developments. Five companies of the 4th Japanese Regiment are, however, pushed up, and drive the Russian right flank battalion back on Ta-wan.

From the central Russian column one battalion is dispatched towards A—a dominating hill whose capture Count Keller regards as essential. Three battalions move off towards pass Y, which is reported to be strongly held, and, having seized it without opposition, consider their task completed. The remainder of the column halts at B, where orders are issued for the main attack.

Just before the columns start the Intelligence officer brings the information that 3000 Japanese are holding a strongly entrenched position on the line of the Temples. It is against this line, therefore, that the attack begins at about 3 a.m. Considerable delay is caused by the straying of the left battalion, but the Japanese outposts at Rocky Hill and the Temples retire without offering much opposition, and, just at sunrise, the Russians gain possession of the Temple ridge. Here a great surprise awaits them. Their task, instead of being accomplished, has hardly begun. From tier upon tier of trenches on the slopes of the main ridge, two battalions of the 30th Japanese Regiment pour in a devastating fire, and a battery from the crest decimates a Russian column which it catches in close order. Russian patrols reconnoitring in the valley had not

seen the trenches, for they were masked by the Temple ridge; and it seems that not a single scout had enterprise enough to leave the main road. And there is yet another surprise in store. Between the Temples and the Japanese position lies a deep ravine, whose existence was quite unsuspected, although the attacking troops had been quartered close by, had worked on the road, and had fought on this very ground.

The waste of time resulting from faulty reconnaissance on the part of the Russians is the determining factor in the issue of the conflict, for it enables the Japanese to bring equality of force to bear. The Russians fight on gallantly, but their field guns cannot be brought into action, and the mountain guns are of obsolete pattern and low ranging power. Exposed, therefore, to artillery fire to which no effective reply can be made, unable to dig for cover in the rocky ground, and galled in flank by fire from height A, in the occupation of which they had been forestalled by their opponents, they retire towards Ta-wan about 10.30 a.m.

The commander of the detachment on the left, who since seizing pass Y has occupied his leisure hours sketching the enemy's position, retires about the same time to the west of the Ta-wan—Hsi-ma-tang road and returns to Ta-wan by a hill-path. To the north, three battalions and half a squadron deploy against pass W and are held up for three hours by a single Japanese company. Such an event illustrates the glorious uncertainty of war, but it does not betoken much push on the part of the attack. Japanese reinforcements arrive near W, and at 11 a.m. the Russians are recalled, having fought just as effectively when opposed to equal numbers as when in greatly superior force. Further east, the column from Chiao-tou drives in a picquet, but, on encountering a whole company, returns home. The commander explained that he retired because his right

flank was turned; he was probably deceived by the firing away to his right, but in any case the explanation was scarcely adequate.

The combined movement costs the Russians 1200 casualties, while the Japanese only lose 365.

Comments.—Count Keller's original plan would probably have been adopted by the Japanese in similar circumstances. The difficulty, however, with numerous small columns is to find sufficient commanders with the required modicum of push; and, to judge from the action of the isolated Russian columns, commanders of the required stamp were lacking among the senior officers. Count Keller, indeed, in his report gives this as the principal cause of defeat, and regards himself as much to blame for not having removed several of them before the battle. Never a day, he says, started with higher promise; the staff arrangements were good; the spirit of the men and of the young officers was splendid; but among the senior officers pessimism and a general dislike to active operations was rife.

In such operations each commander should attack vigorously and go on attacking any forces he may meet, whatever size he may believe them to be. It may be, indeed, that the enemy is met with in overwhelming strength, but then relief may be expected ere long, owing to the action of the other columns. Unfortunately the commander usually imagines that he has encountered the enemy's whole force, and that he must be cautious. It is, of course, not in mountains alone that leaders are apt to be afflicted with this obsession. But it is less noticeable in normal warfare, because intercommunication is better and because a more efficient control over subordinates is secured.

Kouropatkin himself, in warning Count Keller to avoid defeat, did much to mar the operation. It is true that the possibility of a counter-attack on the part of the Japanese


PLAN VI.
MOTIENLING
17th. July 1904.
To Hsia-ma-tang 6 m.
Pass Y
Direction of Pass W 4 m.
Rocky Hill
Old Temple
Lan-Ho
B
K
TAWAN
New Temple
Deep Ravine
Main Position
To Lien-shan-kuan 7 m.
Mo-tien-ling
Direction of Pass X 6 m.
Flank Guard
E
Japanese
A
D
Scale of Miles
1 1/2 0 1 2

Guard Division had to be considered, yet not only were ten Russian battalions out of twenty-five held in reserve, but Kashtalinski held back six more on the grounds that he was not to expect support from the general reserve till the following day. Some of these reserve troops might well have been spared to the right flank guard, which could then have been given an offensive rôle.

The action at Chiao-tou.—The Japanese 12th Division, which had to fall back to Sai-ma-chi during the rains, has long been kept idle, the state of the roads having rendered movement impossible even with pack transport. In July, however, assisted by 12,000 military coolies, it moves forward in order to get into line with the other two divisions of the 1st Army. On the march, a regiment is detached northwards to watch Liubavin's Cossacks, and two companies are detailed to watch the Pen-hsi-hu garrison. On the 18th the leading brigade reaches the neighbourhood of Chiao-tou. A sketch plan of the battle-field is given at the end of the volume.

This village is of some importance because of its position at the junction of roads to Muk-den and Liao-yang, and because a Russian detachment there would threaten in flank an advance by the Mo-tien-ling on Liao-yang. It is held by a force (6 battalions, 3½ squadrons, 39 guns) under General Hershelmann, the commander of the 9th Division, the troops being distributed as under :—

In the main position A–B, 2½ battalions and 32 guns. On left flank near E, 1½ battalions, 1 troop, and 2 guns. On right along ridge C–D, 5 companies and 5 guns. Covering the right flank, 1 squadron. In reserve at F, 1 battalion, 2 squadrons.[1]

Hershelmann, thinking he can effect no useful object

[1] The distribution given is that of the 19th July. It was slightly different on the 18th.

by remaining in a position which he regards as isolated and perilous, has applied for permission to retire. This is grudgingly accorded ; and, as he is making the necessary arrangements for the retreat, the head of the 12th Japanese Division appears, and he suddenly changes his mind. Even though he has only six battalions of his "valorous 9th Division," he cannot, he says, retire at first contact with the enemy. The defenders are therefore to engage battle, purely for the sake of battle, without any strategical inducement to do so, and, consequently, without any clear and reasoned plan of action. The movement of the Russian transport to the rear, and some changes in the disposition of the reserves, cause the commander of the leading Japanese battalion to believe that the Russians are retiring. He accordingly pushes forward rather rashly, suffers heavily, and is forced to retire to find cover about 1000 yards from the position. Here he is supported by two other battalions, and maintains the fight till nightfall.

On the following day the frontal attack is resumed by the Japanese, with five battalions supported by thirty-six mountain guns. The latter, firing from concealed positions against the Russian batteries emplaced on the crest, deal out severe punishment. The attack, however, does not progress, so two battalions are sent to turn the right flank. They make a wide detour, marching some 18 miles through very difficult country, and, eventually, after being joined by two companies from the 2nd Division, bear down on their objective at about 4.30 p.m. Some two hours earlier Hershelmann sends his field batteries to take up a covering position about 6000 yards to the west.

Away to the north two companies of the Japanese 24th Regiment have been working round the Russian left flank, and eventually succeed in frightening one and a half battalions not only off the high ground on the right bank of the river,

but away from the battle-field altogether. And some of their riflemen, clambering up the almost precipitous slopes, bring an enfilade fire at long ranges to bear along the front of the Russian position. Hershelmann now decides to retire; and hearing, shortly afterwards, of the attack on his right, orders the wings to fall back, to be followed later by the centre.

This brings about a curious situation. The left wing has already retired without orders; the right wing falls back to occupy the *position de repli;* and the Japanese turning column on that side, instead of following it directly or moving against the Russian centre, pursues a north-westerly course, outpaces the troops retiring from the main position, and then, striking north-east, pours a destructive fire into their flank and rear, inflicting severe losses.[1] The Russian casualties in all total 590, those of the Japanese, which occurred chiefly in the premature assault, rather less.

The further retreat of the Russians is unmolested; but the results of the action are considerable. It is naturally distressing to Kouropatkin to think that when he fights his big battle at Liao-yang, his communications may be cut by an army marching on Muk-den, and he therefore determines to recapture Chiao-tou. General Schluchevski, under whom Hershelmann's and Liubavin's troops are placed, is ordered to prepare with his corps, the 10th, for

[1] This is according to British authorities. The Russian official account, however, says this fire was executed at long range and was ineffective; but this is difficult to believe, for the Regiment of Briansk which manned the centre and left could have suffered but few casualties until the retirement began. It was well protected in its trenches, and the frontal attack was never seriously pressed. Moreover, after the trenches were evacuated the Japanese were slow in manning them and in firing on the retreating Russians. There appears, therefore, to be no other way of accounting for the heavy losses incurred by the Regiment of Briansk than that described.

this operation; and Count Keller, who does not like his position at Ta-wan, is ordered to stand firm there. The garrison at Pen-hsi-hu (1 battalion, ½ squadron, 2 guns) is strengthened by 6 squadrons and four guns, and three regiments of the 17th Corps, destined for Ta-shih-chiao, are detrained at Liao-yang.

Fresh Russian plans.—On the 20th July an interview takes place at Muk-den between Kouropatkin and the Viceroy, at which it is settled that the Eastern Detachment shall be reinforced to a strength of 64 battalions, 29 squadrons, and 247 guns, and shall then assume the offensive, under Kouropatkin's personal command, against the 1st Army. No secret is made of this intention, and it appears to have travelled quickly to the ears of the Japanese staff, for, on the 22nd, Asada's brigade marches to rejoin the 1st Army. Orders to give effect to the new plan are issued on the 22nd, but Kouropatkin, on joining the Eastern Detachment on the 23rd, declares that the troops are insufficient in numbers and absolutely incapable of operating in the hills owing to the lack of pack transport. He countermands his orders on the 24th, and on the 26th returns to Liao-yang. The fortunes of the southern group must now be followed.

Instructions to Zarubaiev.—The numerous instructions issued by the Russian commander with regard to the type of battle to be fought at Ta-shih-chiao can, owing to limitations of space, only be summarised. It is first decided to fall back on Hai-cheng as soon as the enemy shall bring superior forces to bear. Then portions of the 17th Corps are railed and marched towards Ta-shih-chiao, and instructions are issued on the 19th for an obstinate resistance. Then, again, after the news of the defeat at Chiao-tou, three of the regiments of the 17th Corps allotted to the southern group are detrained at Liao-yang. On the same day

Zarubaiev is informed of indications of a movement from the Ta-ling and warned that he may have to retire on Hai-cheng. In the evening the commandant at Ta-shih-chiao station reports that he has been ordered by Kouropatkin to keep his convoys harnessed and his horses saddled all night. Zarubaiev objects and the order is rescinded; but Kouropatkin's action is indicative of a nervous frame of mind and is not likely to inspire general confidence.

On the 22nd, seven batteries at Hai-cheng destined for Ta-shih-chiao, 8 battalions and 40 guns of the 17th Corps, which have arrived within 15 miles of that town, and the four battalions at Ta-shih-chiao Station, are ordered back to Liao-yang. On the same day Zarubaiev is appointed to the command of the southern group. But his powers are limited: he is not to alter the dispositions of the 1st Corps; he is not to issue orders to Mitschenko; and he is not to alter arrangements made by Kouropatkin. His task is no longer to offer a stubborn resistance, but, if the enemy deploys superior forces, to fall back fighting on Hai-cheng. On the 23rd he is informed that the movement against him may be only a demonstration, and that Oku's army may (leaving reserve formations out of count) consist of less than four divisions.

It is hardly a cause for wonder that Zarubaiev's mind is somewhat fogged. He might perhaps have wired to his chief asking him to state definitely what type of action he was to fight and what troops were placed entirely under his command. Subordinate leaders, however, seldom possess the moral courage that such action demands, and they prefer rather to grumble about their orders and to endeavour to steer a middle course in a sea of doubt. It should, however, always be accepted as an axiom that any subordinate who does not fully grasp the meaning of an order must demand its repetition in intelligible form.

The whole essence of the art of command is that clarity in the expression of intention which can only be generated by a strong will. Infirmity of purpose in the higher leadership will spell hesitation and doubt through all the grades of the military hierarchy: "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to battle?" On behalf of his army and his country it is for the subordinate commander, where such doubt exists, to demand clear definition. For even if the ruling be faulty he will, with settled lines on which to work, be able to fight his battle with chances of success proportionate to his character and ability. If he adopt any other course defeat will be the corollary of battle as at Wissembourg, as at Wörth, and as at Te-li-ssu.

The battle of Ta-shih-chiao.—A sketch plan of the position occupied by the Russians at Ta-shih-chiao will be found at the end of the volume. It lies four miles south of the station of that name, the right resting on the railway, and the left, some nine miles to the east, on the Tung-ta-ho. The position was selected, and the general line to be taken up was indicated, by Kouropatkin himself; and troops had been working at the entrenchments for some fourteen days. The siting, design, and execution of the trenches show that the Russians have assimilated the lessons of the Yalu and Te-li-ssu. Head-cover, covered communications, wire-entanglements, abatis, trous-de-loup, and all devices of the sapper's art are employed. The telephone connects all units and formations with their commanders. The covered position, except as regards a few masked batteries near the firing line, is adopted for the artillery, and numerous alternative gun-emplacements have been made. In front of the right, where the ground is low-lying, the kao-liang, now nearly 6 feet high, has been cut down so as to allow a clear field of fire up to

1200 yards. The left of the position is not so strong, for the rough and hilly ground, scored with deep ravines, allows of the concealed approach of hostile troops. The 1st Corps (23 battalions, 8 squadrons, 70 guns) occupies the ground from Railway Hill by Middle Mt. to Rifle Hill, with 11 battalions and 46 guns in first line. The 4th Corps (22 battalions, 12 squadrons, 36 guns) takes post on Hill A with an advanced guard (5½ battalions, 1 squadron, 20 guns) under General Chileiko near Nan-ta-ling and a battalion at Ta-fang-cheng.

On occupying Hill A it is, however found to be dominated in dangerous proximity by the hills to east and south-east, and it is therefore decided to maintain Chileiko's force in position as part of the line of battle and to throw forward the troops on Hill A (less the corps reserve) to the Tai-ping-ling spur. Thus a new line of defence is created for the 4th Corps at the last moment. Chileiko's section has been well fortified; but in the section on his right, of which General Oganovski has been placed in command, and which has been strengthened by three battalions from the general reserve, there is only time to throw up the most hasty of entrenchments. The general reserve is, by Kouropatkin's order, divided into two portions—behind the right centre, 6 battalions and 16 guns of the 1st Corps, and behind the left centre, 7 battalions of the 4th Corps. Zarubaiev had also counted for his reserve on the four battalions of the 17th Corps at the railway station, and must somewhat sadly have watched them steaming away to the north during the early phases of the battle.

Including the cavalry on both flanks—Kossagovski's (19 squadrons, 6 guns) on the right and Mitschenko's (15 squadrons, 10 guns) on the left—the total Russian forces of the field (45 battalions, 54 squadrons, 122 guns) muster some 33,000 bayonets and 6000 sabres. They are

opposed to some 46,000 Japanese bayonets and nearly 3000 sabres.

On the right flank, some 13 miles as the crow flies, is the garrison of Yin-kou (3 battalions, ½ squadron, 10 guns), and 15 miles to the north-east at Hsi-mu-cheng is the 2nd Corps (31 battalions, 12 squadrons, 12 guns).

On the Japanese side, the 2nd Army (48 battalions, 20 squadrons, 252 guns), after its long halt at Kai-ping, continues its advance early on the 23rd in line of divisions. The 5th Division, being provided with mountain guns, marches on the right in the hilly country; next to it is the 3rd, then on the Mandarin-road the 6th, and finally, on the left, the 4th. The cavalry brigade is in front of and beyond the left flank. During the day the hostile advanced troops are driven in, and the Russian position is reconnoitred. Its situation and extent are accurately determined, but not a gun can be located. General Oku has, however, plenty of information available on which to base the orders, which he issues that evening. They are of especial interest, being conceived in a spirit entirely different from that prevailing before Nan-shan and Te-li-ssu. Then, if Oku erred at all, it was on the side of rashness. Now it is otherwise. Only one division (less one regiment)—the 3rd—is given an unconditional order to attack. Of the others, the 5th and 6th (less one regiment) will also attack; but they are also warned to guard especially against dangers on their right and left wings respectively. The 4th Division is to take up a position near Wu-tai-shan and "hold it in strength as a protection to the left flank. No advance will be made therefrom till it is observed that the general attack elsewhere is succeeding. The 14th Regiment of Artillery is attached to this division."

There is no sign of going the whole hog here; and why? Is it that Marshal Oyama is exercising a restraining

influence ? It may be so, for no commander-in-chief would care to have his advent signalised by a defeat—and that the first defeat of the campaign. The connexion of his name with failure might well exercise a depressing influence on the other Japanese armies. It is possible, therefore, that Oyama is enjoining caution. It may be also that only a reconnaissance-in-force is intended. By making use of interior lines, the Russians may be massing great numbers on their right to overwhelm the 2nd Army, and it may be well to discover this before seeking a decisive battle. Possibly, too, Oku recognises that a scheme of attack, with the sole line of supply directly behind the left extremity, requires special precautions. If the Russian army be strongly reinforced, and if the Russian right strikes heavily, the 2nd Japanese Army may be thrown off the railway and away from its sea base into a hilly and barren country. All this is quite on the cards. The plan of battle can, in fact, be justified from many points of view, but it displays a certain half-heartedness not to be expected from the victor of Nan-shan.

The combat opens on the 24th with an artillery duel which lasts from 5.30 a.m. to 9 a.m. The Japanese deploy during the day 180 guns against the front of the 1st Corps and 72 against the 4th Corps; but their fire not being combined at first with an infantry advance produces no effect. The Russian guns, of more modern pattern and skilfully concealed, hold their own with ease against the more numerous batteries of their opponents. The Russian infantry for some hours do not trouble to occupy the trenches, and thus for a time avoid all loss.

The fight with the 1st Corps may be dismissed in a few words. The pressure exerted by the 4th and 6th Divisions is so slight that up till 1.30 p.m. Russian scouts remain comfortably ensconced in villages 4 miles south of the

position. Nevertheless, as early as 12.15 p.m. Stackelberg suggests a retreat to Zarubaiev on the grounds that if his troops occupy their trenches they will suffer heavy losses; and that must be avoided as it is contrary to Kouropatkin's wishes. From the number of batteries deployed against him, he thinks that the decisive attack will be made against the 1st Corps. Zarubaiev replies that he does not consider a retreat possible during daylight, but that he will consider the question when darkness falls. He takes full responsibility for maintaining the position. About this time a report is received from Zasulich, commanding the 2nd Corps at Hsi-mu-cheng, that the 4th Japanese Army advanced against him at 10.20 a.m. that day from the Ta-ling, and also that a Chinese spy reported a detachment of 10,000 Japanese some 10 miles south-west of the Ta-ling. This is the only message received from Zasulich during the day, and it can hardly be termed helpful. His inaction is in fact most culpable. The two fears ever present in Zarubaiev's mind were that the 4th Japanese Army was either acting with the 2nd Army against him, or else was trying to cut his communication with Hai-cheng. It lay with the commander of the 2nd Corps to solve these doubts by attacking the 4th Army. Instead of doing so, he allowed the Japanese to drive in his advanced troops, sent the disturbing telegram quoted, and made no correction to it later.

About 9 a.m. the main attack develops and is directed, either by skill in reconnaissance or by the fortune of war, against the weakest section of the Russian defences—that is, against the left centre about Tai-ping-ling. The battalion on the hill north-west of Ta-fang-cheng is first driven back and then a heavy fire is concentrated against the points of assault. Oganovski asks Chileiko for assistance in gunfire; and the latter, after sending an artillery officer

to find a suitable observing station, switches the whole of his fire against the batteries which are shelling the section on his right.

Two batteries (one from the corps reserve and one from the general reserve) are sent to the assistance of Oganovski's single and hard-pressed battery; and with the help of some guns on the left of the 1st Corps, the fire of the Japanese batteries is to some extent kept under.

About this time Zarubaiev hears that a company of scouts has remained quite undisturbed in Tang-chih, and that no pressure has been brought to bear on the left section. He therefore orders Chileiko, after arranging for Mitschenko's co-operation, to attack the troops assailing Tai-ping-ling. Later on, he informs General Kossovitch, who is temporarily in command of the 4th Corps, that Chileiko is about to make this attack, and instructs him that, should the Japanese in front of his right section retreat, he must take the offensive with Oganovski's troops supported by the corps reserve. Unfortunately, before these instructions reach the headquarters of the 4th Corps, Chileiko asks Kossovitch for the loan of two battalions to hold his positions during the attack, and Kossovitch, knowing nothing of the matter, refuses. Chileiko then, before letting his force loose into the unknown in rather a difficult piece of country, sends forward a single battalion to clear up the situation. It moves forward apparently in close order and, being met by a crushing fire, is beaten back in rout, and the offensive comes to an end. Mitschenko's aid is limited to the deployment of four squadrons and six guns, which demonstrate but do not attack.

It is not until close on sunset, according to the Russian Official History, that the Japanese deliver the first serious assault. The same authority also states that so sure is the Japanese infantry that its artillery has broken down the

power of the defence, that they do not trouble even to fix bayonets. The attack is beaten back, but comes on again, on this occasion with fixed bayonets—again to be repelled. By this time all Oganovski's local reserves are in the firing line and their places are taken by companies from the corps reserve and three battalions from the general reserve. At 9.30 p.m. a third Japanese assault fails, and at 10 p.m. a fourth, delivered on a wider front including part of Chileiko's section, meets with no better success.

This is the end of the battle. On the right and left the Russian cavalry has done nothing beyond a little reconnaissance. It does not appear to regard fighting on the battle-field as lying within the scope of its duties. A damning indictment to be laid against a cavalry leader is furnished by Mitschenko at the close of the conflict: "The day has passed without incident for my detachment . . . I have had no casualties."

The total losses in the two days' fighting amount on the Russian side to 1052, and on the Japanese side to 1189.

The retreat.—Before nightfall, being convinced that he is confronted by superior forces, Zarubaiev decides to evacuate the position and retire on Hai-cheng. The order for the withdrawal of the transport has been given during the day, and at 6 p.m. instructions are sent to the commanders of the 1st and 4th Corps and of the cavalry to retreat as soon as the combat ceases and to leave rear-guards in the positions. The retreat begins at midnight and is carried out in good order. On the following morning the Japanese, who have not observed the movement, open fire again with their artillery and, receiving no reply, push forward into the position.

Early on the same day Yin-kou is evacuated by the Russians. As it was quite certain that defeat at Ta-shih-chiao would entail the abandonment of this port, it seems

a pity that the garrison there (3 battalions, ½ squadron, 10 guns) was not summoned on the 23rd to take part in the fight. Acting in co-operation with Kossagovski's cavalry it could have brought quite appreciable pressure to bear on the left flank, that is upon the portion of their line about which the Japanese displayed the greatest anxiety.

The Russian rear-guard succeeds in covering the evacuation of most of the stores in Ta-shih-chiao Station. On its retirement the Japanese take possession and also send a small detachment to occupy Yin-kou, which now becomes one of their principal bases. Their cavalry keep touch with the retiring Russian forces, but otherwise no forward move is made between the 25th and 31st July. On the 28th, the 5th Division is sent to join the 4th Army, which has been weakened by the dispatch of Asada's Brigade to the 1st Army.

Comments.—It will be remembered that at Te-li-ssu a counter-attack was attempted and failed—and its failure was ascribed in part to irregularity in the issue of orders. Here we have failure from a similar cause, though the chances of success were in this case perhaps not quite so great. The Russian army was governed by red tape. Zarubaiev had spent his life in that army, yet now, when exercising his first important command, he neglects one of the principles that must have often been ground into him, namely, that orders and correspondence must pass through their proper channel. The order for Chileiko's counter-attack should have been sent first to Kossovitch, and then the muddle would have been avoided. Red tape is sometimes misplaced; it is always reviled; but the complexity of modern war organisation demands its employment, and what is called "common sense" by those who deride its value cannot replace it.

At the combat at Ta-shih-chiao both sides were apparently beaten. The Russians acknowledged defeat by their retreat, and the Japanese, after a struggle lasting sixteen hours, had failed to drive a single Russian from the trenches. The Russian casualties amounted to 2½ per cent, those of the Japanese to barely 2 per cent. The causes of the weakness of the Japanese attack have already been dealt with; the Russian retreat was due almost entirely to Kouropatkin's instructions. The word "almost" is used advisedly, for it is a point for consideration whether or not a leader is justified in throwing away a fair chance of victory in order to carry out his instructions faithfully. Wellington regarded Hill as his best subordinate because he could always trust him, when in command of a detachment, to play the game—that is, to fight only in accordance with the spirit of his chief's instructions, and never to risk a battle on the chance of gaining glory thereby—and this is probably the type of subordinate most commanders would like. Let us therefore consider Hill in Zarubaiev's place.

At 10 p.m. on the 4th July the Russian case stood thus. The troops in the weakest section of the defences had borne the main onslaught of the enemy and had beaten him back repeatedly. There was, it is true, the possibility of an advance by the 4th Japanese Army from the Ta-ling, but the 2nd Corps had been placed at Hsi-mu-cheng specifically to guard against that danger. The cavalry and the 1st Corps had not been seriously engaged, as their combined casualties only amounted to 172. Moreover, in general reserve, and in corps, or local, reserve with the 4th Corps, were 13½ battalions, 6 squadrons, and 8 guns, which had not been in action. The morale of the men was excellent. The Siberian troops, about whom some doubt had been felt, had proved themselves at least as good as the best

from Russia. In such circumstances it is probable that Hill would not have retreated, although he might have telegraphed an account of the fight to his chief and asked for permission to remain firm. But had he continued the battle on his own judgment, he could hardly have been accused either by his chief or by his own conscience of not being fully justified in doing so.

The Japanese, it is to be noted, manage their transfers of units from army to army with more skill than the Russians. Thus the 2nd Army lay ready at Chi-nam-po to support the 1st Army if defeated on the Yalu; the Asada Brigade assisted at the capture of the Ta-ling and then returned to be ready to oppose the projected offensive of the Eastern Detachment; the 5th Division, as described in the next chapter, is present at the combat of Hsi-mu-cheng. A large portion of the Russian army, on the other hand, is kept marching between the Mo-tien-ling and Liao-yang and between Liao-yang and Ta-shih-chiao—much like D'Erlon's corps at Waterloo—always leaving one place just before a battle, or arriving at another just after the battle.

This war, perhaps more even than most, shows the value of conservation and concentration of energy. The numerous Russian detachments flung far and wide over the country will never be found, by their action, to attempt to influence the course of a battle. Only the troops in the narrow compass of the battle-field deemed it their duty to fight. Their comrades remained absolutely passive. Yet the history of every campaign teems with incidents which prove the enormous value of well-handled detachments from small to great. To quote a single instance to the point—the employment of the garrisons of the Belgian fortresses forced Wellington in 1815 to detach largely to cover his communications. Yet in this campaign the

garrisons on Yin-kou and Vladivostock stirred neither hand nor foot. Possibly the failure of Madritov's raid into Korea took the heart out of the Russian leaders; and it must be granted that the handling of a detachment from an army acting on the defensive is generally much less simple than that of one forming part of an army enjoying the full advantage of the initiative.

CHAPTER X

THE ACTIONS ON THE 31ST JULY

The situation after Ta-shih-chiao.—Notwithstanding the indecisive nature of the action at Ta-shih-chiao, its strategical results are of great importance. By withdrawing from his forward position to Hai-cheng, Zarubaiev has uncovered the right flank of the 2nd Corps at Hsi-mu-cheng, and has exposed it to a converging attack on the part of the 2nd and 4th Japanese Armies. Kouropatkin therefore orders the cavalry and the rear-guards of the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps southwards again. These detachments, strung out in the mountains westwards from Hsi-mu-cheng, cannot afford each other mutual support, nor is there any detachment strong enough seriously to hamper the advance of the Japanese should the latter try to force a passage in the zone it is watching. There is, moreover, a gap of 10 miles between the 2nd Corps and Mitschenko, who is on the left of the rear-guard of the 4th Corps. Into this gap both Kouropatkin and Zarubaiev prophesy the enemy will push his forces.

It is not at all clear why the Russian commander wishes to fight another battle. He has already, somewhat gratuitously, given the enemy the credit of a victory and accepted the ignominy of defeat at Ta-shih-chiao—but that was with the ostensible object of holding on as late as possible to Yin-kou. And so long as a Russian force remained at Ta-shih-chiao, another force must remain facing the Ta-ling to safeguard the line of communication. But

now that the 1st and 4th Corps have retreated there is apparently no object to be gained in keeping the 2nd Corps any longer where it is. Moreover, early in July, when laying bare to the Viceroy the whole scheme of operations for the southern group, Kouropatkin had said: "Having thus (by fighting a delaying action at Ta-shih-chiao and then retiring) concentrated three army corps at Hai-cheng, and gained the necessary time for the arrival of the head of the 17th Corps, we shall be able, with great chance of success, and a minimum of danger for our communications, to accept a decisive battle with the Japanese troops advancing from the south and from the Ta-ling." But now that all is ready for the execution of this plan he abandons it, apparently without compensating advantage; and Zasulich is ordered to give battle with the invariable instruction to offer a determined resistance, but not to lay himself open to a partial defeat.

The combat of Hsi-mu-cheng.—The 4th Japanese Army, under the command of General Nodzu who has recently arrived from Japan, consists of the 5th and 10th Divisions and the 10th Kobi Brigade—in all, 30 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 72 guns. Its task is now to drive the Russians out of Hsi-mu-cheng. General Nodzu decides to make his principal attack from the south, and divides his force into two groups—the 10th Division with the 10th Kobi Brigade and the 5th Division—each of which furnishes three columns. There is a sketch plan of the ground on p. 141. The right group is directed against the heights just west of Hsi-mu-cheng, thus engaging the enemy frontally, while the left group (5th Division) moves against a prominent ridge some 5 miles further west, with the object of striking down later on the main road to Hai-cheng and cutting the Russian communications.

The Russian position was entrenched at a time when

attack was expected from the east or south-east; but, after the battle of Ta-shih-chiao, it becomes clear to Zasulich that attack is more likely to come from the south, and towards the end of the month all information received tends to confirm that view. There is, however, not much time available for the organisation and fortification of a new defensive position, for trenches and communications in the mountains entail great labour. Some even of that short time is taken up in strengthening a position at A, facing east, as Kouropatkin suddenly becomes more anxious about the left flank than the right.

The Russian forces consist of the 2nd Corps and the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Division under Vassiliev, in all 27 battalions, 10 squadrons, and 64 guns. The 2nd Corps is posted in the main position facing east and south-east, and the attached brigade on the ridge to the west. Then in succession westwards came a series of detachments under Mitschenko's command: Pavlov's (1 company, 10 squadrons, 4 guns), detached from Mitschenko, on height 1420, and, lying across a valley road to Hai-cheng, two groups (5½ battalions, 6 squadrons, 12 guns), one under Mitschenko's personal command, and the other—the rear-guard of the 4th Siberians—under Rebinder.

A badly worded missive from Russian headquarters leads Zasulich to believe that he is to be reinforced by another brigade of the 31st Division, and he makes his dispositions accordingly. He only finds out the error during the preliminary encounters on the 30th. He is particularly anxious about height 1420 and the valley to the west of it, to the retention of which he attributes the utmost importance; and, with a foreboding of evil, he telegraphs to Kouropatkin that, should Mitschenko evacuate these points, the defence of the whole position will be paralysed. In spite of the proximity of the enemy, Mitschenko at this

time is covering his front of 4 miles with a single squadron—and has not established connexion with the troops on his left. Vassiliev points out the error of his ways and, receiving no reply, informs Zasulich. Hence, probably, Zasulich's telegram. Mitschenko, indeed, on receiving Vassiliev's message, warns Pavlov to guard height 1420 with special care, but makes no improvement in his outpost service.

On the 31st, the 5th Japanese Division makes a start at 5 a.m. and, surprising Pavlov's outposts, captures hill 1420 at 6 a.m. Zasulich does not receive the news of the loss till 10 a.m., and he thereupon sends two battalions and a battery to take up a refused position north-east of hill 1420 covering the right flank. The Russian left centre is attacked about 5 a.m., but there is no chance of surprise in this quarter, for the front is covered by a strong line of advanced posts, which retire slowly under pressure on to the position. The right Japanese group directs its efforts mainly to the capture of hill 787; but three successive assaults fail, partly because the Japanese batteries have been unable to establish themselves in position and afford the necessary support. A fourth assault on the hill is more carefully prepared, and succeeds about 10 a.m. Zasulich collects six battalions for the purpose of retaking the hill, but the heat is so great that he postpones the counter-attack till 5 p.m.

Meanwhile two Russian battalions and a battery on height 1120 have been suffering severely owing to rifle fire from hill 1420, and from the enfilade fire poured into its trenches by four Japanese batteries a little south of that hill. The Colonel and 10 men are struck down by heat apoplexy. There is a scarcity of water. The Japanese artillery, having got the range of hill 1120 to a nicety, turn from shrapnel to lyddite and succeed in disabling

five guns. By 1 p.m. sixteen Japanese guns have been dragged up on to hill 1420. This is the last straw; and, at 2.30 p.m., the order is given to retreat from height 1120. The Russian infantry, under a terrible fire, saves three of the guns, and then retires on to the Hai-cheng road.

In the morning Nodzu, hearing of the capture of hill 1420, and thinking its loss must cause the Russians to retire, orders the regiment in general reserve to move against the left of the hostile position. The attack is easily beaten back, but the effect is to retain an unnecessarily large number of Russian troops in that quarter. In the meantime Mitschenko's troops, away to the right, have not been showing the same tenacity as their comrades. After losing hill 1420, Pavlov drops into the hollow to the north and maintains the combat; later, he makes an effort with the assistance of a battalion lent by Mitschenko to regain the hill, and one squadron actually reaches the crest and remains there for two hours but, being unsupported, has to retire. Mitschenko makes no other attempt to recapture the height he has lost, although he has five battalions still at his disposal; but, alleging lack of gun-ammunition, he retires from position to position, completely uncovering Zasulich's right flank. By 2 p.m. he is beyond the range of the Japanese guns of hill 1420, and the Japanese artillery emplaced there has consequently been able to turn its whole attention on to height 1120. Moreover, on retiring, Mitschenko omits to inform either Zasulich or Rebinder. The latter officer, who is in command of the rear-guard of the 4th Corps, had supported Mitschenko's right flank against the first attack of the 5th Division, but soon after 6 a.m. his own right is assailed by a detachment (3 battalions, ¼ squadron, 12 guns) under General Kodama, which has been specially detached from the 3rd Division by General Oku. Rebinder holds out under no great

pressure until he learns that Mitschenko has retired, and then follows his example.

The signal for the Russian counter-attack against hill 787, in the centre, is given at 5 p.m., but by this time the



Japanese have had time to establish themselves firmly in their position. Three battalions are launched to the assault covered by a vigorous artillery fire. The first line of trenches is carried in most gallant fashion, but before a second line, which appears to have been defiladed from gun

fire and which comes as a surprise to the assailants, the attack withers away. One battalion retreats to the Hai-cheng road; otherwise both sides retain their original positions. The other three battalions detailed for the counter-attack do not appear to have afforded much support to their comrades, but this is possibly due to instructions from Zasulich, for about this time he receives from Kouropatkin the first order to retreat.

About 7.30 p.m. the combat ceases. The troops on the left have maintained their position; in the centre they have retrograded but little; on the right the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Division is now in a second position which had been previously organised.

A second message, however, is received from head-quarters ordering Zasulich to retire on Hai-cheng, leaving a strong rear-guard between that town and Hsi-mu-cheng. These directions are carried out, the retreat being executed in fair order and unsuspected by the Japanese; but a panic breaks out among the drivers of the transport, many of whom unharness their horses and gallop away on them.

Comments.—The honours in this struggle lay rather with the vanquished than with the victors. The heroic endeavours both in defence and counter-attack made by the Veronèje and Kovlov regiments, holding respectively heights 1120 and 787, were achievements worthy of the proudest Russian traditions. The Japanese, on the other hand, never appear to have pressed their attack with great energy. They were fortunate in the easy capture of positions from which they could render parts of the Russian line untenable, but they did not pursue their success with vigour. Their casualties, indeed, only amounted to 857, or about 2 per cent of their strength, whereas their opponents lost double that number. Yet at the close of a long day's fighting they were held up along the whole line. Zasulich, on this

day, might indeed count himself particularly unfortunate. He had foreseen the probable dangers, and taken all precautions in his power against them. His own troops were well handled and fought bravely; yet he had to acknowledge defeat. In the conditions existing on the 30th, Kouropatkin might well have placed Mitschenko under Zasulich's command, for to have two independent commanders on one battle-field is a great handicap to an army.

Kouropatkin was an unlucky commander in some respects, for the timing of his orders and dispatches was often particularly unfortunate. Up till the 30th July the rear-guards of the southern group had orders to fortify their positions and oppose a solid resistance to the enemy, but on the 31st they were only to resist firmly enough to allow them to discover the forces opposed to them. And this was the day when it was particularly desirable that they should stand firm. The last instructions received by Zasulich, on the other hand, were of a more decided nature: "He was to oppose to the adversary a strong resistance, bearing in mind, however, that if the enemy's forces were so overwhelming as to force him to retire on Hai-cheng, his troops must reach that point without being disorganised." This was undoubtedly the most firmly worded directive issued by Kouropatkin, and it produced the firmest resistance.

After the battle.—On the 1st August the rear-guard of the 2nd Corps maintains its position. Mitschenko, who is reinforced by seven battalions and a battery from Hai-cheng, has a slight skirmish and retires again. The important event of the day is the report of a Colonel of Cossacks that three Japanese divisions are moving due north from Hsi-mu-cheng. This report, which no attempt is made to verify, and which is quite inaccurate, added to the unfavourable news arriving from the Eastern Detachment,

decides Kouropatkin to retreat to An-shan-chan, thus abandoning Hai-cheng, a position which has been fortified for more than two months, and where immense quantities of material have been collected for the Hai-cheng—Hsui-yen—An-tung railway. This general retirement is carried out forthwith, and the southern group reaches its destination on the 4th August, when it begins once more to dig trenches and cut down kao-liang. The Japanese follow slowly, contenting themselves with keeping in touch with the Russian rear-guards.

The Eastern Detachment.—It is now time to examine the course of the campaign in the eastern theatre of operations. It will be remembered that Count Keller, on the 17th July, made an abortive attack against the 2nd Division at the Mo-tien-ling and that, on the 19th, the 12th Japanese Division drove a Russian brigade out of Chiao-tou.

For ten days after the latter action the 1st Japanese Army remains quiet. Kouropatkin, however, though he has renounced the intention of leading a force personally against Kuroki, still proposes, in order to regain confidence in the security of his communications, to strike a blow at the 12th Division and force it away from Chiao-tou. The whole of the 10th Corps (except the brigade with Zasulich) is concentrated on the Lan-ho on the 23rd (*vide* the sketch plan on p. 155). After pottering about there awaiting definite instructions till the 29th July, its commander, General Sluchevski, issues orders for an advance on the 30th. Short forward movements followed by daily digging-in are indicated—not a very adventurous policy, nor one calculated to inspire great enthusiasm among the troops. On the 30th the main body reaches the Yu-shu-ling, and the right and left flank detachments Pien-ling W. and Fu-chia-shan.

Kuroki's plans.—Kuroki has, however, heard of this

concentration against his right and, during the week's grace allowed by his opponents, he strengthens his army by the Asada Brigade and by five Kobi battalions from the line of communications. Some commanders in similar circumstances would have strongly reinforced the 12th Division and taken up a defensive position near Chiao-tou. Kuroki, however, believes the best hope of victory to lie in the attack, and that the greatest assistance he can render to the 12th Division is to attack along the whole line. During the night of the 30th–31st the whole of the 1st Army is set in motion, and on the 31st it strikes the Eastern Detachment at the Yang-tzu-ling and the 10th Corps at the Yu-shu-ling.

The country in which these two actions are fought is hilly, pathless, and intricate. The Japanese are therefore greatly favoured by the possession of pack-transport and, as regards the 12th Division, by the possession of mountain artillery. In the southern section of the area of operations the Guard and 2nd Division are opposed to Count Keller, who disposes of the 3rd and 6th E. S. Rifle Divisions; in the northern section the 12th Division and five Kobi battalions are confronted by the 10th Corps and Liubavin's detachment.

Kuroki's general plan of attack is thus summed up in the British official account :—

(1) To turn the enemy's right flank with the Guard Division.

(2) To hold the troops on the heights above Ta-wan by demonstrating with the 2nd Division.

(3) To concentrate detachments from the 2nd and 12th Divisions against the enemy in the Pien-ling.

(4) To drive in the left of the 10th Corps at the Yu-shu-ling with the remainder of the 12th Division.

It is a daring conception: three and a quarter divisions, spread over a front of 30 miles, are to make an attack, without any reserve, in two groups, separated by 10 miles of mountainous country. It must be borne in mind, moreover, that if the Russians gain a success on their right they will probably secure the Mo-tien-ling, and with it the shortest road to Feng-huang-cheng.

The action at the Yang-tzu-ling.—The Russian position at the Yang-tzu-ling, which stands on mountainous ground covering the main approach to Liao-yang, extends for some 5 miles along the Lan-ho, and has its flanks thrown sharply backwards, forming a salient at each end. Two valleys, cutting deeply into it, divide it into three parts and interfere greatly with intercommunication. The field of fire from the eastern face is excellent, for the Lan-ho valley averages some 800 yards in width; but on the flanks the enemy can approach fairly close under cover. The position is, properly speaking, that of Ta-wan, for the col of Yang-tzu-ling is intended only as a second line of defence. Unfortunately for the defenders, this point has not been made quite clear, and some of the officers are under the impression that the main line of resistance is on the col.

Count Keller does not like the position and suggests its abandonment; but Kouropatkin insists on its maintenance as a protection to the right flank of the movement of the 10th Corps. He accedes, however, to the suggestion that only a rear-guard action shall be fought, and that, in case of serious pressure, the defenders shall be withdrawn to a position for decisive action at Lang-tzu-shan. This, however, is not his last word on the subject, for on the 28th he urges an obstinate resistance; the time is past, he says, for retreating before superior forces.

The defences are manned by the 6th E. S. Rifle Division

(12 battalions, 32 guns). The southern front is assigned to six companies of the 22nd Regiment, the southern portion of the eastern front to the 21st Regiment, and the remainder of the line to the 23rd Regiment. Of the 24th Regiment, one battalion holds the second line on the col, one company is posted beyond and in advance of the left flank, and seven companies with six companies of the 22nd Regiment are in reserve. From Ta-wan to the right flank of the 10th Corps is 10 miles, and about half-way between the two forces lies the 12th Regiment. There are seven other battalions of the 3rd E. S. Rifle Division within half a day's march to the westward, but they take no part in the battle. The morale of the troops is at a somewhat low ebb. For five months they have been occupying position after position, out of which they have either been driven or have retired voluntarily. The thought of retreat is therefore ever present in the minds of both officers and men.

On the Japanese side, the Guard Division, advancing from the south at 9 p.m. on the 30th, is divided into four columns: No. 1 Column on the right (3 battalions, 18 guns) is directed against the eastern front about 1½ miles south of Ta-wan; No. 2 Column (2 battalions, 12 guns) against the south-eastern corner; and Nos. 3 and 4 against the southern front to turn the Russian right flank. Of the 2nd Division, four battalions are sent to the assistance of the 12th Division, and the remainder, though allotted the rôle of attacking the northern end of the position, is retained temporarily in reserve.

Dealing with the columns in order from the left, No. 4 Column marches all night and far into the next day, and is so exhausted when it reaches its objective that it does nothing. No. 3 Column does but little more and, communications having broken down, it is not till 3 p.m. that

the divisional commander hears of the failure of the turning movement. At 8 a.m. part of No. 3 Column crosses the Lan-ho, covered by the fire of its batteries, and moves towards the south-eastern corner of the position. Its commander recognises that if he can get a strong footing here he will render untenable the ground in the southern sections. But to achieve his object he must gain the northern edge of a deep gully 200 yards wide, and though supported by three companies from the divisional reserve he can get no further than the southern edge. On the far side of the gully the 21st Siberian Rifles puts up a magnificent fight and holds its own till nightfall. Even when cartridges run out there is no thought of retreat, and the commander is about to fix bayonets and charge when a fresh supply arrives.

When the divisional commander of the Guards Division hears of the failure of the turning movement, he at once pushes in the two battalions of the right column and supports them with fire from three batteries. About the same time the 2nd Division deploys for attack, two battalions advancing south, and four battalions north of the main road. In the artillery duel, which is now general over the whole front, the Japanese have had rather the worse of the exchange, as the Russians have had the benefit of measured distances and, moreover, owing to the length of the ranges, have been able to use shrapnel where their opponents are reduced to lyddite.

Nevertheless, in the northern section, the attack progresses. The 23rd Siberian Rifle Regiment, which is holding too great an extent of front, scarcely shows the stern resistance exhibited by its comrades on the right. The troops give way under the heavy artillery fire and, at 6.30 p.m., are in full retreat to the second position, thus uncovering the flank of the 21st Regiment. The Japanese bivouac round

the positions, ready to complete the attack on the following day.

Shortly before 2 p.m. the Russians suffer serious loss in the death of their gallant commander, Count Keller. During the three months he has held the command of the Eastern Detachment he has striven, in most disheartening circumstances, to uphold the morale of the officers and men. With the latter he succeeds to a great extent, but courageous, energetic, and straightforward as he is, he has not the gift of inspiring subordinates with some of his own keenness, or even of enforcing a thorough discipline. Once the morale of a corps of officers is lowered, it is far more difficult to raise than that of the men, and only the sternest measures and complete eradication of the evil elements can raise it again. Kouropatkin has especial cause for regret for Keller's fall. He has not too many senior officers under him on whom he can rely, and in Count Keller he has lost a most trustworthy and able subordinate.

In the evening, about 7 p.m., General Kashtalinski arrives from the 3rd Division to take command. The combat, except for a few spasmodic attacks on the 21st Rifles, has ceased. After studying the situation, the new commander decides to recapture the old positions at Ta-wan, and to strengthen his force for the renewal of the conflict by bringing up a couple of batteries and some infantry from the 3rd Division. This plan has much to recommend it, for the effect of continued retreat on the morale of the troops is manifest.

Meanwhile news arrives of a reverse away to the left at Pien-ling, but the 12th Rifles are still standing firm in the interval. The prospects of the defenders are quite favourable, more especially as the Japanese have only one and a half battalions in reserve, though this fact is, of course, unknown to Kashtalinski. But the plan is referred to

Kouropatkin, and he telegraphs at midnight that he cannot allow any of the reserves to be used as the direction of the enemy's main attack has not yet been determined. This sentence is the expression of a principle that ruins many of the Russian commander's schemes. By the time the enemy's plan has been fathomed the last chance of employing the reserves, and with it the last hope of victory, has long passed away. But some hours before Kouropatkin's answer arrives, Kashtalinski's resolution begins to waver. Confirmation arrives of the disaster at Pien-ling to part of the 10th Corps, and at 10 p.m. he assembles a council of war, with the usual result—a unanimous vote for retreat. The detachment consequently withdraws towards Lang-tzu-shan, being unmolested in its retirement. On the 2nd August both the divisions are concentrated at that point.

The Russian losses in the action of Yang-tzu-ling number 390, those of the Japanese 536.

The action at Yu-shu-ling.—On the 30th, just when General Sluchevski has completed the arrangements for continuing his offensive on the following day, an order arrives from Kouropatkin directing him to defer his operation till the arrival of a brigade of the 17th Corps which has orders to march from Liao-yang on the 2nd August. The forward movement is therefore countermanded, and the 10th Corps remains, on the eve of combat, distributed over 5 miles of front on the line Pien-ling West—Fu-chia-shan. Under General Martson at Pien-ling West are seven and a quarter battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 mountain guns and, at Li-pi-yu, under escort of a company, a field battery, which cannot move in this mountainous country. Martson had been directed by Sluchevski, in the original order, to turn the left flank of the Japanese position at Chiao-tou.

North of the Hsi-ho, on the Fu-chia-shan, is the Tambov

Regiment; south of the river on the Yu-shu-ling and towards Pien-ling West are two batteries and three and a half battalions of the Penza Regiment. The general reserve under Hershelmann, consisting of six battalions and one squadron, is in the rear of the left centre. Away to the rear on the Lan-ho, under the protection of one battalion and four squadrons, are sixty-nine field guns, for which no positions can be found. The right flank is covered by the 12th Rifles, the left flank by Grekov's detachment (1 battalion, 7 squadrons), about 1 mile north of Fu-chia-shan, and by Grulev's detachment and Liubavin's Cossacks, both at Pen-hsi-hu.

Two distinct actions are fought by the 10th Corps on the 31st. The engagement on the right flank at Pien-ling West will first be described.

Of General Martson's detachment, half arrived on the position at 3 p.m. on the 30th, and the other half, including the commander, at 10 p.m. There was therefore not much time available for entrenching, nor had the commander an opportunity for reconnoitring his position. On the left of the line is a dominating hill which forms the key of the position. This had been occupied by a section of the Penza Regiment, but instructions had been issued that it was to be taken over by General Martson. The company detailed by the latter to occupy the hill fails to do so, with the result that, on the following morning, the hill is seized without much difficulty by the enemy, and its loss to the Russians is the determining factor in the ensuing action.

To turn now to the 12th Japanese Division. A detachment (5 battalions, 1 squadron, 6 guns) under Sasaki leaves Chiao-tou at 3.30 a.m. and, after driving in the Russian outposts, moves to the attack of the Pien-ling position. Sasaki recognises the importance of the dominating hill to the north and detaches a flanking party to capture it.

At the same time a frontal attack is made. On an adjacent but lower hill to the south two Russian companies break suddenly and retreat. Their ground is at once occupied, and the solitary section of the Penza Regiment, now suffering severe losses from fire in front and on both flanks, after a gallant resistance, retires.

Just at the moment that the Japanese reach the crest, three Russian companies, headed by a brass band, begin to ascend the slopes and pay a heavy penalty for being too late. A battalion in reserve makes an ineffectual attempt to recapture the hill, and then the whole Russian left begins to fall back. On the Russian right matters progress favourably at first, and an attempt is made to envelop the Japanese left, but the appearance of the four battalions, lent by the 2nd Division, causes the Russians in that quarter also to retreat. Okasaki does not press forward, but moves westwards to some heights overlooking a defile through which the Russians must pass on their way to Li-pi-yu. There a ghastly scene is enacted. During the battle of the Pyrenees British troops had a like experience: at the bridge of Yanzi the soldiers of the Light Division fired, but with averted eyes, on Reille's crowded masses struggling in the defile. The Japanese do not claim to have displayed a like repugnance, but doubtless they too found the work abhorrent. Martson now withdraws his shattered troops behind the Lan-ho, and joins the reserve.

There is no pursuit, for Sasaki has orders to combine in the northern battle by turning the flank of the Penza Regiment. That regiment, however, declines to have its flank turned. The company on the right, in occupation of an advanced post, holds out alone till midday and then retreats to the main position. Beyond driving it back, Sasaki effects nothing. His excuse, according to our official account, was that the ground was too intricate

and hilly even for infantry. The Russians, however, who could not compare with the Japanese as mountaineers, found no great difficulty in movement.

Okasaki's pursuit is checked by four squadrons of the Terek-Kuban Regiment (of whom more hereafter), with two machine guns from the general reserve. In all probability, however, his instructions precluded a move to the Lan-ho prior to a Japanese advance along the whole line.

The fighting in the north now claims our attention. At 4 a.m. two Japanese regiments advance to the attack, the 46th north of the Hsi-ho and the 24th well to the south of that river. The attack is to be supported by thirty guns while three squadrons and four Kobi battalions are detailed to watch the Russian detachments on the right flank at Pen-hsi-hu, and one battalion only is kept in general reserve. The action of the 24th Regiment is quickly dealt with: after reaching the wide open valley east of the Shih-shan ridge, it is instructed to wait until the effect of Sasaki's turning movement be felt; and as that, as related above, proves a failure, the 24th Regiment does nothing. Of the 46th Regiment, one battalion is sent against hill 500, one against Fu-chia-shan, and one is held in reserve. The picquets on hill 500 are completely surprised; the Japanese crown the ridge and blaze away into the bivouac on the western slopes. It speaks volumes for the steadiness of the Russian soldier that on such a trying occasion there is no real panic. In fact one, Colonel Lippoman, picks up a couple of companies and makes a desperate effort to recapture the ridge. The attempt proves a failure, and the gallant Lippoman is killed; but sufficient time has been gained to restore order, collect the wounded, and retire.

Shortly afterwards the Japanese gain possession of the Fu-chia-shan, and the Tambov Regiment, with a much reduced effective, is gathered on the parallel ridge to the

west. Strong reinforcements arrive, and the Russian artillery shell the captured ground most effectively. The Japanese can get no further. At midday the Russians have assembled seven battalions and two squadrons on their left flank and are contemplating a counter-attack, but Sluchevski forbids it—at any rate till nightfall. The two Russian batteries are effectively handled and have the better of the artillery duel, though the Japanese guns are under cover. At 6.30 p.m. Sluchevski receives a telegram from Grekov, stating that "The Japanese are moving their artillery round our left, and their infantry are following the guns in closed columns." These troops are pure figments of the imagination, but Sluchevski naturally credits the report. About the same time Kouropatkin telegraphs that, until he is certain of the direction of Kuroki's main attack, he cannot allow Sluchevski to make use of the brigade of the 17th Corps. By this hour the original general reserve had been expended—four battalions to the left flank, four squadrons and two and a quarter battalions to take the place of Martson's detachment covering Li-pi-yu, one battalion to help the centre. Thus, to meet any fresh attack, there is only Martson's demoralised force. Sluchevski therefore decides to retire behind the Lan-ho. The retreat is as usual well conducted, and practically unmolested by the Japanese. At 11 p.m. Sluchevski receives a telegram informing him that General Bilderling, commanding the 17th Corps, has been placed in command of both the Eastern Detachment and the 10th Corps.

The Russian casualties amount to 2069, those of the Japanese only to 453.

Comments.—The success of the 1st Army was due mainly to causes beyond the control of its leader, though some of these causes doubtless entered into his appreciation of the situation. The daring of the conception has been

Plan X
YANG-TZU-LING and
YU-SHU-LING
31st. July 1904



touched upon; it would have been termed reckless had there been a leader of note on the Russian side. The determination to attack was admirable; but might not Kuroki have played at least as strong a card with less danger? Might he not have employed the Guard Division and the greater part of the artillery of the 2nd Division to hold Count Keller and cover the Mo-tien-ling, and have thrown the remainder of the 2nd Division against the flank of the 10th Corps? Having dealt with the latter, he could then have turned with his whole force against the Eastern Detachment. The operation was feasible owing to the relatively great mobility of the Japanese troops and the known supineness of the Russian leaders. To attack with equal numbers along a whole line is but seldom productive of great success; the skill of a leader is shown rather in bringing superior force to bear at the right time in the most effective direction.

In the course of a fortnight the Russians have fought five defensive battles—Chiao-tou, Ta-shih-chiao, Hsi-mu-cheng, Yang-tzu-ling, and Yu-shu-ling. These battles show a curious similarity. In each case, except for the disaster at Pien-ling, the Japanese attack has by nightfall proved a failure; in each case the Russian army retreats with the loss of morale and prestige that follow defeat, and the Japanese gain the credit of victory with its attendant advantages. It has been already pointed out that the main cause of the Russian defeats was the indecision at head-quarters resulting largely from dual control. Alexiev proposes bold measures that may redeem the political situation; Kouropatkin, cautious as ever, adopts the Viceroy's measures in part and, just at the moment when the chances of success seem bright, he plays for safety.

Apart, however, from faults in the higher leadership, there were many other factors at play. Herschelmann

decided, as already stated, to fight at Chiao-tou to give his valorous 9th Division their baptism of fire; the result was not only the defeat at Chiao-tou, but also that at Pien-ling, for the Briansk regiment, shattered at Chiao-tou, was the first to break at Pien-ling. Again, the destruction of Martson's detachment furnished the main reason for the withdrawal both of the Eastern Detachment and of the 10th Corps. Zasulich had fought on the Yalu for the same reasons that Herschelmann fought at Chiao-tou. A leader inspired with such sentiments is a valuable asset to an army, but it may be best to keep him in a subordinate rank, and not to entrust him with an independent command.

The effect of lack of preparation for war on the Russian side was clearly visible. Without mountain artillery and pack-transport the offensive of the 10th Corps was almost bound to fail. Moreover, the slow-moving, burly, plain-trained Russian, who suffered from heart ailments when he tried to scale hills, was at a disadvantage with his more agile opponent, who out-marched him and out-climbed him, and would consequently appear unexpectedly on his flanks or rear.

Results of the fighting on the 31st July.—Kuroki has now gained possession of the Lan-ho valley, and can therefore coordinate the movements of his scattered divisions with greater ease. He is also one march nearer Liao-yang. The 2nd and 4th Armies have, moreover, gained touch in the neighbourhood of Hai-cheng, and their supply difficulties have been solved to a great extent by the capture of an additional base at Yin-kou.

Nevertheless the Russian forces on their side, though morale is diminished, have suffered no great strategical disadvantage by defeat. They are now more concentrated —from An-shan-chan to Lang-tzu-shan their front measures

but 45 miles. On the other hand, an extent of 30 miles of mountainous country separates the Japanese southern group from the 1st Army. Kouropatkin can therefore still operate against either group—with reduced time and space to manœuvre, indeed, but with increased facility of supply and transport. He can now, moreover, remedy the prevailing disorganisation, and return detached units to their proper formations. He is, of course, more than ever anxious for his line of communication about Muk-den, but it is doubtful if there is any real danger on that score. Should Kuroki move his whole force in that direction, he will be completely isolated and, with his flanks and communications exposed, will be lucky to escape with anything less than annihilation. If, on the other hand, he sends a strong mixed detachment there, he weakens his army and exposes it to defeat in detail; and he can hardly send a simple raiding force, as he is relatively weak in mounted troops.

In this regard—that is, in its rôle of protection—full justice has perhaps not been done to the part played by the Russian cavalry. In its active or affirmative duties it failed, but in its negative duty of preventing the Japanese cavalry from acting effectively in destroying the railway or disturbing the rest of the infantry it proved, from very force of numbers, of considerable value.

CHAPTER XI

PORT ARTHUR

The Position of the Passes.—It is now necessary to turn back to the events in the Kuan-tung subsequent to the battle of Nan-shan. A sketch plan of the peninsula will be found on page 163.

After General Oku's departure northward with the 2nd Army, the 1st and 11th Japanese Divisions remain in the Kuan-tung to form a nucleus of the 3rd Army which, under the command of General Nogi, is destined to besiege Port Arthur. Pending the arrival of reinforcements, and while the fleet is busy clearing Ta-lien-wan Bay and Dalny harbour of mines, so as to enable them to be used as bases, the Japanese troops dig themselves in opposite the Position of the Passes. This position, some 12 to 15 miles from Port Arthur, runs along the crest of a line of hills extending almost from sea to sea and measuring from north to south some thirteen miles. It is occupied by a force of 1½ divisions under General Fock. Chien-shan, an advanced post and a good observing station, is held by a company and two light guns. For a period of three weeks the opponents remain watching each other and busily entrenching.

The Russians from their point of vantage can count the Japanese numbers, but the thought of an offensive movement at this time does not appear to have presented itself to them, although the occasion was not unfavourable. Two divisions and a strong naval brigade might have been

employed for the stroke, leaving reserve battalions, fortress troops, and sailors in garrison; such a force would have been overpoweringly strong in artillery, for, of the two Japanese divisions, one—the 11th—was only supplied with small mountain guns. The distance separating the adversaries was so short that lack of transport, which usually renders the garrison of a fortress immobile, would not have materially affected the operation. It is, however, no light undertaking to organise a mobile force from sedentary troops, and the Russian leaders were not unnaturally anxious to utilise every spare moment allowed them in strengthening the fortifications, which were still incomplete.

On the 23rd June the Russian naval sortie, which has been described in Chapter VIII, takes place, and fails. Two days later General Nogi, strengthened now by a Kobi Brigade and a naval detachment, makes his first advance and seizes Chien-shan. An attempt made by the Russians early in July to retake this important position miscarries, though assisted by the fire of several warships. Then, during July, the 9th Division, 4th Kobi Brigade, 2nd Field Artillery Brigade (72 guns), and a large number of siege guns arrive, and as a consequence Nogi now determines to carry the Position of the Passes.

General Fock has in the meantime been very busy entrenching. He figures so prominently in the operations in the Kuan-tung that his character may be worthy of more than passing notice. He is apparently a close student of war. When Tretyakov, at Nan-shan, calls repeatedly for reinforcements, he quotes a principle: "Keep back your reserves as long as you possibly can, as they are always asked for and sent up too early." He doubtless remembers that Napoleon refused to comply with such demands at Austerlitz, and won, that Blücher allowed his reserves to be

absorbed, too soon into the firing line at Ligny, and lost. Therefore in Napoleonic fashion he declines to let his reserve go forward piecemeal into the fight. Unfortunately, however, he goes a step further than the great master, and refuses to use his reserve at all. Then, apparently from studying the South African War, he concludes that all trenches should be placed at the foot of slopes, and he insists on their being so sited even where there is an insufficient command to obtain a fair field of fire. Finally his study of Nan-shan leads him to believe that the Japanese always make their decisive attacks round the left flank. He therefore expends a vast amount of labour on the ground to the extreme left, where there is a gap between the hills and the sea, and has, necessarily, to leave several important portions of the position almost untouched. Thus little attention has been paid to Yu-pi-lu-tzu, where there is a prominent salient; and, in the second line, of which Wolf Hills form the dominant feature, not only are the trenches sited low, but the kao-liang, in the midst of which they are dug, has not been cut.

Japanese attack.—The Position of the Passes is at this time occupied by 14 battalions, 22 scout detachments, 1 squadron, 54 guns, and 32 machine guns; 4½ battalions and a battery are held in reserve. Against this force Nogi, on the 26th July, directs his attack in three columns, of which, roughly speaking, the right consists of the 1st Division, the centre of the 9th Division and 1st Kobi Brigade, and the left of the 11th Division. The 4th Kobi Brigade is kept in reserve. A converging attack, made by the right and centre columns on the Yu-pi-lu-tzu salient, is beaten off, and a day's heavy fighting results only in the capture of a couple heights on the Russian right. As the Russians have only lost 350 men, and there are still ten companies in reserve, Stoessel decides to continue the battle. On the 27th the

salient is again assaulted, and the defenders, running short of ammunition, are reduced to throwing stones; the Japanese see their chance and rush in, but they are immediately driven out by the bayonet. To the north Japanese ships have been shelling the salient; to the south Russian ships creeping inside the minefields have been helping the defenders. By nightfall the Russians have lost 1000 men; but their line is intact and there is every intention of continuing the fight on the morrow. In the night, however, an important height on the Russian right is captured by the Japanese. An attempt at recapture fails, and the order is given to withdraw to the second position.

The retirement begins at 9 a.m. on the 28th. The Japanese, crowning the conquered heights, pour a heavy fire into the retreating troops. The three days' fighting has cost the Japanese nearly 4000 casualties, and the Russians have lost about half that number.

Withdrawal to Port Arthur.—The second position runs from Louis Bay by Wolf Hills and Ta-ku-shan to the sea, and is strong enough naturally; but, as already stated, the kao-liang has not been cut, the trenches have no command, and there is consequently no field of fire. Given time, all this might have been remedied, but the Japanese are much helped by a piece of fortune and press quickly on. The officer commanding the left section on Wolf Hills, considering his reserve too weak, sends the following order to the firing line: "Send back one of the companies from the position to the reserve." No less than three company commanders take the order to apply to their own particular company, and the enemy seeing them retiring, dash into the gap and gain the position. With the capture of Wolf Hills the resistance on the second line collapses, except on the right about Ta-ku-shan. The Russians are again

heavily punished in the retreat, as no arrangement has been made to cover their retirement by the guns of the fortress. It had indeed always been the custom of the Japanese to make long pauses at the close of an operation, and this relentless pursuit has taken their opponents by surprise. By the evening of the 31st July, the point reached in the narrative of the field operations further



north, the Russians are within the outer line of the defences of Port Arthur, and the Japanese are entrenched on the captured heights.

Ta-ku-shan and the adjoining height are not captured until the 9th August, and then only after two days' fighting and at a cost of nearly 1200 men.

The fortress organisation.—The fortress of Port Arthur is heavily over-staffed. There is General Stoessel, in reality the commander of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps,

but, by virtue of seniority, commander of all the Russian troops in the Kuan-tung. There is the staff of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. Then there is General Smirnov, commandant of the fortress, and his staff. Again, while the 4th and 7th Rifle Divisions are battling outside Port Arthur, their guns are in charge of the Major-General commanding the artillery of the 3rd Siberian Corps; but once inside the defences they pass under the control of the Major-General commanding the artillery of the fortress. There is also a chief of the staff to General Stoessel and a chief of the fortress staff. General Kouropatkin had realised the friction that would occur and, on the 3rd July, had ordered Stoessel to escape in a destroyer—but Stoessel suppressed the telegram.

In one respect the fortress is fortunate. General Kondratenko is appointed to the command of the land defences. He proves himself a most gallant and capable soldier and, under his inspiring leadership, the morale of the troops rises. As regards food, estimating the garrison at 42,000 men, there is still flour for 180 days; but from the beginning of August horseflesh has to be issued in lieu of meat. There is never really a great scarcity of supplies, however, as the high prices paid are always sufficient to tempt the blockade-runner.

Naval sortie of the 10th August.—Since the 1st August the ships in harbour and the docks have been suffering at intervals from bombardment, albeit by unaimed fire. Now that Ta-ku-shan has been lost the bombardment will probably become more vigorous. Moreover, about this time Admiral Vitgeft receives a direct order from the Czar to break through and proceed to Vladivostock. One battleship has already been damaged severely by fire, and several other warships to a lesser extent. A decision is therefore arrived at to attempt a sortie on the 10th.

"About 9 a.m. the whole fleet, preceded by six steam hoppers, in line abreast, to sweep the channel for mines," moves out of the harbour. The opposing naval forces are approximately equal in numbers and weight of metal, but long tarrying in harbour has not improved the sailing qualities of the Russian ships. Admiral Togo has not changed his strategy, and still wishes the Port Arthur fleet to be destroyed by the army, so that his own ships may be equal to dealing with the Baltic fleet. He therefore endeavours to head off Vitgeft, and confines himself to a running fight at long ranges. His caution is so great that, as the day is closing, there appears to be some possibility of the escape of his quarry. Fortunately for the Japanese, at this critical time, two 12-inch shells strike the Russian flagship, killing the Admiral, Captain, and navigating officers, and also damaging the steering gear. The flagship begins to go round in a circle, and in so doing throws the whole Russian line into disorder. Moreover, some time elapses before the signal transferring the command to Admiral Ukhtomski can be made, and the latter, on receiving it, has great difficulty in signalling his own orders, as the topmasts of his flagship have been shot away.

So much confusion and delay is caused by these untoward events that Admiral Togo is now able easily to head off the Russian fleet and drive it back, heavily damaged, into Port Arthur. One battleship and several cruisers attempt to escape, but are either sunk or are disarmed in neutral ports, and their crews interned. Such is the end of the great sortie—the last effort of the Russian armada. Its fate must now be one with the fortress. The return of the defeated fleet is, moreover, a bitter blow to the defenders of the stronghold. Not only is the signal failure of the Russian naval power in the East depressing to the garrison, but their return means that the blockade will

be as strict as ever, and therefore supplies will be hard to obtain.

Comments.—It is not proposed to discuss Admiral Togo's action in allowing the Russian fleet to get back to Port Arthur without engaging it closely, beyond observing that the Japanese commander was in the position of having to be very careful of his ships in view of the possible arrival of a hostile armada from the Baltic. But it is desirable to point out that the course followed by him necessarily exercised a considerable influence over the operations of Marshal Oyama.

Command of the sea was absolutely indispensable to the Japanese military forces in Manchuria, and the existence of a somewhat formidable "fleet in being" within the secure haven of Port Arthur was a constant, even if it was not a very serious, danger to Oyama's forces. So much was this the case, and so imperative was it that the fleet in Port Arthur should be disposed of before any naval reinforcements should reach the Russians from Europe, that the Japanese military chief was now obliged to make the reduction of the fortress an objective equal in importance to that of defeating the enemy in the open in front of Liao-yang, and this just at the time when the culmination of his strategical combinations was at hand. A couple of divisions withdrawn from General Nogi and transferred northwards might obviously make a vast difference in the great battle which was shortly to be expected. They might well make the difference between defeat and victory, or between a mere tactical success and the decisive overthrow of Kouropatkin. It was decided, therefore, to attempt the capture of the fortress by assault.

The first great assault of Port Arthur.—The capture of Port Arthur with all the prestige attaining thereto,

and with all the enthusiasm it will arouse in Japan, the assurance of the permanent command of the sea, the probability of a decisive victory at Liao-yang the possibility of finishing the war in a burst of glory, seeing that the peace party is at the moment asserting itself in Russia—such are the tempting prospects. What are the dangers? The Japanese have not failed to drive the Russians from a large number of entrenched positions. Their morale is assuredly greater. There is no great deterring example of a failure to storm a fortress in modern war, except, perhaps, that of Plevná, where failure has generally been attributed to mismanagement. True, neither the number nor the weight of the available siege guns is up to requirements, but, on the other hand, the defences are believed still to be incomplete. If this were the reasoning the gains appear certainly to justify the risks. But Oyama issued his first orders for the attack of the Liao-yang position on the 14th, that is, before the great assault on Port Arthur. It would thus seem that he was not depending on the assistance of Nogi's troops to aid his advance, and that the ill-fated assault may have been undertaken as the result of the over-confidence due to continued success.

On the 13th August the first attempt is made against the main defences, and, on the north, some outlying works are captured after desperate fighting. A summons to surrender is now sent which is curtly refused. A like treatment is accorded to an offer to allow non-combatants to leave the fortress, as the underlying motive is suspected by the Russians to be the desire for information rather than the cause of humanity. "At the time of the parley," according to our official account, "the distance between the combatants was nowhere more than a mile, and yet during the four and a half months that were to elapse before

the Japanese should succeed in crossing this narrow space, the combined losses on both sides were to exceed a hundred thousand men."

General Nogi now determines to storm the works. A bombardment is carried out on the 19th, followed by an assault which is continued at short intervals till the night of the 24th August. Two redoubts only are captured, and they are practically untenable owing to fire from a second line in rear. The artillery support has not been nearly sufficient, and the cost has been enormous. The Japanese have a casualty roll of 15,000; the Russians have lost 3000. The valley lying between the two forces is heaped with dead. The penalty for an error of judgment has been severe, although, if Oyama did expect assistance at Liao-yang from General Nogi's divisions, it was an error which success would assuredly have justified.

The battle of Ulsan.—Before closing this chapter it will be convenient to refer to the operations of the Vladivostock squadron. All through June and July it makes a series of successful raids against the Japanese trade and communications, and Admiral Kamimura incurs great odium, and damage by fire to his town house in Tokio, for his inability to bring the raiders to book. No arrangement appears to have been made by the Russian admiral at Vladivostock with Admiral Vitgeft for concerted action on the occasion of the sortie on the 10th August. But, on receiving news that the fleet has left Port Arthur, the cruiser squadron puts to sea with the object of joining its comrades. Admiral Jessen, who is in command, decides to make for the Korean Straits and await the arrival of Admiral Vitgeft's fleet there. On the 14th August he is met by the Japanese squadron under Admiral Kamimura. The Russians maintain a running engagement for about five hours with a greatly superior force, and fight splendidly.

The Japanese never press home the attack, but they succeed in sinking the *Rurik*, and the other two cruisers escape to Vladivostock, the chase being abandoned by Kamimura just when their capture or destruction appears certain. As, however, they never succeed in leaving port again during the war, the object of the Japanese admirals may be said to have been accomplished.

CHAPTER XII

THE PRELIMINARIES OF LIAO-YANG

Recapitulation.—The Japanese divisions marching by the mountains and the Japanese divisions marching by the plains are converging on their objective, and the plans, devised with such skill and executed with such patience and perseverance, are approaching their consummation. On the other side the Russian leader has gathered his forces around him and is making ready, in concentrated strength, for that battle which he has postponed with a perseverance equal to that displayed by his adversaries in their offensive movement. The operations on both sides are, however, for the moment interrupted by the rain, and, as a temporary armistice enforced by nature prevails throughout Manchuria, it may be well at this point to gather together the threads of the story which have become somewhat unravelled in considering the course of events, owing to the necessity for darting first to one point and then to another of the extensive theatre of war.

The torpedo attack on the 9th February, that awakes Russian statesmen from their optimistic dreams, inflicts moral and material damages on the Russian fleet from which it never fully recovers. Bottled up in Port Arthur, it there awaits the fall of that fortress.

The military operations are initiated by the dispatch of the 1st Army to Korea. For a period of six weeks this army, or portions of it, marches slowly over abominable roads till it reaches the River Yalu, where Kuroki strikes

and defeats a detachment pushed out by Kouropatkin to gain time for the concentration of the Russian army at Liao-yang. Kuroki's next move is to Feng-huang-cheng, where he remains for weeks threatening the single Russian line of communication and thus covering indirectly the landing of other Japanese armies on the Manchurian littoral.

At the beginning of May the 2nd Army is disembarked near Pi-tzu-wo—an operation rendered easy by the inaction of the Russians by land and sea. Towards the end of this month General Oku gives an exhibition of ruthless determination at Nan-shan, and as a fruit of his victory obtains possession of Dalny as a base. He then turns northward with three divisions, which at first cover the disembarkation of other troops under Nogi destined for the siege of Port Arthur and, later on, join in a concentric advance on Liao-yang. About the middle of May, the leading division of the 4th Army, which under Nodzu is to fill a gap between the 1st and 2nd Armies, begins to land at Ta-ku-shan.

The middle of June is marked by the battle of Te-li-ssu, when General Stackelberg's force, moving to the relief of Port Arthur, is defeated by the 2nd Army. Shortly after this battle the Russian fleet, having repaired damages, makes a sortie, and, though the effort is of the feeblest, the reappearance of the damaged battleships causes Japanese Imperial Headquarters to issue an order for the temporary suspension of the general advance. The commanders of the 1st and 4th Armies, however, having made their preparations, decide to gain better jumping-off places for the later operations. Kawamura, with the 10th Division and a brigade lent by the Guards, seizes the Ta-ling and Kuroki the eastern passes of the Fen-shui range. The 2nd Army is at this time idle owing to lack of transport.

On the 17th July Count Keller makes his attack on the Mo-tien-ling and is repulsed. Two days later the left of the Russian line is beaten by the 12th Japanese Division at Chiao-tou. Kouropatkin, fearing for his communications at Muk-den, then decides on striking a heavy blow at Kuroki, and begins to assemble a large force for this purpose, intending to command it personally. But finding it is not well equipped for such an operation, he changes his mind and settles to capture Chiao-tou instead, making use only of the 10th Corps. Kuroki, however, refusing to be attacked, himself becomes the assailant, and not only defeats the 10th Corps, but also forces the Eastern Detachment to abandon its position at Ta-wan.

In the meantime the 2nd Japanese Army has been advancing and, as the result of an action on the 24th July, causes Zarubaiev with the 1st and 4th Siberians to retire from Ta-shih-chiao on Hai-cheng. On the 31st the 4th Army, under Nodzu, defeats Zasulich at Hsi-mu-cheng, thus gaining touch with the 2nd Army. The whole of the Russian southern group then retires to the fortified position of An-shan-chan, where it remains till the end of the rains.

The result of these various operations is that early in August the 1st Japanese Army is along the Lan-ho within 25 miles of Liao-yang, and that the 2nd and 4th Armies are on an east and west line through Hai-cheng, about 40 miles from Liao-yang. Opposing Kuroki is the 10th Russian Corps, part of the 17th Corps, and the Eastern Detachment, which has now been christened the 3rd Siberian Corps—the whole being under the command of General Bilderling. Opposing the southern group are the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Siberian Corps—the whole being under General Zarubaiev. At Port Arthur the 3rd Army, under General Nogi, has been increased to three divisions and two Kobi Brigades. The Position of the Passes has been captured, and unaimed fire

can now be brought to bear on the harbour. As a result of these successes on the part of the Japanese, the Russian fleet attempts to break out toward Vladivostock, but is beaten back. On the 19th begins a great assault on the defences which results in a bloody repulse for the assailants.

Russian appreciations of the situation.—The Viceroy is on his way to Vladivostock when he hears of the accumulation of disasters on the 31st July. He immediately returns, and on the 3rd August has a conference with Kouropatkin at Liao-yang. His first inquiry is as to the cause of the retreat from Ta-shih-chiao, to which Kouropatkin replies that the retirement was made on the initiative of General Zarubaiev, who was influenced in his decision by the note received from Stackelberg; the Russian commander appears to regard himself in no way responsible. After the conference the Viceroy and Kouropatkin both write to St. Petersburg. Alexiev gives Kouropatkin's version of affairs with his own strong criticism thereon, and he then proceeds to explain his views on the existing situation: He considers it advisable to throw back Kuroki at any cost, and adds: "As to the concentration of six corps at Liao-yang on a position, certainly vast and fortified, but without advantages in front and with a river in rear, it seems dangerous enough, all the more so now that the enemy has exposed his design of undertaking a strategic turning movement round the position towards Muk-den."

But Kouropatkin is firm in his refusal to undertake at present anything in the nature of an offensive movement. He bases his decision now on the diminished morale of the eastern group. He may think of assuming the offensive perhaps when the 5th and 6th Siberian Corps and the 1st Army Corps from Europe arrive. For the present An-shan-chan is to be held, if General Bilderling can maintain himself on the line Lang-tzu-shan—An-ping.

Kouropatkin proceeds then to outline the causes of his reverses, and the annotations of the Minister of War on this letter are of considerable interest:—The enemy is in superior numbers, and though the difference in this respect is not sufficient to give him decisive victory, yet acting offensively he can bring superior force to bear on the selected point of attack. (Annotation, "That is just what we ought to do.") The enemy's preparation and the adaptation of his equipment to the theatre of war is better than ours, he is more nimble and less heavily burdened, and we are suffering from the great heat and from thirst. (Annotation, "That must be equally true of the Japanese.") The kao-liang, standing as high as a horseman's head, interferes not only with the action of the infantry, but with that of the cavalry. Changes of disposition even of considerable forces can be effected without being observed, which gives the assailant great advantages over the defender. (Annotation, "Then we ought to attack.") The senior officers are showing a want of confidence as to our success (annotation, "That is hardly astonishing when we have nothing but defeats"), and many of them are getting nervous.

Finally, Kouropatkin asks the Emperor to reinforce him with five corps, and requests that the oldest classes of reservists may not be taken. He also urges that each army corps may be equipped with pack-transport and be allotted at least twenty-four mountain guns.

On the previous day, Jilinski, in a letter which he terms "hard but no more than just," had written to the Minister of War pointing out that Kouropatkin had shown himself absolutely incapable not only of a resolute offensive, but even of an energetic defensive, and suggesting that someone should be placed over him with greater authority than that exercised by the Viceroy.

Russian dispositions.—The extraordinary wave of heat that had so oppressed the troops during the actions at the end of July culminates in a tropical storm on the 7th August, and from that date till the 27th August the rains continue with but few interruptions. Operations come to a standstill, and both sides remain quiet until the 23rd August, when the Japanese again begin to move. A map of the country around Liao-yang to illustrate the battle and the operations immediately preceding it will be found at the end of Chapter XIV, facing page 254.

Kouropatkin has issued orders for the defence of the An-shan-chan line by the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Siberian Corps, but, on the 7th August, he decides that any fighting there is to be of a purely demonstrative character. At this date he is busy with the evacuation of stores and non-combatants from Liao-yang; he is constructing six good roads leading north from that town, and is dispatching officers from every corps to reconnoitre lines of retreat so as to be able to act as guides, even at night. In front of positions at Muk-den and Tieh-ling, kao-liang is being cut down to clear the field of fire. So that it does not at present look as if Kouropatkin means to fight it out at Liao-yang. Nor are these arrangements for a retreat, about which no secrecy is maintained, calculated to stimulate resistance. On the 9th, all the old-pattern guns, numbering eight batteries, are collected at Liao-yang, and, with nine battalions and two and a half squadrons, furnish a permanent garrison there. At the same time a mobile force, also to be stationed at Liao-yang, of eight battalions, five and a half batteries, and a dragoon regiment, is formed under General Yantzul.

With the eastern group, as with the southern group, should the enemy attack, the outer positions are now to be held by rear-guards only. Advantage is to be taken of the

pause in the operations to carry out a continuous guerilla warfare. Ambuscades are to be devised. Night attacks are to be made—by moonlight, if possible. Prisoners are to be captured—for each soldier taken 100 roubles, for each officer 300 roubles are promised. There is, however, no instance on record of these suggestions being carried out. On the 17th Zarubaiev is appointed to the command of the southern group—but Kouropatkin constantly ignores both him and Bilderling, and issues his instructions direct to corps commanders.

The fear of the severance of communications is a source of constant anxiety to the Russian chief throughout all these operations, and is at the bottom of most of his dispositions and changes of disposition. For this reason the eastern group is mulcted of two brigades, of which one, with five and a half batteries, is sent to the mobile force at Liao-yang and the other with three batteries to Muk-den. This reduces Bilderling's force, which is watching a somewhat extended line, by sixteen battalions and eight and a half batteries. The Viceroy, who is still anxious to see the attack on Kuroki carried out, points out that this dispatch of troops to Muk-den from the line of battle is not the best way of dealing with the situation, and suggests to Kouropatkin that he should bring back the brigade sent to Muk-den. The brigade is brought back, not to An-ping, but to Liao-yang, where it is set to work on entrenchments. In the meantime reinforcements are pouring in at a rapid rate from Europe. By the 5th August the detrainment of the 17th Corps is complete, and on the 12th, the head of the 5th Siberians arrives, detachments from it being dispatched to cover Muk-den from the south-east. Before the end of the battle of Liao-yang the whole corps has detrained and the leading units of the 1st European Corps are arriving.

Stoessel manages at this time to get through a series of messages calling urgently for help. The Viceroy therefore asks Kouropatkin to make a demonstration southwards to draw troops from Port Arthur. Rumours are now plentiful that the 2nd and 4th Japanese Armies are going to stand upon the defensive, and that troops from their ranks are being constantly dispatched to take part in the siege of Port Arthur. These rumours may have been promulgated by the Japanese staff in the hope of enticing the Russian army to the south and out of its fortifications. One—Popov—arrives from Port Arthur to confirm them, but he is apparently regarded as a double spy. Kouropatkin, at all events, gives them no credence and declines to advance. He says that Stoessel has been calling for immediate succour for two and a half months, and that the nervous state of that commander's mind renders his reports unreliable. There is reason to believe, too, that Kuroki has been reinforced with a view to an advance on Muk-den, and in such case the move of three corps to Hai-cheng would be suicidal.

On the 23rd the Russian commander changes his mind. "The arrival of the 5th Siberian Corps is assured. One of these days, with the help of God, the 1st (European) Corps will likewise begin to arrive from Harbin. In these conditions I regard it as no longer necessary to fight rear-guard actions in the positions occupied . . . but to accept battle there with a view to defeat the enemy and to pass to the offensive if the conditions are favourable." The new plan is communicated to the troops, and they are again set to work vigorously on the entrenchments in the advanced positions.

The Russian field army.—On the 23rd August the Russian field army is distributed in four main groups :—

Southern Group (59 battalions, 50 squadrons, 156 guns),

consisting of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Siberian Corps under General Zarubaiev, in position astride the railway in front of An-shan-chan, about 20 miles south of Liao-yang.

Eastern Group (64 battalions, 32½ squadrons, 238 guns), consisting of the 3rd Siberian Corps (late the Eastern Detachment), the 10th Corps, and part of the 17th Corps under General Bilderling, in position about 18 miles south-east of Liao-yang.

General Reserve (30 battalions, 20½ squadrons, 191 guns) at Liao-yang.

Army Reserve (32 battalions, 8 squadrons, 88 guns), consisting largely of troops of the 5th Siberian Corps, distributed chiefly at Muk-den, Sha-ho, and Yen-tai.

The Southern Group includes the Liao-ho detachment (1½ battalions, 8 squadrons, 4 guns), which, on account of the capture of Yin-kou and of the use the Japanese may make of the river for a turning movement, is brought up to a strength of 8½ battalions, 9 squadrons, and 16 guns, the extra troops being taken from the 5th Siberian Corps. A further detachment (1½ battalions, 14 squadrons, 14 guns) is sent to a point half-way between Ta-wan on the Liao-ho and Liao-yang. And yet another (4 battalions, 8 guns) is sent to Hsin-min-tun, the railway station 35 miles west of Muk-den.

The Eastern Group includes the following detachments:

Grulev's (4 battalions, 6 squadrons, 4 guns) at Pen-hsi-hu. Shestakov's (1 battalion, 2 guns), under Colonel Grulev's command, pushed out towards Chiao-tou. Liubavin's Cossacks (12 squadrons, 4 guns) on the upper Tai-tzu-ho. Madritov's (2 battalions, 10 squadrons, 2 guns, increased later by 2 battalions and 6 guns) on the extreme left, watching the roads leading from the south-east to Muk-den. Along the Tai-tzu-ho, between Liao-yang and Pen-hsi-hu, is a dragoon regiment.

There are thus 14 battalions, 23 squadrons, and 38 guns guarding the right flank, and 7 battalions, 32 squadrons, and 12 guns guarding the left.

This distribution is interesting, for two reasons. Firstly, that some 12 per cent of the Russian field army is being utilised for guarding points not directly threatened by a single Japanese soldier; and secondly, that so strong a force has been detached westwards. The latter may perhaps be accounted for by the reported landing at Yin-kou of a division from Formosa which presumably intends to operate up the Liao-ho. Or it may be that the reports current at this period concerning an intervention by China and as to the activity of General Ma and his model army are gaining credence.

But these detachments do not end here. The violation of the principle of concentration of force is being carried much further than the dissipation of a mere 12 per cent. Leaving out of account some 30,000 frontier guards who are required to guard the railway against Khunguses, there remain 23,000 troops in the Maritime Province of whom considerably more than half could have been spared. Moreover, the temporary retention of part of the 5th Siberian Corps at Muk-den as an army reserve not definitely at the disposal of the army commander is also in the nature of a detachment.

The total Russian combatant field force numbers about 152,000, including 128,000 bayonets, 16,000 sabres, and 673 guns. In the above figures no account has been taken of a brigade of the 1st European Corps which arrives on the battle-field of Liao-yang on the 31st August and 1st September.

The Japanese field army.—The Japanese field army is distributed in two main groups:—

The 1st Army (42 battalions, 10 squadrons, 120 guns)

under Marshal Kuroki, including 1200 sabres and 40,000 bayonets.

The 2nd and 4th Armies (71 battalions, 23 squadrons, 364 guns), including 60,000 bayonets and 2600 sabres. The grand total is therefore about 100,000 bayonets, 3800 sabres, and 484 guns.

These figures are, however, only approximate. They are calculated at the somewhat high figure of about 900 bayonets to a battalion; but it is possible that the battalions have been made up to a strength even of 1000 bayonets or more. The only unit reinforcement that has reached the field armies since the middle of July is the 11th Kobi Brigade, attached to the 2nd Army, so that the railway has probably been utilised for the dispatch of drafts to the front.

Not much information has been disclosed with regard to the Japanese troops employed on the lines of communication at this time. It is known, however, that five Kobi battalions guarding the communications of the 1st Army arrived during the battle of Liao-yang, and that two others, with a few guns, were guarding the line near Sai-ma-chi. There appears also to be little doubt that the services of troops of the conscript reserve, of unbrigaded Kobi troops, and 4000 or 5000 Koreans were utilised. In comparing the organisation and distribution of the opposing forces, the most striking feature is the extraordinary simplicity of the Japanese order of battle and the complicated nature of that of the Russians.

The Russian intelligence department at this time computes the Japanese forces at 144 to 168 battalions, 52 squadrons, and 572 guns. It has estimated the first line formations with some accuracy, but it places the 8th and 9th Divisions with Count Nodzu, and it has failed to notice the transfer of the 5th Division from the 2nd to the 4th

Army. The reserve troops are much over-estimated, and it is there that its principal mistakes occur.

A Russian appreciation of the situation.—The following is, in condensed form, an appreciation elaborated by the writers of the Russian Official History of the situation on the 23rd August, as it may or might have appeared to Kouropatkin :—

We are the stronger as regards number of battalions, but our battalions have a weaker effective ; the number of bayonets on either side is therefore approximately equal.[1] Including our mounted scouts we have a fourfold superiority in cavalry. In number of weapons our artillery is slightly superior to that of the enemy and, even allowing for our handicap as regards a number of old-pattern guns, our general artillery value is probably the greater. The enemy, it is true, has a large proportion of mountain artillery, but our deficiency in that respect will entail no disadvantage to us in a defensive battle, seeing that our guns will be in fortified positions. The Japanese are deployed on a front of 63 miles, and an interval of 30 miles exists between their 1st and 4th Armies. We, on the other hand, are more concentrated, our front being only 53 miles in extent. A distance of 14 miles separates our eastern from our southern group ; but the gap presents no great danger owing to the presence of thirty battalions at Liao-yang and of the army reserve at Muk-den. In the case of a Japanese offensive we may have confidence in our works at An-shan-chan and Lang-tzu-shan, but the position of the 10th Corps about An-ping, somewhat extended and not well fortified, inspires some disquietude. Provided we reinforce that corps we may expect the Japanese to shatter themselves against the positions of our troops, who have

[1] Kouropatkin, as a matter of fact, estimated his adversary to possess 153,000 to 187,000 bayonets against his own 128,000.

a good field of fire, are well entrenched, and behind efficient obstacles. Our cavalry, able to act freely anywhere owing to the abundance of food and forage available at this period, can, after allotting ample troops for intercommunication duties, form a corps of cavalry which may be thrown during the battle upon the enemy's rear to destroy his magazines, transport, etc.

This appreciation hardly takes count of all the difficulties from the Russian point of view. The occupation of two positions entails, as Colonel Ross[1] points out, four flanks instead of two—a most undesirable feature. It is the flanks that usually cause the greatest anxiety, and it is there that reserves are so often sent unless used offensively. In the coming battle, therefore, dissipation of reserves greater than usual may be expected. Again, no prominence is given by the Russian compilers to the question of communications, which exercised such an important influence on the operations. The Japanese are making use of an "enveloping base"—that is to say, a base on the arc of a circle with lines of advance extending along the radii towards the objective at the centre. Thus, if any one of the armies be defeated, it can retire along its radius to the point on the arc whence it obtains its supplies. The other armies are not necessarily seriously affected by the retreat of the first, and they may either press forward on their original objective or strike right or left against the communications of the assailant, should he be pursuing the beaten army. The Russians, on the other hand, are tied to their base by a single line of railway, and it is clear from the distribution of the troops that this fact is never absent for one moment from Kouropatkin's thoughts. That it preyed upon his mind till it upset his power of balanced judgment is evident from a study of his dispositions and

[1] "The Russo-Japanese War," Colonel Ross, D.S.O., p. 347.

actions. And it must be acknowledged that his responsibility was exceedingly heavy, for, let that line be definitely severed and the point of attack held, and the 200,000 odd Russians in Manchuria must then either hurl themselves upon the enemy to conquer or die, or else surrender *en masse*.

The question of morale, too, must be considered. Just as Benedek's corps had been beaten one by one before he stood to fight decisively at Königgrätz, so, except for the new arrivals—the 17th Corps and the 5th Siberians—have all the Russian corps had to acknowledge defeat. Moreover, the indecision in high command, the refusal on the part of subordinates to take the initiative, the endless marches and countermarches, loss of faith in the principles on which they were trained—all these matters, piled upon a succession of discomfitures, might well destroy the morale of any army. The heart of the Russian soldier is, however, not easily broken; he may be depressed, but given the order to attack and a little inspiring leadership, and he will display all his old faith and courage. Led he must be, however, for he has no initiative; and the morale of the officers who might lead him has suffered somewhat, and it is no light matter to raise it.

The Japanese advance.—On the 14th, Marshal Oyama issues a directive for the attack. Note its brevity, its simplicity, and the faith in subordinates. "The 1st Army will attack the enemy on the road from Liao-yang to Feng-huang-cheng; the 2nd and 4th Armies will attack him in the neighbourhood of An-shan-chan, and prepare for the attack of Liao-yang."

The rains prevent the immediate execution of this order, but it is interesting to note that it was issued before the great assault on Port Arthur began. Oyama is anxious that the Russians shall not have time to garnish their works with

heavy guns which are said to be *en route* for Liao-yang. The order is repeated on the 23rd, and the advance definitely begins on the 24th. A plan to illustrate the battle of Liao-yang will be found at the end of Chapter XIV. The left of the Guards, attacking the right of the 3rd Siberian Corps, is beaten back; the right and centre of the division are allowed to gain a little ground, the Russian advanced posts falling back before them. A detachment sent by Nodzu into the valley of the Hsi-ta-ho to gain touch with the 1st Army is stopped by Grekov's cavalry. There is a slight forward movement by the Japanese towards the front of the 10th Russian Corps on the 23rd, but none on the 24th. On the whole, the Japanese advance appears lacking in energy, and the general impression received by the Russian staff is that the main attack is to be directed against the 3rd Siberians by the 1st Army assisted by a portion of the 4th Army. Kouropatkin, however, warns General Ivanov, the commander of the 3rd Siberian Corps, that the enemy's movement may be only a demonstration, and that he must be careful of his corps reserve. On the 25th the situation appears clearer, the movement against Ivanov's right is more pronounced, and Kouropatkin, taking it to mean an attempt to push in between the southern and eastern groups, orders Zarubaiev to send three squadrons into the gap. The 17th Corps is also brought up, the bulk of the 35th Division being directed to move up in rear of the centre of the eastern group and Yantzul's mobile force to a point on the Tai-tzu-ho in rear of the 10th Corps. Ivanov strengthens his own right with three battalions and, during the night of the 25th–26th, calls to his assistance, without reference to superior authority, a brigade of the 35th Division and two batteries which were intended by Kouropatkin as a general reserve to the eastern group.

On the 26th, the 2nd and 4th Japanese Armies begin to

move against Zarubaiev. The 4th Army is on the right, having as its own right the 10th Division. Next to the 10th comes the 5th Division, which has to keep touch with the 3rd Division of the 2nd Army on the Mandarin road. West of the railway are the 6th and 4th Divisions and, covering the left flank, is Akiyama's cavalry (8 squadrons, 6 guns, 8 machine guns). The two Kobi Brigades follow in rear of the centre. On the Russian side, the 1st Siberian Corps is on the right, in front of An-shan-chan, the 2nd on the left, and the 4th in the centre.

The Russian advanced guards on the left fall back quickly, uncovering the flank of those on their right. The latter nevertheless maintain a gallant and skilful fight in the retirement, constantly forcing the enemy to deploy. Zarubaiev issues instructions that the main positions are to be held to the last, and asks Kouropatkin to send him eleven battalions and twenty-four guns belonging to the southern group which have been employed on the works at Liao-yang.

The position of An-shan-chan has been strongly fortified, except in the portion held by the 2nd Siberians. Four months of labour have been expended on it, and thirteen redoubts and emplacements for 136 guns have been built. A network of roads, 28 miles in length, has been made behind the position for communication between sections and to the rear, rivers have been bridged, and fords have been ramped. In front line and in local reserve are 43½ battalions, 17 squadrons, 106 guns, and 16 machine guns, and, in general reserve, 26 battalions, 14½ squadrons, 70 guns. Loins have been girded for a strenuous conflict, for this is to be a square fight with no looking back as in former battles. Then, at 4 a.m. on the 27th, comes the fatal message, "Do not fight a decisive action. . . . Hold the enemy with rear-guards and retire to the Sha-ho . . ."

The cause of this sudden alteration is to be found in the retirement of the eastern group, which will be dealt with later.

The evacuation of An-shan-chan.—During the period prior to the 23rd August, when it had been the intention to retire as soon as the enemy should begin his advance, the routes to be used had been staked, signposts erected, and every precaution taken to ensure a safe and quick withdrawal. Nevertheless Zarubaiev's army encounters many difficulties in its retreat. The roads are like those in Virginia in the War of Secession, of which the bottoms were said to have fallen out, and guns and vehicles of all sorts sink deeply into the mud. Enormous labour is expended, sometimes in vain, to extract them, and progress is excessively slow. A fog favours the withdrawal from the position, and it is not until 2 p.m. that the Japanese staff hear of the retirement.

There is not much time, therefore, for the organisation of a pursuit on the 27th, but, on the 28th, Russian rear-guards are followed closely and have to fight desperately to fulfil their duties. The rear-guard of the 2nd Corps, on the left, falls back prematurely, and without warning headquarters or the troops on its right. Tolmatchev, commanding the left flank-guard, does the same. This allows the 10th Japanese Division to get round the Russian left, and also enables part of the 5th Division to fall on the flank of the rear-guard of the 4th Corps. The latter, under General Kossovitch, fights a very gallant action for many hours, pressed on one flank by the 5th and on the other by the 3rd Division. Eventually it is supported by four battalions sent up by Zarubaiev, which, though at the cost of heavy losses, cover the retreat. On the right, the rear-guard of the 1st Corps suffers less, but the right flank-guard is closely beset, and only gets clear with the loss of its

battery, which founders in the mud. The cavalry on either flank effects but little; true, the kao-liang is a great inconvenience, but blank casualty returns are hardly what is to be expected of cavalry in desperate rear-guard actions. Tolmatchev, on the left, leaves his troops without instructions or word of any sort, and trots home for the night to Liao-yang. Samsonov, ordered up from the rear to cover the withdrawal of the rear-guard, finds the task impossible, and, with a loss of two Cossacks wounded and one missing, retires to bivouac north of Liao-yang. Small wonder that Kouropatkin finds it necessary during the campaign to issue repeated instructions on the handling of cavalry.

Except as regards the cavalry and the 2nd Corps, the retreat has been exceedingly well managed. Space forbids a full description, but the account given in our Official History will repay careful perusal. The Japanese are unable on the 28th to push north of the line of the Sha-ho and, during the night, the whole of the southern group retires into the works known as the advanced lines. It is now time to turn to the fortunes of the Eastern Detachment.

The combat of Lang-tzu-shan.—It will be remembered that the Japanese Guard Division on the 25th succeeded in pushing back the advanced troops in front of the 3rd Siberian Corps, and that this fact, combined with the result of a distant reconnaissance made by Liubavin, who had found the northern bank of the Tai-tzu-ho clear of Japanese troops, provoked the belief that the main attack of the 1st Army would be directed against the right of the eastern group. During the night of the 25th–26th, the various Russian detachments in that region are called in and placed under the command of Kashtalinski, the position at the same time being extended somewhat to the south-west. As a matter of fact the Russians are deceived, for the

attack is to fall in greater strength on the 10th Corps, in the direction of An-ping.

The position held by the eastern group runs along the crest of some very steep ridges, rising 1000 feet above the river valleys. On the right, where it faces nearly south, it is broken by the valleys of the Tang-ho and Hsi-ta-ho; in the centre and left the line runs east of the Tang-ho, and trends slightly east of north. Kao-liang is everywhere plentiful, and completely screens the approach of the Japanese.

The objective selected by Kuroki for the Guard Division is the portion of the position west of the Tang-ho. Two columns are formed, the right under Watanabe, moving into the fork between the Tang-ho and the Hsi-ta-ho, and the left column under Asada against the extreme right of the position. Watanabe's column, with two batteries, is meant only to make a holding attack, so does not attempt much at first. Asada's column, which is supported by eight batteries, is beaten back without much difficulty. The Japanese guns, concentrating on a single Russian battery, force it to change position, but they fail to notice the change and continue to shell the empty emplacement. The battery then, aided by three others which are handled with equal skill, gains the upper hand in the artillery duel, and consequently the Japanese infantry, unsupported by gun fire, proves unequal to its task.

During the morning Colonel Martinov, the commander of a regiment of the 17th Corps, which has executed a fatiguing night-march, and is now endeavouring to join the reserve of the 3rd Siberians, hears that the right of that corps is in danger. He moves at once to the sound of the guns and sends forward three of his battalions to make a vigorous counter-attack against Asada's left. The latter has to discontinue his attack and entrench, and even then

it is all he can do to hold his own. Long before the occurrence of Asada's troubles, however, Hasegawa, the divisional commander, appeals to Kuroki for reinforcements, and he is promised the 29th Kobi Regiment, which forms the whole reserve of the 1st Army. To afford immediate relief to Asada, the right column is directed to deliver a vigorous frontal attack. It is said to have assaulted the Russian trenches eight times in most determined fashion, but its casualty list offers no confirmation of the report of such exceptional vigour. By nightfall the Guards have lost about 1000 men, chiefly in the left column, and their attack has completely failed. It has been pressed, however, with sufficient energy to cause Ivanov to inform Kouropatkin that one or two divisions of Nodzu's army have joined in the attack against him.

This combat furnishes one of the very few instances on the Russian side of initiative on the part of a subordinate, and the only instance of the delivery, albeit on a small scale, of a successful counter-attack. Had Martinov's success been followed up by a vigorous offensive on a large scale on the part of the 3rd Siberian Corps, the Guard Division could hardly have escaped defeat. The opportunity was particularly favourable owing to the fact that the Russian artillery had had the better of the fight with the Japanese guns. Kashtalinski had, indeed, intended a counter-attack, but rescinded the order on account of the fatigue of the troops and because of a storm of rain that fell towards evening. The left of the 3rd Siberians was not attacked, and on that account appears to have done nothing during the day.

The action at An-ping.—Beyond the left of the 3rd Siberians, but facing eastwards, the 10th Corps, under Sluchevski, is holding two lines; the advanced line, some 14 miles long and doubly convex in shape, is the better,

but it is of too great an extent to be held by the troops available. It has, however, been strongly fortified, and the troops now occupying it have been told to offer a determined resistance. The artillery, with the exception of fourteen guns, is in the second line or in reserve. The position is divided into two sections, that on the right being manned by the 9th Division, and being broken up into sub-sections under Generals Riabinkin and Orbeliani. In Riabinkin's sub-section, on a frontage of 4½ miles, are five battalions in trenches and five battalions in reserve. With Orbeliani are five battalions in the front line and only a cavalry regiment in reserve. There are two mountain guns on this position, the remainder of the artillery allotted to the sub-section being in the valley in rear, or in the second position. The whole front of the division is 10 miles long.

The left section reaching out towards the Tai-tzu-ho is under Colonel Klembovski, and consists of the Tambov Regiment, 12 squadrons and 8 guns. Three battalions with six guns occupy the main crest line, and the 4th battalion with two guns is on a position echeloned to the left rear. The Cossacks are watching the river line.

The general reserve, consisting of twelve battalions of the 31st Infantry Division, 6 squadrons, and 50 guns, is posted in two groups at and north of An-ping. The total force available for the defence of a line 14 miles in length is 32 battalions, 12 squadrons, and 110 guns.

It will be remembered that a brigade of the 17th Corps intended for the support either of the 3rd Siberians or of the 10th Corps had been summoned by General Ivanov to the assistance of his own corps. There remains Yantzul's mobile force, now close to the bridge near the junction of the Tang and Tai-tzu, where it is well placed to act north

of the latter river or reinforce the left of the 10th Corps as desired.

Against the front held by Sluchevski are directed the 2nd and 12th Japanese Divisions. The Guard Kobi Brigade is posted to the right rear facing north, as a bar to Russian action from the direction of Pen-hsi-hu. The nature of the country not being favourable to the movement of field artillery, half the field guns of the 2nd Division have been lent to the Guards. Kuroki therefore decides on a night attack in order to discount the enemy's superiority in gun-fire.

The 2nd Division is divided into two columns: on the right Okasaki (4 battalions, 18 guns) is directed against Riabinkin's left; on the left, Matsanuga ($5\frac{3}{4}$ battalions, 6 guns) moves towards point 2100. The divisional reserve (2 battalions, $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron) follows the left column. One company is sent to gain touch with the Guard Division. Marching through the night, these columns make their attack long before dawn on the 26th, the brunt of the assault falling on Riabinkin's troops. The Russians are not taken by surprise, and they repel the first attacks. After a time, Matsanuga manages to capture some trenches with his left, but can get no further, for his right is beaten back with heavy loss. Okasaki succeeds in driving the troops opposed to him out of their trenches, but they retire in good order to occupy a line a little further west. General Nishi, the commander of the 2nd Division, has by this time expended all his reserves, and the arrival of a couple of Russian battalions, which come up as reinforcements, leads him to expect a counter-attack. He appeals for support, but Kuroki decides to send the whole of his reserve to help the Guards. The Russians, however, have no thought of assuming the offensive.

On the right of the 2nd Division, the 12th Division is also

making a night attack in two groups. That on the left (5 battalions, 1 squadron) under Shimamura is directed in two columns against Orbeliani, and that on the right (6 battalions, 2 squadrons, 2 guns), under Kigoshi, is directed in part against Orbeliani's left, and in part against the position held by the Tambov Regiment, still further to the Russian left. The remainder of the divisional artillery is held in reserve till 4 a.m., when it takes up positions in rear of the left column.

The 35th Russian Regiment in the centre of Orbeliani's section is driven from its trenches, but not till about 9 a.m. The two battalions of the 36th on its left, attacked by some five Japanese battalions, are forced to retire about 6 a.m. They are covered in their retreat by two dismounted squadrons of the Terek-Kuban Regiment, who put up a most gallant fight and lose about half their strength. The action is interesting as being almost the only occasion on which the Russian cavalry plays a really important part in a general action.

By 9 a.m. the whole of the 9th Russian Division has fallen back to the second position. The retirement is admirably conducted, being covered by the fire of some forty guns and by the advance of fresh troops. By this time, too, nine[1] battalions of the original reserve are also in the second position, which leaves Sluchevski with only one battalion at his disposal, for at 8 a.m. he had sent off six companies to help the hard-pressed Tambov Regiment, whose misfortunes it is now necessary to relate.

About 1 a.m. a portion of Kigoshi's northern column, after a desperate climb, seizes and manages to hold on to the northern slopes of the Pei-kou mountain. Owing to the nature of the ground the Tambov Regiment cannot put many

[1] One battalion of the 35th Regiment, which was escort to the guns, has neither been counted as on the position nor in reserve.

men in line to meet the attack. It holds its own stoutly, however, and with repeated bayonet charges beats back another portion of Kigoshi's column, which makes a frontal attack. At 8 a.m. the six companies dispatched from the general reserve arrive; another charge is made by the Russians with some success, and the combat dies away for a time. But about 3 p.m., after a vigorous bombardment, the Japanese renew the assault, and a desperate hand-to-hand conflict ensues. Many of the assailants are hurled a hundred feet down precipices, and the attacking battalion loses about half its strength. One small party, however, manages to hang on to a point whence it can enfilade the guns and, just at this moment, Klembovski is wounded. The second in command is away on the position to the left rear. Confusion ensues. The personnel of the battery retreats, abandoning the guns and, about 5 p.m., the Russian infantry falls back.

It has been a fine piece of work on the part of the Japanese: two battalions, supported by fourteen mountain guns, have forced back five and a half battalions and a battery, and their action is to cause a whole army corps, and ultimately two armies, to retire. The success of the two battalions has only been made possible by the resolution of two small parties which, having secured points of vantage, maintain them to the bitter end. There are few points more striking in this campaign than the way in which detachments, varying from a company to a squad, have affected the fate of battles. This, a power conferred by the modern rifle, argues two things: firstly, the responsibility that the youngest commander, from the squad-leader upwards, may have to bear; secondly, the possibilities that lie awaiting the cavalryman.

But to return to the battle. Sluchevski has sent the last battalion of his reserve to the left, and now asks to be

allowed to use Yantzul's detachment. Kouropatkin, however, warns Bilderling that the direction of the principal effort of the 1st Army, which he estimates at six divisions, is not yet discovered, and he warns his subordinate to be careful. An attack may come by the right bank of the Tai-tzu-ho. However, at 8 p.m. Bilderling hears that the whole of the ground about Pei-kou has been evacuated by his troops, and he accordingly decides to give Yantzul's troops to Sluchevski. Yantzul is now appointed to command the left section, and his force is brought up to a strength of 17 battalions, 10 squadrons, and 44 guns. Bilderling has given him to Sluchevski that he may recapture the Pei-kou heights; Sluchevski issues the necessary instructions; at 10 p.m. an order arrives from Kouropatkin that these heights and the guns left on them are to be retaken at all costs. Every preparation is made, and then comes a telephone message from headquarters directing the 10th Corps to retire across the Tang-ho.

The Russian losses in this part of the field amount to 1793, and those of the Japanese to 1339.

Comments.—Once again the Russians have to suffer all the penalties of defeat without having been beaten. The 3rd Siberian Corps has more than held its own. The 10th Corps has been driven only from the advanced to the main position; its left, it is true, has been defeated, but seventeen battalions are about to move against two to recover the lost ground. The Russian casualties amount only to 8 per cent. And yet the 10th Corps is ordered to retreat, although its withdrawal must involve the retirement, not only of the 3rd Siberians, but of the whole Russian army. And that army must be dragged through a slough of despond both physical and moral, to the reduction of its force on the day of the great battle which, though postponed, is yet inevitable.

Kouropatkin gives three reasons for the order to retire. Firstly, that the withdrawal of the 10th Corps from the first to the second line of defence has uncovered the left of the 3rd Siberians, which, however, is hardly correct; a salient has, it is true, been formed at the point of junction of the two corps, but that this would be the case must have been patent to all when the battle was planned. Secondly, that the left of the 10th Corps has been turned. Thirdly, the storm that broke out towards the close of the battle has covered the fords of the Tang-ho. The last point, again, is a matter that had been thrashed out before the battle, for this was the period of the rains, and after each deluge the river was sure to rise. The danger, in truth, can hardly have been great, for the Russian troops crossed on the 27th, and the Japanese on the 28th, without great difficulty, and that after the storm on the 26th. As a matter of fact, too, some hitherto unknown fords were discovered on the morning of the 27th. No new feature was therefore introduced into the general scheme, except the capture of the Pei-kou heights and, from the arrangements made, their recapture appeared certain. At the close of the day the Japanese, with every man except the Guard Kobi Brigade flung into the firing line, could only oppose 42 battalions, 10 squadrons, and 120 guns to 82 battalions, 32 squadrons, and 271 guns. Are not these figures significant of the advantages of the offensive?

Inaction was manifested by the outlying detachments. Liubavin's and Grulev's combined forces advancing against Kuroki's rear might have effected a most useful diversion. They might at least have engaged the Guard Kobi Brigade, which, owing to their inaction, could have been utilised against Sluchevski on the 27th had the 10th Corps been allowed to maintain its ground. The question arises how far the commander of a detachment such as Grulev, set

to guard a point, may act on his own initiative. To one part of the question the answer is clear—if by his movement he still covers the point either directly or indirectly, his action is justified; otherwise much will depend on circumstances.

Sir Ian Hamilton, in "A Staff Officer's Scrap Book," gives us a striking picture of a modern commander. Seated in a camp chair on the summit of a hill, smoking endless cigars and chatting affably with those around him, Marshal Kuroki controls the battle. He intervenes only to dispatch the whole reserve to the Guard Division. There is not much more, in fact, that he can do. He has issued his orders; he places trust in his subordinates, and he leaves to them the execution of their tasks. Only so long as he retains the reserve can he influence the battle except by his spirit. The Japanese staff do the whole of the spade work, yet they seek to "impress all outsiders with the idea that Kuroki thinks of everything for himself, whilst his assistants are merely the blind and passive instruments of his authority." And in this connexion the same writer considers the greatest lesson of the war to be the exclusion of jealousy and egotism, and the cultivation of more "loyalty and disinterestedness to our brother officers."

Retirement of the eastern group.—The storm and, perhaps still more, the exhaustion of the Japanese troops, prevent pursuit on the evening of the 26th. It would in any case have spelt certain defeat for the pursuers early on the 27th. On that day the same mist that enveloped Zarubaiev's army covers also the eastern group. The Japanese, except in the Guard Division, cannot see 100 yards to their front till late in the day, and then their attempted advance is at once beaten back by the rear-guard. The Russian retreat, it is almost unnecessary to say, is admirably organised and is executed without

much loss. By 8.30 p.m. the last Russian is across the river and the bridge dismantled. To the south, the 3rd Siberian Corps has undergone many hardships; there is but little fog, indeed, and the Guard Division has taken up the pursuit most cautiously, but the streams are swollen, and the roads deep. One column takes seven hours to cover 5 miles. It seems to the Russian soldier a poor reward for the successful fight of yesterday.

By the evening of the 27th the Japanese 1st, 2nd, and 4th Armies are all occupying the positions vacated by the Russians. On the 28th the Russian retreat is continued, and the eastern group enters the advanced lines of the great field fortress of Liao-yang. The 17th Corps is directed north of the Tai-tzu-ho to guard against a turning movement.

CHAPTER XIII

THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG

The 28th August.—On the 28th August the direction of movement of the 1st Japanese Army is changed by Oyama. So light has been the resistance offered to the 2nd and 4th Japanese Armies that it now appears possible that the Russians do not intend to stand at Liao-yang, and that the relatively determined opposition of the eastern group has been offered to facilitate the retirement of the southern group. Lest, therefore, the converging forces end by enclosing a space denuded of troops, Kuroki is ordered to move nearly north instead of west and to push his right wing north of the Tai-tzu-ho in order to bring about any necessary envelopment, his left wing being at the same time extended westwards to gain touch with the 4th Army. The staff work of such an operation, with divisions strung out on a line 20 miles long, is considerable; fortunately, however, for the 1st Army, Oyama's orders are received before the day's march is begun.

The Guard Division being on the outside of Kuroki's wheel has the longest distance to traverse and, meeting with considerable resistance from the 3rd Siberian Corps, is unable to reach its allotted line. Its cavalry only is in touch with the 4th Army by nightfall. The 2nd Division has a lighter task: one brigade is to assist the Guards, and the other is to take up a line from the junction of the Tang and Tai-tzu along the main ridge just west of the Tang. The latter is opposed by the 10th Russian Corps,

which maintains its position till midday and then retires. The right brigade of the division then crosses the river, but the left brigade, which is now in touch with the Guards, is held back by the Russians till the evening. The 12th Division moves into the bend of the Tai-tzu immediately north of An-ping; and the general result of the day's operations is that the opposition offered by the Russian rear-guards suffices to prevent the Guards and 2nd Divisions from reaching their allotted stations.

The 29th August.—The 29th August is a day of comparative rest. On the Japanese side it is spent in the completion of the approach-march, in bringing the various formations into line, and in endeavours on the part of Akiyama to locate the enemy's right flank. The Russians, for their part, after the rear-guards have been withdrawn into the advanced lines, busy themselves with the work of reorganisation and redistribution.

The Russian positions at Liao-yang.—The Liao-yang positions consist of two lines of entrenchments—the "advanced line" and the "inner position," the latter of which forms a bridge-head in front of the town. The advanced line is occupied by three corps: the 1st Siberians on the right, the 3rd Siberians in the centre, and the 10th Corps on the left. A gap, nearly 3 miles in width, lies about the Tassu brook between the 1st and 3rd Siberians; and, as pressure has been felt in this quarter, Kouropatkin pushes into the opening a detachment (6½ battalions, 6 squadrons) under General Putilov, drawn partly from the 2nd and partly from the 3rd Siberian Corps. Guarding the left flank, north of the Tai-tzu, is the 17th Corps (26 battalions, 18 squadrons, 174 guns).

The remainder of the troops, which may be said to constitute the general reserve, are distributed in five main groups:—

1. The 2nd Siberians (13 battalions, 2 squadrons, 32 guns) just south of Liao-yang. 2. The 4th Siberians (25 battalions, 6 squadrons, 32 guns) massed just north of Liao-yang. 3. Samsonov's Cossack Division (19 squadrons, 6 guns) just west of Liao-yang. 4 and 5. Two detachments of the 5th Siberians—one (8 battalions, 2 squadrons, 16 guns) under General Orlov, on the railway 25 miles north of Liao-yang, and the other (11½ battalions, 6 squadrons, 24 guns) under General Ekk assembling on the right bank of the Tai-tzu, some 2 miles east of Liao-yang.

On the 30th August Mitschenko's cavalry (11 squadrons, 6 guns) is sent to cover the right flank about 3 miles west of Liao-yang and to gain touch with Grekov (1½ battalions, 14 squadrons, 12 guns), who is still further west guarding against a wide turning movement in that direction and maintaining communication with Kossagovski on the Liao-ho. Away to the east the various detachments, including those of Liubavin and Madritov, now amount to 10 battalions, 24 squadrons, and 20 guns. Pen-hsi-hu (see Map II) has been evacuated by the infantry detachment owing to a rumour, which proves to be false, that two Japanese battalions have crossed the Tai-tzu at Kansha.

The whole Russian field force is therefore distributed as follows :—

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.
In the advanced lines (3 Corps)	89½	14	254
Guarding left flank (1 Corps)	26	18	174
Guarding right flank	—	11	6
General Reserve	53½	31	110
Garrison of Liao-yang	5½	2	—
Part of 1st Corps (arrived 1st Sept.)	8	—	26
Protecting detachments	26½	66	50
	209	142	620

Thus in the front line of battle there are about 116 battalions, 43 squadrons, and 434 guns; and in reserve 67 battalions, 33 squadrons, and 136 guns. The right section occupied by the 1st Siberians extends for 5½ miles from the railway towards the Tassu brook. It has been strongly fortified, the kao-liang cut down and entangled, and obstacles of all kinds created. It suffers somewhat from the disadvantage of being overlooked by hills some 2 miles to the south, which furnish excellent artillery positions, and from which the Russian dispositions and movements in this section can be watched. The centre section, manned by Putilov's detachment and the 3rd Siberians, lies east of the Tassu brook, facing partly south-west and partly south, and is some 4 miles in length. In the original scheme of defence the intention had been to bring the valley of the Tassu brook under a cross fire of artillery, but now a plentiful crop of kao-liang has grown up and precludes the possibility of such action. Co-operation between the right and centre sections will consequently be a matter of some difficulty. The broken ground in front of this part of the line offers greater facilities for a covered approach to close quarters than elsewhere, and the bright red colour of the soil renders the concealment of trenches impossible.

The troops of the 10th Corps, manning the left section along a front of 5 miles, are on a line of hills steeply escarped to the front, and though the ground to the south is even more broken than that opposite the centre section, they command most of the approaches. The entrenchments in this section and in the centre section are far from being complete, having been begun only on the 23rd August, nor has there been any great clearance of kao-liang.

The general appearance of the advanced line is that of a double salient, whose line of division is the Tassu brook.

In rear there are seven bridges over the Tai-tzu-ho, but the river is at first quite unfordable in this reach, and remains so until the 30th, when it becomes fordable at Mu-chang.

The Japanese plan of attack.—On the evening of the 29th Marshal Oyama issues his orders for the attack of the advanced position. General headquarters take post behind the left, a position indicative of the direction of decisive effort.

The 2nd Army (less one division) is to attack the Shou-shan-pu position, the division on the right (the 3rd) being instructed to render assistance to the 4th Army. The 4th Army is directed to advance east and west of the Tassu brook. Acting in conjunction with, and on the right of the 4th Army, a group consisting of the Guard Division and the 29th Kobi Regiment, to which the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division is added on the 30th, is to move against the hills above Meng-chia-fang. The action to be taken by the remainder of the 1st Army is not specified in the order, but the instructions received by Kuroki on the 28th read as follows: "The 1st Army . . . will make preparations to cross the Tai-tzu-ho as rapidly as possible with the bulk of its troops." Akiyama is to cover the left flank, and one division—the 4th—is to be held in rear of the left, not in general reserve, be it noted, but "at the disposal of general headquarters"—a fine point in military terminology indeed, but one of considerable influence in the employment of troops.

In the battle these instructions are not very closely adhered to. Actually, four groups are formed, to the abandonment of the existing army organisation. The first consists of the 3rd, 6th, and 5th Divisions, with the 11th Kobi Brigade and a large mass of extra-divisional artillery; its objective is the western salient occupied by

the 1st Siberian Corps; and thus 41 battalions, 17 squadrons, 222 field and 48 heavy guns are directed against a force which consists at first only of 24 battalions, 10 squadrons, and 70 guns. The second group is composed of the 10th and Guard Divisions, the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division, and the 10th Kobi Brigade; it is directed against the eastern salient, which is manned by the 3rd Siberians, the 10th Corps, and Putilov's detachment, and in this case 36 battalions, 9 squadrons, and 96 guns are to be thrown against 62½ battalions, 16 squadrons, and 204 guns. The third group consists of 1½ divisions of the 1st Army, which is separated by a gap of 9½ miles of hilly country from the main Japanese forces and is to cross the Tai-tzu-ho. The fourth group, composed only of the 4th Division, is in rear of the left flank.

As usual, the Japanese staff have marked the weakest point in the hostile line—the gap at the Tassu brook—and decide to push 2 divisions and a Kobi brigade into it, and, as usual, their tactics are as daring as their strategy is cautious. The task assigned to Kuroki verges on the foolhardy. The retention of but one division in reserve out of the eight engaged marks the usual Japanese principle of development of fire. There is no hint, such as often appears in the Russian orders, of the possibility of defeat or of action to be taken in that event. The only measure of security adopted is the retention of the 4th Division covering the railway and the greater part of the attacking troops in fairly close proximity to it.

Russian information.—The information culled by the Russian intelligence department by the evening of the 29th August is as follows: The Japanese field army is divided into four main groups. Dealing with them from right to left—the 1st Army, counting 5½ to 5¾ divisions, is divided into two groups each numbering about 30,000

combatants. The 4th Army forms the third group and is estimated at 3½ divisions or about 38,000 men. The 2nd Army, constituting the fourth group, is said to consist of 5¼ divisions or about 60,000 men.

The whole force is estimated in round numbers at 153,000 bayonets, 4500 sabres, and 568 guns.

The 30th August.—The Japanese operations on the 30th August may be most conveniently described from east to west. On the right, Kuroki has been making preparations for some days to cross the Tai-tzu; and, on this date, during the battle that is raging along the whole front, he hears that Liao-yang is being evacuated. He is informed that trains are leaving that station for the north every five minutes. The Russian Official History states that the shortest possible interval of departure was seventeen minutes and that actually the interval between trains was much longer. Kuroki, however, accepts the report as evidence of the impending retreat of the Russian army, and, on the strength of it, takes the fateful decision to strike at once against the Russian communications. He accordingly orders the 12th Division to cross the river near Kan-sha, to move north to Swallow's Nest Hill, and then north-west. The infantry of the 2nd Division is to follow the 12th, and the artillery is to cover the advance from the left bank south of Swallow's Nest Hill, near which point a bridge is to be built. Umezawa's Kobi Brigade is to move to the north-west towards Pen-hsi-hu.

About 4 p.m. Kuroki hears that the Guard Division is in difficulties, and is informed that the enemy has assumed the offensive against the Japanese 10th Division. He decides to detach the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division with three batteries under General Matsanuga to the assistance of his left wing. The news of the repulse of the Japanese at all points, which reaches him by nightfall, in no way deters

him from the intended passage of the river. The crossing is effected without difficulty. Not only is it unopposed, but, according to our official account, no opposition is anticipated, for the Japanese observe during the crossing none of the precautions peculiar to night operations. The Russians have 31 squadrons patrolling the river and, in the part where the crossing is effected, the responsibility is clearly defined; yet the first report of the passage is not received at Russian headquarters till 5.30 a.m. on the 31st. By that the Japanese have established themselves on the right bank of the river at and west of Swallow's Nest Hill.

It is now time to turn to the operations of the central group.

The Guard advances in two columns, Watanabe on the right, Asada on the left. The timing of the movement depends on Asada, but his artillery is dominated by the Russian guns and he consequently holds back his infantry till noon, hoping affairs may change for the better; he then attacks but is beaten back with ease at all points. Watanabe, in the meantime, after waiting for some hours for a report of progress on his left, decides, at 11.30 a.m., to move forward independently. In this quarter the result of the artillery duel is indecisive, and after some hard fighting the right of the detachment manages to break into the Russian lines. This occurs about 4 p.m.; and, about 6 p.m., two companies on the left manage also to obtain a lodgment in the enemy's trenches. This, for the day, is the high-water mark of success, and the tide of victory now rolls back. A Russian battery-commander, marking the gradual penetration of the neighbouring lines, boldly leaves cover and pours a heavy fire into the Japanese ranks at a range of 400 yards—a costly but effective expedient. At the same time some fresh Russian battalions, stimulated by the news, which has just arrived, of the bloody repulse

suffered by the Japanese at Port Arthur, charge up and recapture the trenches.

About 3.30 p.m. the commander of the Guard Division receives an important message from his cavalry. It is to the effect that his own left wing and the 10th Division have been heavily engaged all day, and that a large hostile detachment is moving to the counter-attack. Hasegawa consequently decides to break off his action. Firing is kept up till sunset; but, at 9 p.m., on a report from Watanabe that his position is untenable, the whole right wing is ordered back to the line from which it had started in the morning. Five companies had hardly been engaged, and it would have been more in accordance with Japanese custom to have utilised them for a night attack. The Russian artillery has been well handled here. It has fired away indeed a stupendous amount of ammunition, but the expenditure receives some justification in the repulse, mainly by gun fire, of the left of the Guard Division.

On the right of the Guards, Matsanuga's Brigade of the 2nd Division arrives somewhat late on the scene and makes a half-hearted attack on the 10th Corps. It is beaten back, but its action has the effect of causing Sluchevski to reinforce his front with three battalions in the expectation of a night attack.

On the left of the Guards, the 10th Division and the 10th Kobi Brigade have met with no better success in their attempt to envelop the right of the 3rd Siberians. A Russian battalion holding an isolated advanced post is nearly annihilated, but against the main position the attack is easily repulsed. One column works its way well down the Tassu valley, under cover of the kao-liang, but it suffers heavily from artillery fire and is brought to a standstill. About 3 p.m. the 10th Division once more advances, and is once more repulsed. Shortly afterwards it is attacked by

two battalions of Putilov's detachment, driven out of a couple of villages and thrown back up the Tassu valley; this apparently is the great counter-attack reported by the Guard cavalry which created such consternation. The fighting at this point has been bloody and determined. The 3rd Siberians have been forced to employ the whole of the corps reserve, and two of the Japanese regiments engaged have lost nearly a quarter of their strength.

In the Shou-shan-pu section most elaborate fortifications have been constructed by the Russians, and the foreground cleared of kao-liang affords an excellent field of fire. Beyond the clearance the roads connecting the numerous villages of this fertile plain form, as it were, a network of corridors with walls of millet 12 feet high. The position is attacked by the left Japanese group consisting of the 2nd Army and of the 5th Division from the 4th Army, together with a numerous artillery. A movement against the front offers no prospect of success; but the Russian left looks more promising, for there the spur, along which runs the main line of defence, merges into the southern hills. The 3rd and 5th Divisions therefore select this point as their objective, and move to the attack, at the same time working away with their right down the Tassu brook, and seeking to envelop the left of the 1st Siberian Corps. Stackelberg, even before being attacked, has called urgently for reinforcements, and has moved up part of his corps reserve towards his left. He sends a second message as soon as the attack begins, but reinforcements are not required there, for the section commander, Kondratovitch, there succeeds in repulsing the enemy.

On the Japanese left, and separated by a wide gap from the 3rd Division, the 6th Division is launched against the extreme right of the Russian line; but the sodden ground hinders its enveloping movement, and it is 1 o'clock before

the attack becomes serious. It should have been further hindered by the Russian cavalry, but an exchange of duties took place on the day of battle between Mitschenko's and Samsonov's detachment, with the result that the former arrived late in position. Moreover, from some unexplained cause Gourkho's squadrons, which had been watching the right of the 1st Siberians, were transferred early in the day to the left flank of that corps, where they could be of no possible use. The march of the 6th Division has, however, been watched from Shou-shan-pu and from a captive balloon, so that on its long-delayed arrival it meets with a very warm reception. The Japanese, though pressing forward with the determination to be expected of Oku's troops, are repeatedly driven back. At 4.40 p.m. Stackelberg reports that he has not lost a single foot of ground.

Shortly before that hour General Oku receives the following message from Marshal Oyama : "The enemy in front of the 10th Division of Nodzu's Army has assumed the offensive ; the 2nd Army must without delay expel the enemy from the Shou-shan-pu height and come to the assistance of the division in difficulties." The scare caused by the counter-attack of two Russian battalions in the Tassu valley is noteworthy. It decides Kuroki to send the 3rd Brigade to the Guards, it is the determining factor in the failure of the attack of the central group, and now the 2nd Army is to do desperate things to save the resulting situation. If this be the outcome of such a puny affair, what would have happened had Kouropatkin struck with 60 battalions ?

On receipt of Oyama's instructions the 2nd Army is pushed in again, but with no better success. Kouropatkin has sent forward some 11 battalions and 24 guns to help the 1st Corps, and, with their aid, the Japanese are repeatedly repulsed. The opposing cavalries to the west have done but little, for the height of the kao-liang makes

manœuvre very difficult. Mitschenko is sent a couple of battalions, and under their protection he turns in for the night.

Thus, up till the close of the day, the Russians have maintained themselves stoutly. Their right, it is true, has been turned owing to Mitschenko's late arrival, and the 1st Siberians have been forced to extend their right flank to the north. Kouropatkin, in response to numerous appeals, has dissipated most of the reserve and has now only 17 battalions in hand. Oyama, on the other hand, though he has experienced a decided check, has still the 4th Division at his disposal almost untouched.

The troops on both sides pass a wretched night. The weather, after a burst of heat, has turned cold again. The Russian trenches have not been drained and are half filled with the rain. The men, soaked to the skin, deprived, as a matter of precaution, of fires, hungry, and weary with many days of constant marching and fighting, are busy burying the dead, dressing and carrying away the wounded, distributing ammunition, watching for night attacks, eating a little and sleeping a little where the chance occurs. All this for a cause but little to their liking; and yet not a grumble is heard, and the troops entertain hopes of a hearty, resolute fight on the morrow.

Comments.—There are some noticeable features in this day's battle, besides the counterstroke of Putilov's two battalions. Stackelberg, both before and after he was attacked, called loudly for reinforcements. Sluchevski, whose centre and left had not been touched, called also for assistance from the reserve, because it was clear, according to his statement, that his corps would be the enemy's principal objective on the morrow. What a heavy rôle is that of the defender! Not only has he to provide against all the probabilities, but all the possibili-

ties as well; not only must he be ready to meet an attack by day, but must watch patiently through the night, even though the enemy be sleeping. And, when he has watched and fought and starved for days, the fruits of his labour may be lost because the man or the unit to right or left has retreated.

The failure of the Japanese to time their movements correctly was due to causes partly within and partly beyond their control. The refusal to use the 4th Division throughout the day is noteworthy and in accordance with the precedent of Ta-shih-chiao. Oyama may have expected a counterstroke along the railway, and may have been unwilling to dispense with the guard to his own communications until he could strike at those of the enemy. Once Kuroki effectively threatens the line north of Liao-yang, the Russians should be too busy in defence of their railway to think of reprisals.

The 31st August: Japanese operations.—It has been mentioned that Kuroki, after passing the Tai-tzu-ho, established himself on the right bank in the vicinity of Swallow's Nest Hill. There he digs himself in with the expectation of being attacked; but the fighting on the 31st in this quarter is limited to a few skirmishes and an artillery duel carried on with the 17th Corps. It is 9 a.m. before General Bilderling hears of the passage. He promptly orders out troops to oppose the crossing and directs Liubavin to act against the Japanese rear.

There is not much promptness in execution. Liubavin, far from advancing, is retreating some 7 miles north of Pen-hsi-hu after a slight engagement with the Kobi Brigade, in which his casualties amount to one man killed and two wounded. Umezawa crosses the river in pursuit and moves a few miles to the north. About 3 p.m. General Dobrjinski, commanding the 35th Division, posts 7½

battalions and 48 guns on and near Manju-yama, and keeps 6 battalions and 56 guns in reserve. Orbeliani sends forward a reconnaissance, but hearing that the crossing has been effected, withdraws away to the north. Nowhere is any attempt made to drive off the dangerous intruders. The information at the disposal of the Russian staff is that 1½ divisions have crossed the river; but Kouropatkin does not believe it. In fact, he expresses surprise at the incompleteness of the information available and urges energetic reconnaissance.

Towards 11 p.m. Kuroki issues his orders for the 1st September. The 15th Brigade is to take Manju-yama, and the 12th Division on its right is to move towards the railway.

Some 12 miles to the south-west the remainder of the Japanese 1st Army has an easy day. General Nodzu, in command of the central group, is with his 5th Division, and his whole interest is absorbed in its doings. He directs the 10th Division to conform to the action of the Guards, and pays no more attention to it. Now the Guard Division fought a pretty severe action on the 30th, and it now spends the day entrenching against that threatened counter-attack. The 10th Division therefore waits in vain, and the operations east of the Tassu brook are confined to an artillery duel.

Oku, in the meantime, is fighting a very different battle. For his attack on the 1st Siberian Corps he collects no less than 234 field and 48 heavy guns. On his right five regiments move at 3 a.m. against Stackelberg's left. On the extreme right of this group the leading companies get close up to the trenches in the darkness, but there they are stopped by obstacles and by a heavy fire. Unable to advance and anticipating annihilation at daybreak, they fall back about 500 yards to seek cover. In the centre of the group, two

battalions manage to get through the wire entanglement, but just beyond they are stopped by a row of mines. Just as they summon courage to bolt across, eight fougasses explode, and, though no damage is done, the assailants retire with some celerity to a cutting, where they remain clear of explosions but suffering somewhat heavily from rifle fire. The regiment on the left of the group meets at first with a greater measure of success. Somewhat delayed in its advance by the mud and by the kao-liang, cut down here to a height of about 3 feet and entangled to form an obstacle, it is nearly 5 a.m. before the assault can be delivered. Seven companies then dash gallantly forward. The first line of trenches is captured and then a second line. Two strong counter-attacks are repelled, but Russian reserves arrive in overwhelming force and drive the shattered remnant out of the trenches and down the hill. The regiment, having lost over 1100 men, is then sent back to the reserve, and the left of the 3rd Division is reinforced by two Kobi regiments.

31st August: Russian dispositions.—The dispositions of the Russian troops must now engage our attention. During the night of the 30th–31st the Russian commander recalls as many as possible of the reserves he had sent forward to the firing line. He is especially anxious to fathom the operations of the 1st Army, for he knows that they were not fully engaged on the 30th, and he suspects a movement across the Tai-tzu to be in progress. A strong reserve may therefore be required north of the river to strike the dangerous force. But General Stackelberg, who had been strengthened on the 30th by 18 battalions, is far from willing to part with his reinforcements. In fact, he is almost insubordinate on the subject and incurs reproof by his commander; but, censure notwithstanding, he manages to keep all the troops except one regiment, and

that is only allowed to go under protest. During the night the 3rd Siberians manage to collect a corps reserve of 12 battalions, and the 10th Corps one of 14 battalions.

But after all their preparations the fighting on the 31st resolves itself, in the Russian centre and left, into a mere artillery duel in which the Japanese are worsted. In front of the extreme left Russian patrols report a wide gap, and General Vassiliev, commanding at this point, decides on taking the offensive. About 8.30 a.m. he pushes a battalion on to a hill about a mile in front of his line and sends patrols eastwards to the Tang-ho. At the same time he reports his action to Sluchevski and asks for reinforcements. Kouropatkin, flushed with success, had, on the evening of the 30th, issued an order that "army corps commanders may take the offensive to-morrow at their own discretion." Sluchevski, however, telephones to his chief for instructions. It is one of the virtues of the telephone that it absolves a subordinate from the responsibility of acting at his own discretion; and Kouropatkin orders the over-daring Vassiliev back again. If he has any troops to spare they must be placed in the corps reserve. This decision was unfortunate, for, according to Sir Ian Hamilton, there were, beyond four companies near the junction of the Tai-tzu and Tang, no troops available to defend Anping, the point where the lines of communication of the 2nd and 12th Divisions crossed. "A bold stroke at Anping . . . would have cut Kuroki's forces clean in two and . . . would have probably so destroyed and disorganised his transport as to put the 1st Army out of action for several weeks to come."[1]

After the successful resistance on the left of the 1st Siberians, Kouropatkin anticipates an attack east of the Tassu brook. He accordingly moves up 12 battalions

[1] "Staff Officer's Scrap Book," Vol. II, p. 87.

from his reserve in that direction. About midday, however, after a terrific bombardment, the 3rd Japanese Division again makes an attack to the west of that stream. A desperate struggle results in the capture of the first line of trenches, the Russians retiring to the second line. Across a narrow space, but a few yards in width, these resolute soldiers blaze at one another. But as no reserves are brought up on either side, the respective positions remain unaltered. The right of the 1st Siberians has been engaged in a sanguinary combat since the dark morning hours, but without any decisive result. A horse battery of Akiyama's, concealed in the kao-liang, enfilades and completely silences one Russian battery and puts all the officers in the group out of action. The effect of this one cleverly handled battery is greater, in fact, than that of the two hundred guns which are launching a tornado of fire at Stackelberg's gallant troops.

Further to the right the activity of the infantry with Mitschenko, which is expressed in the capture of a village and a resolute attempt to capture a second, tends to confirm Marshal Oyama's worst fears. He thinks a strong Russian counter-attack is developing against his left and line of communications. Consequently the 4th Division, which, had it been thrust in to support the 3rd Division early in the afternoon, might have decided the conflict, is for long held back by general headquarters.

Early in the morning Kouropatkin issues instructions which reach headquarters of army corps at 6 a.m., to the effect that, if strong hostile forces should be located on the right bank of the Tai-tzu-ho, the troops on the advanced position should be withdrawn into the main position round Liao-yang. A large reserve will then be collected with which to attack the enemy on the right bank.

In this order Mitschenko is directed to cross the Tai-tzu-ho as soon as the 1st Siberians fall back. Unfortunately for the Russians, in his anxiety to conform with these directions, Mitschenko makes preparations for withdrawal long before the 1st Siberian Corps shows any sign of retirement. The cessation of activity against the Japanese left decides Oyama to allow Oku the use of the 4th Division. The Russian right is now to be objective, and all preparations have been made for the attack, when a false report of heavy Russian columns advancing from the north-west is received. The Japanese movement is suspended, and the 4th Division wheels round to meet these imaginary adversaries. Then a thunderstorm breaks and, for the moment, hostilities cease.

The attacks on the 1st Siberian Corps and its reinforcements, made by the left Japanese group, have now lasted thirty-six hours and have cost about 7000 men. Only at one point has it captured a Russian trench, and even there the Russian line is only damaged, not broken. At 8 p.m. on the 31st, after the bombardment preceding the intended attack of the 4th Division, Stackelberg has still eleven companies in corps reserve. The Russian situation, except for a scarcity of gun-ammunition, is therefore at this hour distinctly favourable. The whole line of the advanced position is practically intact and has survived most vigorous assaults at its weakest points. In front of the left the Japanese have fallen back; in front of the right they have suffered enormous losses. The general reserve, if not intact, is being gradually re-collected.

Kouropatkin's decision.—The Russian losses have amounted to 6000. Kouropatkin calculates that the enemy must have suffered to double that extent. His situation has been further improved by the arrival of four fresh battalions from Russia. News, however, has been flowing

in of the passage of the Tai-tzu-ho by a strong Japanese detachment. This force can no longer be neglected, and the problem before Kouropatkin is whether he shall use his general reserve for a blow along the railway, trusting to the 17th Corps and troops of the 1st Corps to repel Kuroki, or whether he shall retire into his bridge-head and strike at Kuroki with his reserve. The former is, bearing in mind the terrible repulses inflicted on the Japanese, not an undertaking of exceptional difficulty or danger; and we have seen the bare possibility of such an operation to have been enough to make Marshal Oyama exceedingly nervous for his communications. It is moreover a measure that must, if successful, undoubtedly lead to greater results than the defeat of Kuroki. The other alternative is, however, in some respects the more alluring. Kouropatkin's gravest anxiety has ever been for the safety of his communication with Muk-den. With the defeat of the 1st Japanese Army that anxiety will vanish for ever. If he makes a counter-attack southwards there will be, at every step forward, a pull at his heartstrings calling him back, at every step a magnification of the 1st Japanese Army whose strength has never yet been fixed. There is, besides, something vastly attractive in the manœuvre against Kuroki. The use to be made of the river appeals strongly to a life-student of Grand Tactics, and the 1st Army, separated from its comrades by the deep waters of the Tai-tzu-ho, is offering a singularly tempting objective.

The second course is therefore adopted. Apparently, however, it is a parry rather than a lunge. For Kouropatkin thus expresses the reasons for its selection in a telegram to the Czar: "My general reserve was no longer strong enough to ensure the success of a counter-stroke in a southerly direction. A withdrawal into the

main position shortened the length of line to be defended, making it possible to concentrate a considerable portion of the army north of the Tai-tzu-ho. There was undoubtedly a danger that Kuroki might cut our communications, and the most pressing duty of the army seemed to be to guard them."

The withdrawal from the advanced position.—During the night the whole of the troops occupying the advanced position are withdrawn to the inner line. It is no mean undertaking. A determined and successful night attack —and the assailants may arrive pell-mell with the defenders on the next position. But the dangers of retreat have no terrors for the Russians; and their confidence is justified, for not a sound reaches the enemy. Japanese engineers are busy close by, removing obstacles under cover of darkness in preparation for a fresh assault, when they find, soon after midnight, that the Russians are evacuating their trenches. The 3rd Division then moves forward and peacefully occupies the heights it has struggled so long and so gallantly to win.

Kouropatkin's general plan of action is now that the inner position shall be defended by 72 battalions, 14 squadrons, and 184 guns drawn from the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Siberian Corps and from a brigade of the 10th Corps, the whole being under the command of General Zarubaiev. The bulk of the 10th Corps and one division of the 5th Siberians are to remain near Liao-yang and the other division of the 5th Siberians at Yen-tai station. The 1st Siberians and Mitschenko's cavalry are withdrawn to the right bank of the Tai-tzu to take part in the offensive movement. Late on the 31st, however, news that Kuroki is moving north from the Tai-tzu towards the Yen-tai mines, makes Kouropatkin anxious for the left of the 17th Corps, and he therefore dispatches Samsonov's cavalry

and Orlov's brigade in that direction, thus depleting very early the force available for the counter-stroke.

Summary of events from 23rd to 31st August.—The withdrawal from the advanced position marks the close of a distinct phase in the battle, and it may be well at this point to recapitulate shortly the main events that have been related of this historic struggle.

Up till the 26th August the Russian commander had decided to hold the positions occupied by his southern and eastern groups at An-shan-chan and east of the Tang-ho respectively. The defeat of the left wing of the 10th Corps on the morning of that day makes him anxious for the safety of his communications. He accordingly issues directions for the withdrawal of the two groups into the advanced position and for the disposal of the 17th Corps, facing east, to guard the communications north of the Tai-tzu.

The retirement is conducted admirably indeed, and with eventual success, but under continuous pressure from the enemy and under natural conditions sufficiently trying to sap the moral and physical endurance of the best of troops.

On the 30th the Japanese make a determined attack on the advanced position, but at nightfall have to return to their trenches, having been beaten from end to end of the Russian line. On the 31st the assault is resumed against the right of the line, but, in spite of the most desperate valour on the part of Oku's troops, the 1st Siberians hold their ground. Relief, however, comes from Kuroki, who crosses the Tai-tzu on the night of the 30th–31st, and now, established on the right bank, is disturbing the mental equilibrium of the Russian commander by threatening the railway. Anxiety for the safety of that single artery is again the deciding factor. The positions so valiantly

maintained are abandoned, and the army is redistributed. For the present 3½ corps are to hold the bridge-head, 1½ corps with Samsonov's cavalry are to reconnoitre Kuroki's forces, and the remainder are to await further developments north of the river.

Comments.—The Japanese succeeded in wringing temporary and partial victory out of a desperate situation. False reports of the retirement of the Russians induced Kuroki to cross the Tai-tzu-ho prematurely. The danger to which he was exposed was great; but it passed away, and his action proved decisive of the first stage of the battle. Oyama had thrown in his last reserve—the 4th Division—and in the event of its repulse and of a Russian counter-attack there was nothing left to guard the railway. But fortunately for the Japanese, before the 4th Division was repulsed the influence of Kuroki's daring movement, 20 miles to the north-east, was already being felt—so much felt, indeed, that Kouropatkin determined to strike the intruders heavily. Trouble, therefore, may still be in store for the Japanese right wing, but for the moment Oyama can rest content that a great crisis has been successfully negotiated.

The inaction of 2½ Japanese divisions on the 31st August is only partially explained by the statement that General Nodzu, under whose command these troops were placed, became so much absorbed in directing the fight of the 5th Division that he omitted to issue orders to the other formations committed to his care. If this statement were correct, what were Marshal Oyama and his staff about to allow half their force to remain idle? It looks much as if the troops attacking the left and centre were disinclined to close once more with their redoubtable opponents. The Guard Division had suffered very heavy casualties, and it may be that, for the moment, its spirit was broken.

That Oku's troops were able to continue the assault with vigour was due in large measure to the iron resolution of their commander, but also to some extent to the fact they outnumbered their opponents and were supported by a very powerful force of artillery.

CHAPTER XIV

THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG—(*continued*)

The 1st September.—South of the Tai-tzu-ho, the 1st September is a day of comparative calm. The Japanese 2nd and 4th Armies advance and occupy the trenches vacated by their opponents and the ground overlooking the main defences of Liao-yang, the 4th Division wheeling round towards the western front with Akiyama's cavalry on its left, and the remaining divisions forming up against the southern front. A few heavy guns bombard the railway station but without much effect, and an occasional artillery duel takes place. Of the 1st Army, the Guards are directed to force a passage east of Mu-chang, and the 3rd Brigade is directed to rejoin the 2nd Division by the pontoon bridge.

North of the river a very different scene is enacted. Kuroki, still firm in the belief that the Russians are retreating, presses forward vigorously. Kouropatkin, on learning from Bilderling that some 30,000 Japanese are across the Tai-tzu-ho, scribbles on the report, "I must quickly elaborate a plan for passing to the offensive. It is most desirable to concentrate to-day, approach and deploy to-morrow, and attack the day after"—a somewhat deliberate plan of operations when confronting so quick and hard-hitting a commander as Kuroki. The Russian troops north of the river who are available for the execution of this plan amount to 45,000 bayonets, 7200 sabres, and 335 guns, whereas their adversaries only total 17,000

bayonets, 600 sabres, and 60 guns. For the moment the initiative, however, lies still with the Japanese.

The left of the Russian line from hill 920, by Hsi-kuan-tun to Manju Yama, is to bear the brunt of the attack. It is occupied by the 35th Division (16½ battalions, 6½ squadrons, 104 guns) under General Dobrjinski, Ekk's detachment (7 battalions, 2 squadrons, 8 guns) being close in rear. Dobrjinski's instructions for the day are to determine, by ceaseless reconnaissance, but without fighting, the front, depth, and direction of movement of the Japanese army. His right flank is covered by the 3rd Division of the 17th Corps under Yantzul, and by a detachment at Mu-chang. Some 3 miles beyond, and in advance of, his left flank is Orbeliani's cavalry (11 squadrons, 6 guns), and near the Yen-tai coal mines is Samsonov's cavalry (19 squadrons, 6 guns), which has just completed a night march of 19 miles. Orlov, marching from Yen-tai station, arrives at the coal mines at 2 p.m. Away to the east, Liubavin (4 battalions, 18 squadrons, 12 guns) is retiring before Umezawa.

Kuroki's operations.—Very early in the morning of the 1st September Kuroki crosses the pontoon bridge and climbs Swallow's Nest Hill. There he receives a message from Oyama to the effect that he is not to commit himself to a general attack until the situation shall become a little clearer. About 9 a.m. he is informed of the Russian retirement in front of the 2nd and 4th Armies, and he takes this as a proof of the correctness of his assumption as to the Russian retreat from Liao-yang. His troops have already initiated their operations. The 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division is on the left, and the 23rd and 12th Brigades of the 12th Division in centre and right respectively; three battalions are in divisional reserve to the 12th Division; but there is no general reserve. The artillery of the 2nd Division is present, having crossed the river during the

night; and part of the 3rd Brigade of the same division, summoned from the south of the river, arrives during the day, although too late to take part in the fighting.

On the night the 12th Brigade captures Wuting-shan; but the commander of the 2nd Division decides to await the effect of the fire of his guns before advancing. A somewhat futile artillery duel therefore takes place, the Russians ranging on a false crest and the Japanese unable to locate the Russian batteries. The Japanese fail to realise throughout the campaign a point that was made so evident in South Africa, namely, that an artillery attack on an entrenched position is *per se* of no value. To be of use it must be combined with an infantry advance, as neither the gunners nor riflemen in the defences will show themselves for the mere pleasure of affording targets.

It is not till 11.30 a.m. that the 15th Brigade moves to the attack. About that hour the commander of the 12th Division—General Nishi—hears that his right is being seriously threatened from the direction of the Yen-tai mines. He is forced, therefore, to make a detachment in that direction, and later, at 1.50 p.m., hearing that a Russian column two miles long has been sighted to the north-west, he decides to suspend his attack. He sends word to that effect to Kuroki, and also to Okasaki, who is commanding the 23rd Brigade on his left. The latter, recognising the difficulty of breaking off the action at this stage, continues his attack alone. To provide him with the necessary support, the guns of the 2nd and 12th Divisions are moved forward 500 yards and concentrate their fire upon Manju Yama, which is Okasaki's objective.

The message from General Nishi causes Kuroki at last to realise that the Russians are not retreating, and that there may be serious trouble in store for his isolated army. Opposed in front by the 17th Corps and Ekk's detach-

ment, and threatened in the flank by Orbeliani, Samsonov, and Orlov—the situation is one calculated to shake the strongest nerves. Nevertheless no thought of adopting a defensive attitude enters his mind. The remainder of the 3rd Brigade and the 29th Kobi Regiment are ordered up from south of the river, Umezawa is directed from Pen-hsi-hu towards the Yen-tai mines, and General Nishi is instructed to use one brigade, the 12th, to deal with the threat against the right, and with the other to co-operate in Okasaki's attack. The advance is now continued in determined fashion, but the Russian position is too strongly entrenched to justify the hope of its capture by daylight.

Soon after nightfall, however, after a short burst of artillery preparation, the 15th Brigade moves through the millet to the attack of Manju Yama. The regiment on the right manages to seize the northern end of the hill. The regiment on the left captures Hsi-kuan-tun, the commander of the ten Russian companies in garrison abandoning it without waiting for the attack, and without informing the troops to right and left. At the same time three Russian batteries, deprived of escort, fall back. A gap is thus opened up in the Russian line, and into it the left of the 15th Brigade penetrates, the luckless defenders of Manju Yama, who number six battalions, being thus enveloped on both flanks. They are reinforced by three companies, and they then make a couple of counter-attacks. On the repulse of the last they abandon the position and fall back on Sha-ho-tun. From the Yen-tai plateau both Orlov and Samsonov remain passive spectators of the fight during the day; but it occurs to neither to intervene and, at 2 p.m., they prepare to bivouac at the mines.

Comments. The fighting on the 1st September has thus been limited to an engagement between forces of the strength

of one division on either side. Kuroki, indeed, in the pursuit of an enemy imagined to be in retreat, might well esteem himself fortunate in not having been crushed by overwhelming numbers. He has chosen, however, the best method of immobilising his opponents, that of a bold offensive; and that he continued the forward movement rather than attempted to break off the action after discovering his mistake, stamps him as a leader of high rank.

It has been held that Manju Yama, a hill of no great height, became a point of merely fortuitous importance during this battle, that it possessed no real tactical value, and that only because its peak rose high amidst the surrounding sea of kao-liang, did it arrest the attention of the Japanese leader and magnetise his wandering troops. There appear, however, to have been stronger reasons for its attack. It barred the shortest route from Swallow's Nest Hill to the railway. If Kuroki should move north-west on Yen-tai station, a hostile force on Manju Yama would oppose a standing menace to his communications, and could not therefore be ignored. The height formed the left flank of the Russian position proper on the right bank of the river; and an attack upon it would, therefore, turn that flank and render the withdrawal of troops in the salient formed by the river a matter of difficulty. A final reason may be drawn from the fact that the deep waters of the Tai-tzu-ho, flowing along the whole front of the 17th Corps, were as a wide ditch to a fortress; to act against the Russian right and centre on hills 1057 or 920, Kuroki would have had to recross the Tai-tzu-ho, and cross it once again in moving to the attack; that is to say, he would have had to cast away every tactical advantage of the situation, and undertake an operation that gave no promise of success. Kouropatkin, moreover, regarded Manju Yama as the pivot of manœuvre for his great counterstroke, and was

much distressed at its loss. Consequently, we shall see on the morrow desperate attempts to recapture it. Manju Yama, therefore, far from being regarded, like the sandbag battery at Inkerman, as a mere "symbol of victory," about which troops causelessly surged and struggled, may be considered to have been not only the tactical key on the right bank, but to have been the key of the whole battle-field of Liao-yang.

The 2nd September: Kouropatkin's design.—During the night of the 1st–2nd September Kouropatkin, in ignorance of the loss of Manju Yama, draws up Disposition No. 4—his plan for the counterstroke. The striking force is to be deployed between Yen-tai coal mines and Manju Yama, the latter place being used as pivot for the wheel to the right, the main feature of the movement by which Kuroki is to be crushed and thrown into the river. The 35th Division, supported by Ekk's Brigade, is to hold the pivot, while the bulk of the 10th Corps, the 1st Siberians and Orlov's Brigade, with Samsonov's and Mitschenko's cavalry, execute the offensive movement. The 3rd Siberians are to remain in reserve, and a rear-guard (a new name apparently for an additional reserve) of one brigade of the 1st Siberians, under Kondratovitch, is to be retained on the railway just north of Liao-yang. The total force for the stroke amounts to 92 battalions, 79 squadrons, and 352 guns, and, according to the Russian estimate, includes about 57,000 bayonets and 5000 sabres.

The passive defence of the entrenchments round Liao-yang south of the river is entrusted to General Zarubaiev, with 64 battalions, 10 squadrons, and 152 guns. North of the river there is also a detachment of 3 battalions and 24 guns watching the ford at Mu-chang, and, covering the right of the 35th Division, is the 3rd Division, under Yantzul, counting 16 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 68 guns.

The combat on the eastern side.—By the morning of the 2nd September, undeterred by his experiences of the previous day, Kuroki, having been informed that the 2nd and 4th Armies hope to reach the line of the Tai-tzu-ho in the course of the day, has once again reverted to his belief in a Russian retreat—his orders, in fact, begin with a statement that the Russians are retiring on Muk-den. Umezawa is to continue to move on the coal mines, the 12th Division is to pursue in the direction of Yen-tai station, the 2nd Division is to capture height 920 and then march due west, and the Guard Division is to cross the river in its front and to capture height 1057.

The story of the day's battle begins away eastward. Umezawa and Liubavin come to blows on the 1st September. The latter is driven northward; whereupon Umezawa continues his march towards the coal mines, and his appearance in that neighbourhood frightens away Samsonóv. Liubavin, however, resumes the offensive towards the Japanese communications about Pen-hsi-hu, and Umezawa is forced to return and fight again on the 2nd September. He is now victorious, and accordingly decides to leave two battalions to cover his communications, while with the remainder he pursues his journey. In the meantime Samsonov has returned, and manages to hold his own at the Yen-tai mines till 5 p.m., thus covering the left flank for some hours after Orlov's rout, now to be described. On his retirement, Umezawa occupies the Yen-tai mines.

The rôle allotted to Orlov's force is that of flank-guard; and it is also to march against the enemy's right flank and rear, regulating its movements by those of the 1st Siberian Corps. Before receiving a copy of Disposition No. 4, which contains these instructions, General Orlov is ordered by General Bilderling to co-operate with the 17th Corps and, at 2 a.m. on the 2nd, he is informed that the 17th Corps

will attack at dawn. At 4.30 a.m., when about to move up in support, he receives a message from General Kharkevitch, the quartermaster-general of the army, telling him that his chief duty is to keep in touch with General Bilderling and, if the 17th Corps is not attacked, to act in the manner that has been indicated; as he has not, however, yet received Disposition No. 4, he naturally cannot fathom the meaning of this order. He accordingly halts and sends off to General Bilderling for instructions. As no reply is forthcoming, he disposes his troops for defence south of the Yen-tai plateau, his guns in the centre of the Fang-shen heights, and his infantry on either flank. Samsonov is on his left, Orbeliani on his right, and one regiment of infantry is held in reserve. News now arrives that heavy fighting has taken place in the night at Manju Yama, though nothing is yet known of the result. It soon becomes evident, however, that the combat has been renewed in that quarter, and Orlov consequently decides to march to the attack of Manju Yama, which, according to rumour, has been captured by the Japanese.

Rout of Orlov's brigade.—He leaves a detachment (2 battalions, 2 squadrons, 8 guns) in the position, and sets out in a kind of attack formation, with five and a half battalions in front, and four battalions and a squadron in reserve. The remainder of his guns are directed to come into action if required in the kao-liang. After advancing a bare mile, one battalion comes in touch with the enemy and, after a short fight, retires in disorder. Orlov now decides to await the appearance of the 1st Siberian Corps, and then to push forward on its left. About 1 p.m. he is attacked by Shimamura with the 12th Brigade. The Russian artillery in the dense millet cannot come into action and, though all the Russian battalions are deployed, they can make no impression on the enemy. On the other hand,

one Japanese battalion, working well round to their own right, has driven a regiment of Samsonov's off a hill close to the coal mines. Orlov is therefore getting anxious for the safety of his line of retreat and, just at this crisis, he receives directions from headquarters to act with caution on account of the reverse suffered by the 17th Corps. Orlov considers the case will be met by a retirement and, after reporting that he can gain touch neither with Stackelberg nor with Bilderling, he withdraws in the direction of Yen-tai station. The Japanese, making use of their superior mobility, pass their opponents unobserved in the forest of kao-liang and cut in on their line of retreat, causing the retirement soon to degenerate into a rout. Some of the scattered remnant is rallied by the 1st Siberians, but not for long, and the second impulse of flight carries many of the fugitives to Yen-tai station. Sir Ian Hamilton tells us that as soon as the news of this is received at Japanese headquarters, Kuroki's staff at once jump to the conclusion that the troops so easily routed by Shimamura must consist of reservists. The conjecture is correct. General Orlov's troops, drawn from the 5th Siberian Corps, consist mainly of second category reservists and of young soldiers.

The 1st Siberians play a less important part in this action than in that of the 31st August. But is it fair on a gallant corps, when other troops are available, to gather it up from the firing line, where it has fought and suffered for days, and to use it for a counterstroke? Anyhow, its march is very slow. Exhaustion, deep mud, tall millet, obscured vision, intense heat, do not tend to rapidity, and only 10 miles are covered in seven and a half hours. Stackelberg rallies part of Orlov's brigade and, after a heated altercation with its leader, sends him forward to make an isolated attack with a single battalion. The battalion

is annihilated, and Orlov desperately wounded. Beyond this, Stackelberg displays no great energy, and the result is that not only does the weak and isolated Japanese right avoid disaster, but, at the close of the day, it is playing a very strong hand. After defeating Orlov's brigade, Shinamura presents an unbroken front to the 1st Siberians; and Umezawa, on the right, reaching the coal mines, threatens Stackelberg's left and causes him to retire.

On Stackelberg's right, Mitschenko has had an unsatisfactory day. Starting early in the morning with orders to establish communication between the 1st Siberians and the 17th Corps, he loses his way in the forest of kao-liang and moves north to the Yen-tai railway instead of east. Then discovering his mistake he turns south-east and, in his march, crosses the heads of Stackelberg's two columns and delays them considerably. Finally he forms up on the right of the 1st Siberian Corps, whose commander begs him to stand fast to cover the flank of an advance he intends to make in the night. Mitschenko refuses this help without a direct order from Kouropatkin and, at 8 p.m., retires some miles in order to bivouac for the night, losing his way again *en route*. On this occasion his troops do not incur a single casualty. Much of Mitschenko's shortcomings might perhaps be excused on the ground of the indifferent training of his troops; but as a cavalry leader he is lacking in dash, and he scarcely acts loyally by his comrades. Further to the south the 10th Corps, except as regards its advanced guard, has hardly fired a round, having been retained in reserve all day.

We now come to the main scene of action on September 2nd. Early in the morning a dispatch is sent to Bilderling placing the 10th Corps at his disposal, and at the same time instructing him, in case he cannot hold the ground about Hsi-kuan-tun, to fall back on the next position available.

He is further directed not to become involved in a decisive action with superior forces. It is not certain that Bilderling received the last message.

Repeated attempts to recapture Manju Yama.—Kouropatkin himself starts for the battle-field about 6 a.m., passes the 3rd Siberians and 10th Corps and, hearing heavy firing both to north-east and south-east, hurries on Vassiliev with the advanced guard (8 battalions, 3 squadrons, 24 guns) of the 10th Corps to height 920. At 10 a.m. he reaches high ground about two miles west of Sha-ho-tun. As yet he has received no word of the loss of Manju Yama. News filters but slowly through these high-growing crops and, although the Russians are amply provided with telegraph and telephone apparatus, they have no flag-signallers and not many heliographs, nor do they seem to have installed an efficient communication system of any sort. This fact, and the difficulty of seeing and of finding the way over the battle-field, militate greatly against Kouropatkin in his control over the counterstroke. It is most disconcerting too that the reports do not arrive in their chronological order. About 10.40 a.m. a message, timed 8 a.m., is received from Bilderling, reporting that his troops have repulsed two Japanese night-attacks and recaptured the position. Twenty minutes later, another dispatch, timed 10.30 a.m., arrives, in which General Bilderling declares his intention of recapturing Hsi-kuan-tun and Manju Yama. On the heels of that a third dispatch, timed 8 a.m., giving details of the loss of Manju Yama and the retirement of the 35th Division.

Two staff officers, sent forward to reconnoitre, report that few Japanese can be seen on Manju Yama, but that shrapnel can be seen bursting in the direction of the coal mines. Kouropatkin, now becoming anxious for Orlov's safety, orders Bilderling to get into communication with

him and, at all costs, to prevent the enemy from massing against him. At the same time Stackelberg is instructed to advance so as to support the 17th Corps and, as already stated, Orlov is warned to be careful.

In the meantime Dobrjinski, under whose command Ekk's detachment is placed, has been ordered by Bilderling to recapture his old positions. The force at his disposal numbers 18 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 batteries. The batteries open fire on Manju Yama and are shortly afterwards joined by Vassiliev's guns. The Japanese artillery, although it has advanced during the night, can make no effective reply, and the Russian infantry, covered by the effective support of the guns, advances to the attack about 10 a.m. Seven companies make an isolated attack against the Japanese right and are repulsed with considerable slaughter. Shortly afterwards Vassiliev's battalions come up and are pushed straight into action by Kouropatkin. But, after driving a Japanese post from an offshoot of hill 920 which it had occupied during the night, the Russian advance is brought to a standstill. These two uncoordinated attacks are directed by general headquarters without reference to Baron Bilderling. Soon after midday, the latter writes to Kouropatkin to say that the 35th Division will support Orlov's attack from the north in the evening, and will again attempt to recapture its old positions. To Kouropatkin these two tasks seem incompatible, and he accordingly demands further information, laying greater stress on the attack than on co-operation with Orlov. He sends up a regiment to strengthen the right flank and asks what other reinforcements are required.

About 1 p.m. he hears that the Japanese in front of Zarubaiev have been repulsed but, at 2 p.m., comes the counterblast of Orlov's rout and the news of the occupation by the enemy of the Yen-tai mines, within eight miles of

the main railway line. The weakest point in Kouropatkin's armour has been pierced, and the great counterstroke begins to lose its sting. Stackelberg is warned not to advance till he can be supported by the 3rd Siberians, and the latter do not seem to have received any instructions to help him.

Later, Stackelberg is informed that the 17th Corps will attack at 5 p.m. and that he is to support it if possible. The Russian commander, therefore, has not quite abandoned his great plan. He still means to attack, and the 10th Corps is ordered up to Sha-ho-tun. At 2.15 p.m. the Russian artillery begins once again to bombard the Japanese on Manju Yama, and from 5 p.m., with the addition of batteries from the 3rd Division and the 10th Corps, the Russian guns in action total 152. The effect is not great, however. The Japanese suffer but few casualties, and Okasaki has been credited with the statement that the rhythmical snoring of his warriors, sleeping securely in their trenches, rose higher even than the screeching burst of the shrapnel. The attack is executed in three columns: on the left, Colonel Istomin with 7 battalions; in the centre, Vassiliev with 13 battalions; and on the right, Ekk with 7 battalions. In reserve, in rear of the centre, are the 9 remaining battalions of the 10th Corps.

Matters progress slowly, although Kouropatkin has warned Bilderling of the importance of the time factor; and the Russian commander-in-chief, chafing at the delay, orders Sluchevski, who knows nothing of the ground and is ignorant of the general situation, to take charge of the operations. Shortly afterwards he writes to Bilderling as if Sluchevski is only to help him with his corps. Sluchevski solves the command-problem on his own initiative, by placing himself at Bilderling's disposal. During the morning the troops receive direct orders from Kouro-

patkin, Sakharov, Bilderling, Dobrjinski, Ekk—in fact, from anyone, apparently, who feels inclined to interfere. In the evening it is equally difficult to discover the real commander.

On the Japanese side the casualties suffered by the 15th Brigade have, as already mentioned, been wonderfully small considering the weight of metal concentrated on their small position. The 3rd Japanese Brigade has now rejoined the 2nd Division north of the river, and Okasaki has been reinforced by two battalions of the 29th Regiment. About 7 p.m. the Russian attack begins, 26 battalions moving forward in a great semicircle some 2½ miles long. It is a strange scene. The wearied troops marching in the gathering darkness through the thick forest of kao-liang, Japanese outposts, covered from view, pouring volleys into the dense ranks and retiring, friend undistinguishable from foe as the daylight disappears, units merging into one another as the front gradually narrows. By 8.30 p.m. the three columns converging on their objective succeed, however, after desperate fighting, in capturing Manju Yama and Hsi-kuan-tun. Unfortunately for the Russians, someone on the left flank of the 35th Division orders the "cease fire" to be sounded, and this call is taken up along the whole front, followed by the "assemble." The right and centre columns then begin to retire and, after a bayonet fight with some other Russian troops, whom in the darkness they mistake for Japanese, they return in confusion to Sha-ho-tun. Vassiliev, who witnesses their disordered arrival, reports to Sluchevski that the attack has failed.

Istomin's troops, however, still hold the northern end of the Manju Yama hill. On the south, too, some troops that have not retired, and a collection of odd companies amounting to about four battalions, carry out an assault and regain

the abandoned trenches. By 10 p.m. Manju Yama is again wholly in Russian hands and, about midnight, Kouropatkin receives a report to that effect. About this time Vassiliev also learns the true history of events. For some unknown reason, but probably because he understands the 10th Corps to be required in general reserve on the 3rd September, he issues orders that all troops of that corps remaining on the hill are to evacuate it. His order is executed, and thereupon the troops of the 17th Corps, with their flanks exposed by the retirement of their comrades, not unnaturally follow suit. On the morning of the 3rd September the Japanese are again in occupation of the hill, from which they themselves claim never to have been driven.

The combat south of the Tai-tzu-ho.—Events on the left bank of the Tai-tzu-ho now claim our attention. The line occupied by the 2nd and 4th Siberian Corps is about 10 miles in length. The 4th Corps is defending the western, and the 2nd Corps, assisted by 8 battalions and 24 guns of the 10th Corps, the southern front. Up to the night of the 1st–2nd September, the 3rd Siberians act as general reserve to the defenders, but, on the morning of the 2nd, General Kouropatkin absorbs them into his force for the counterstroke. The fortifications constructed are of a semi-permanent nature, and are garnished with redoubts and forts. The kao-liang has been cut, but to what extent is not clear.

The Japanese, having spent the 1st September mainly in reconnaissance and in bombardment, succeed in locating the Russian lines with fair accuracy. A night attack, made on a redoubt near the railway by a single battalion, is repulsed, but at a second effort, made at 4.30 a.m. on the 2nd, the Japanese succeed in entrenching themselves within 400 yards of the work. The main attack begins at 7 a.m., the 4th and 6th Japanese Divisions moving against the

western face, and the 3rd, 5th, and 10th Divisions against the southern face. The town is bombarded by 180 field and 32 heavy guns, but the results achieved are not commensurate with the expenditure of ammunition.

The Japanese infantry, awaiting the effect of the fire, moves slowly forward. The Russians content themselves with a passive defence, except on their right flank, where a reconnaissance is made by the corps reserve of the 4th Siberians under General Rebinder. Kouropatkin, anxious as to the safety of his right flank, had ordered the rear-guard of the 1st Siberians, under Kondratovitch, to a position on the right bank of the Tai-tzu, close to and in prolongation of the line of defence, and had instructed Zarubaiev to make a demonstration in the same direction to clear up the enemy's intentions. The task is fulfilled with vigour. Rebinder drives in a weak detachment on the left flank of the 4th Japanese Division, but reinforcements reach it, and a desperate fight is maintained till 3 p.m., when the Russians retire, having suffered a loss of 1300 men. Their energetic action, however, by no means runs to waste, for they have located the enemy's left flank, freed the Russian commander's mind from anxiety in that direction and, at the same time, have disturbed Oku's mind as to the safety of his left flank to such an extent that he sends thither four battalions from his small reserve.

The Japanese now press their attack along the whole line, and with especial energy along the southern front; but at no single point do they penetrate the Russian trenches. The defenders are, however, running short of gun ammunition. At 6.30 p.m., Zasulich reports his brigade-park empty and asks for a fresh supply, and his request is forwarded to general headquarters by Zarubaiev, who asks at the same time for permission to bring the brigade of 1st Siberians to the left bank of the Tai-tzu to replace his own corps

reserve, most of which has now been absorbed into the firing line.

This request is the first of a series of three messages which reach the Russian commander early in the morning of the 3rd September, and whose combined effect is to cause him to decide on retreat. Just prior to the receipt of Zarubaiev's report he had decided to carry out his original plan, and had arranged with General Bilderling for its execution. The 10th Corps and the 3rd Siberians were to be employed for the offensive stroke, the 1st Siberians and the 17th Corps were to guard the flanks. At that time the defence on the left bank showed no sign of slackening. But then came these three messages: the first, the one quoted above; the second from Stackelberg, reporting that the 1st Siberian Corps had retreated owing to losses suffered in the last five days, which have left it in no condition to go forward, or even to meet a resolute attack; the third that Manju Yama had been abandoned, although height 920 was still held. About this time also came word from Liubavin that he had retreated to a point within 25 miles of Muk-den.

Kouropatkin decides to retreat.—Such a succession of blows might have broken the resolution of a more determined soldier than Kouropatkin. Stackelberg's retreat brings the danger to communications more than ever into prominence, and is probably the deciding factor. At 6 a.m. on the 3rd September the Russian commander resolves to retreat to Muk-den and issues the necessary orders.

Comments on Kouropatkin's action.—A situation is seldom quite so black as it looks to a general who already thinks he is being beaten. The tendency is always to accept too freely the statements of subordinates whose minds are unbalanced by the spectacle of local disaster. There are usually a hundred reasons why an army should retire for

every one that it should stand. At the Antietam, even Stonewall Jackson urged his leader to an immediate retreat; but Lee judged better of McClellan's losses and of the value of an unflinching attitude. Little account is, in the circumstances, taken of an adversary's troubles, yet in the case of Liao-yang they were patent. Very heavy losses had been suffered by the Japanese on the 30th and 31st August, and again on the 2nd September; their efforts had failed against the defences of Liao-yang, and they had suffered a severe repulse at Port Arthur. Must not these losses be sapping the strength of this small Japanese nation? Then again, from the course of the fighting round Hsi-kuan-tun, it would appear that Kuroki had been engaged *au fond*. But all these matters weigh as nothing against the scale containing the threat to the railway communication, the flight of Orlov's brigade, the retirement of the 1st Siberians, and the supposed scarcity of ammunition. Yet Oyama, on the other side, looking towards the unbroken lines presented by the defences of the city, can scarcely feel yet the elation of prospective victory; his reserves are already in the firing line, and the slaughter of his troops has been great. To Kuroki, across the river, the outlook is brighter, for Manju Yama has been recovered, Orlov has been routed, Umezawa is now in contact; there are seven battalions still in reserve, and the Guard Division is at call.

Kouropatkin is not an optimist—even his expressions of confidence take a mournful tinge. "I will not retire from Liao-yang; Liao-yang shall be my grave," he said to Bilderling; and this at a moment when his hopes were running high. His was a spirit of limited ambition, defined in its vision by the postponement, at best by the avoidance, of defeat, rather than by the achievement of victory. Yet natural causes, chief among which was a superiority of

numbers, nearly led him beyond his mental goal. It is a mark of the high level of confidence reached by him that the disaster to Orlov, and the consequent threat to the railway, did not cause him immediately to abandon his offensive. It was the succession of blows that struck him in the early hours of the 3rd September that broke his spirit.

Yet what could he have done? Ammunition was in reality plentiful, for a trainload had just arrived; but he did not hear of this until after the decision was formed. Zarubaiev might have been given Kondratovitch's brigade of the 1st Siberians which he had asked for. The attitude of the Japanese Guards in front of Yantzul was so irresolute that half of the 3rd Division might have been moved to height 920; the 10th Corps and the 3rd Siberians were comparatively fresh, and the cavalry had done but little. The 17th Corps, supported by the 10th Corps, might have continued its attack on Manju Yama and, after capturing it, might have pushed straight on to Swallow's Nest Hill. On the left the 3rd Siberians, followed in second line by those weary warriors, the 1st Siberians, might have dealt with the 12th Japanese Division and Umezawa's brigade, operating against their inner flanks, and forcing them to fight for their communications or retreat. The troops arriving from Russia pushed towards the coal mines after detrainment might, moreover, have protected the railway or supported the left flank as required. The Russians still enjoyed considerable superiority in numbers, and each day would make that advantage more pronounced.

The suggestions here made differ in reality but little from the plans of the Russian commander for the 3rd September before he received the three messages. His information was, however, less complete than ours. The Russian Staff Conferences show that, long after the war, the Rus-

sians still laboured under serious delusions. Kouropatkin did not, for instance, estimate his numbers as superior to those of his opponents. It is true that he counted Kuroki now as weak, but on the other hand he pictured Umezawa as strong—strong, too, where the menace was most effective.

The battle-field is the place for instant decisions, and there was no time to verify the statement that ammunition was running short; at railhead, amidst the depots and parks, Zarubaiev might be trusted to give a correct version of the matter. With the knowledge at our disposal and sitting far from the toil and turmoil of battle, it is clear that the Russian commander should have made another bid for victory, and that the result would then have depended on endurance and morale. The Russian morale had no doubt suffered severely, but the gallant fighting in this prolonged battle of such corps as the 1st and 3rd Siberians, which, since the commencement of the campaign, had endured defeat after defeat, without once feeling the glamour of victory, showed how quickly daring leadership or slight success might restore it. Moreover, impartial observers have stated that, amongst Kuroki's gallant troops, the breaking strain had very nearly been reached, and, if the steel were snapped, it was a commonly expressed belief that the high temper of the metal would militate against any repair or welding process.

Lessons of the battle.—Orlov's disaster threw the danger of defeat for the first time in the battle from Japanese on to Russian shoulders. Prior to that occurrence an unprejudiced observer, in possession of all the elements of the problem, would have given preference to the Russian chances of victory. It was perhaps the greatest of the contributory causes to the ultimate result of the conflict, for not only did it bring into prominence the menace to the railway, but it was

also the indirect cause of Stackelberg's retreat. From the incident and its results an object-lesson of some importance may be derived. It is that whatever may be the brain-power, the intellect, the skill in the leadership of an army, and whatever may be the expenditure of money, the subtlety of strategy, the perfection of organisation and direction, the result of a campaign will depend largely on the courage of the man. For there will always be times and places where heroism on the one side and lack of it on the other may break the back of every military calculation. It is true that courage is stimulated by good leading and success; but it is not born on the scene of conflict. It is created largely by the systems of national and military training, and is at no time more valuable than in that first great battle on which the fate of the campaign so often depends.

In these days high civilisation will always tend to diminish or eliminate the fighting qualities unless a corrective be applied. Judged by Western standards, neither combatant in the Far East reached a high level of civilisation and, as might be expected, the struggles were of a desperate and sanguinary nature—more so, in fact, than any of the great conflicts that have taken place in Western Europe in the last century. The course of the war showed, too, that the Guards—the most civilised division in Japan—were lacking in sting, whereas on the Russian side there was no more sturdy and gallant corps than that commanded by Zarubaiev, composed of rude natives of Siberia.

But in this instance it was less the courage of Orlov's soldiers that was at fault than their training. A force composed of a mixture of recruits and old soldiers is doomed in a tough fight to disaster. By the term "old soldier" is implied the soldier who has passed through his period of service with the colours and his first period of service

in the reserve, and whose training has practically ceased—as was the case with the second category reservists in Russia. Such a man may have his value. If not too old, his previous training and discipline may fit him for police duties in the home country; and certain modern conditions, such as the dependence on food imports and the unemployment due to the financial debacles that will occur in states balancing perilously on their credit system, may necessitate, on the outbreak of a European war, a very large increase in the police force. He may also be employed in fortresses and in posts on the line of communications, provided the enemy allows him time for a little preliminary training. The provision of these posts with garrisons by special troops is of considerable importance, for if it be not done, regular formations must be broken up for the purpose. This was the case with the Russians in Manchuria, and it accounted to some extent for the state of confusion at which their organisation arrived. And, finally, he may be employed to reinforce, but by not more then 10 per cent, the units of the regular army, where his services would be valuable for carrying out tasks such as baggage duties, by which the combatant ranks are depleted in war. It is well to understand his limitations, for to talk of improving ill-trained troops by a stiffening of old soldiers of the type indicated is clap-trap pure and simple.

The experiences of the Russians indicate that the young soldier, on the other hand, should be kept in hand and trained as long as possible but, when dispatched to the seat of war, he should join seasoned units in the field. Neither young soldiers nor old soldiers should form complete units, nor should a unit be built up of a mixture of the two categories. Band them together or band them with ill-trained troops, and they will only bring discredit on their country. The Japanese principle, when more troops were

required, was to expand existing units rather than create new formations.

If soldiers be sufficiently well trained on a system that admits of a measure of elasticity and individualism without abatement of discipline they will not be thrown off their balance by meeting new and unexpected conditions. "The genii of the mountain and of the kao-liang," Sluchevski tells his men, "are two new enemies. To the devil with the genius of the mountain! Of the genius of the kao-liang we must make an ally." Japan, both from the nature of her training grounds and previous knowledge of the theatre of operation, was able to bind the spirits to her will. By mobility in the mountains and a system of group fighting in the kao-liang she conquered her difficulties. Not so Russia. The Russian soldier, born and trained in the plains where he was expected to fight, laboured heavily in the mountains, and had often to be invalided for heart-ailments. But it was principally the predilection for movements in mass, and the low average of individual initiative and intelligence to which the Russian misfortunes in the unusual circumstance of hill and forest may be ascribed. In the defence of positions the worth of the Russian soldier shone brightest, for there his stolid courage and firm discipline could find their full reward, and his antiquated methods were of less import than in more active operations.

The retreat.—At 6 a.m. on the 3rd September the Russian commander issues the orders for the retreat of the whole army on Muk-den. Zarubaiev is directed to begin at once the withdrawal of the garrison of Liao-yang towards Yen-tai station, to destroy all road-bridges, to pack up pontoons, and to damage the railway bridge to such an extent as to prevent its use for the passage of troops. He is to send Kondratovitch at once to Yen-tai station and to evacuate the forts at dusk.

In the meantime the artillery of the 4th Japanese Division has crept closer to the trenches, and renews the bombardment at dawn. The infantry of the division delivers a succession of the most determined assaults on the western face of the works, but they are repulsed with a slaughter without parallel in the war. There is no detailed report of this fighting; but according to the official account "several Russian officers and men went mad, their minds unhinged by the fierceness of the struggle." In one Russian regiment alone there are 916 casualties out of a strength probably of 2700. Both the bombardment and the infantry attack are maintained all day, but not a Japanese flag is planted on the ramparts before the Russians retire of their own accord.

At 4.30 p.m. Zarubaiev issues his orders. The retreat is to begin at 7.30 p.m. The railway bridge and the three bridges below it are to be used by the 4th Siberians, the other three bridges by the 2nd Siberians and the detachment of the 10th Corps. The twenty-eight siege guns have already been sent north. They had been in Liao-yang since the 24th August but, owing to difficulties of transport, only two batteries had, by the morning of the 3rd September, been moved into position, and even they had not time to open fire before the receipt of the order to retire. Two batteries had been allotted to Bilderling, and might have helped him greatly had they been mounted on heights 1057 or 920.

The retirement of the 4th Corps is covered by a rear-guard (8 battalions, 16 guns) under General Chileiko, which occupies the second line of defence at 5 p.m. The scouts of the main body evacuate the main position at 11 p.m., and at 1 a.m. on the 4th Chileiko, hearing that the bridges are clear, begins his own retreat. A similar procedure is adopted with the 2nd Siberians and the brigade of the 10th Corps, and proves equally successful.

At 1.45 a.m., when Zarubaiev is in full retreat, he is directed to deter the Japanese from pursuing to the right bank of the river. He therefore leaves General Putilov, with eight battalions, on the right bank near the railway, and directs the Muchang detachment, which has not retired, to maintain its positions. For three whole days Zarubaiev's troops had kept the Japanese at bay, repulsing their daring and determined assaults with a valour only equalled by that of their opponents. Their losses number only 2246, of whom 1300 fell in their counter-attack. And now they are withdrawn in an orderly retreat, burning their bridges, and putting an unfordable river between them and their foes. This method of fighting in front of a river spanned by destructible or defensible bridges has its advantages, of which Königgrätz furnishes another example. It would seem almost as if the Japanese have gained a barren victory; and it is indeed barren of material result, for, as Kouropatkin proudly says, "Not a single trophy was left behind, not a prisoner, not a gun, not a transport cart." But a victory can never be barren; it must from its nature produce moral results exceeding greatly in value the tale of prisoners and captured guns. The Russians have stood to fight a pitched battle, have put forth all their strength and have been defeated. The spoil of battle is not visible, but it is there—in the heart of the Japanese soldier.

The withdrawal of the other Russian corps presents a less difficult task compared with that which confronted Zarubaiev. Kuroki's troops, with the exception of his reserve, are by now thoroughly exhausted. The bitter struggle of yesterday round Manju Yama has at last brought home to him that he is not dealing with a mere rear-guard. A continued offensive is at present beyond his powers, but, casting his eye over the casualty list of the

Guard Division for the 2nd, he finds a blank report. The passage of an unfordable river in face of an enemy in position has evidently been regarded as too dangerous to attempt; the trial would entail a mere waste of life, and there is something in the theory. But their comrades in the 1st Army might have found words of censure for Hasegawa and his warriors had Yantzul, disregarding the very mild threat of the Guards, thrown the weight of half his division into the scale on the 2nd September. Be that as it may, however, Kuroki is now determined that the Guards shall work, and, at 9.45 a.m., sends an order directing Hasegawa, if he cannot at once effect a crossing to his front, to dispatch a brigade to Swallow's Nest Hill to cross by the bridge at that point. The reply is not received till 5.45 p.m. Hasegawa finds it "impossible to withdraw the troops from their position by day," but he sends two battalions from the reserve to the point indicated, to be followed after nightfall by four more battalions. Then, at 8 p.m., Kuroki orders the whole Guard Division, except three batteries and a battalion, round by the bridge to the north bank. Bad roads and mountainous country, however, necessitate a long detour and, by nightfall on the 4th, the bulk of the division is still south of the river. On the evening of the 3rd, the 15th Brigade on Manju Yama is replaced by the 3rd Brigade.

This pause in the active operations of the 1st Japanese Army enables the Russian troops opposed to Kuroki to effect their retreat with comparative ease. The corps commanders are ordered, at 6 a.m. on the 3rd, to fall back on Yen-tai station; the 17th, 3rd Siberian, and 1st Siberian Corps with Mitschenko's cavalry taking up a line from Chan-hsi-tun to post No. 8 on the Yen-tai railway, to cover the retirement of the other troops. The regiment on height 920 retires early under the cover of gun-fire

directed on Manju Yama, and the general retreat begins at midday. Two of Yantzul's battalions with some guns hold height 1057, to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the 3rd Division, which, with the 35th Division and Ekk's brigade, moves off towards Chan-hsi-tun.

In the course of the day a request is received from Liubavin, who is retreating some 15 miles north of Pen-hsi-hu on the road to Muk-den, for a reinforcement of four battalions. The cause of the request is obscure, as Liubavin does not seem to have been pressed at all on the 3rd, but anxiety for his communications becomes supreme once more in Kouropatkin's mind. The message reaches him early on the 4th September, and he immediately orders three regiments to entrain for Muk-den, although at the time the three remaining brigades of the 1st Corps are detraining at that town. By a mistake in orders no less than five regiments with two batteries are dispatched to the Manchurian capital, and one battalion is sent direct from Muk-den to Liubavin. Kondratovitch's brigade is moved to Tu-men-tzu, a point about 2½ miles north of post No. 8, where there are already two battalions and two guns of the 1st Siberians. Between this point and Stackelberg's left are Samsonov's and Gourkho's cavalry detachments. South of Tu-men-tzu, a slight engagement takes place on the evening of the 4th, and then a report arrives of Japanese troops still further north. Stackelberg sends up six battalions to help in the defence of Tu-men-tzu, bringing the strength at that point to 15 battalions, 16 squadrons, and 14 guns. The only serious fighting on the 4th September takes place between Stackelberg's rear-guard and the 12th Japanese Brigade in the dark hours of the morning. It is a chance encounter that results in an indecisive action and heavy losses for both sides.

On the Japanese side Kuroki's troops are too much

exhausted to pursue on the 3rd. Nor is it till 11 a.m. on the 4th that their leader realises the Russians are really retreating. His right wing gains some ground during the day, but the 1st Army makes no real start before the 5th. On that day the Russians complete the evacuation of Yen-tai station. A Japanese battery from the 2nd Army causes a slight panic by opening fire on the rear-guard, and Umezawa's small force threatens the railway to the north, but cannot compete with the twenty-four battalions which line up to oppose it. Kuroki has been warned not to get far ahead of the other armies, and he is still without his Guard Division. Thus the Russian army gets clear away and, passing the Sha and the Hun rivers, settles down to rest after its fortnight of hard fighting. For his part, Marshal Oyama regards pursuit as hopeless, and sets to work to recruit the strength of his forces and prepare for a future advance.

Thus ends one of the great battles in the world's history, a battle of indeterminate strategical and tactical issues indeed, but meriting its appellation by reason of its vast moral, political, and inter-racial effects. The Western armies, massed in superior numbers, under a leader of high reputation, have been driven from ground of their own choice by the warriors of the East. Strong fortifications, a more numerous cavalry, a better gun, have availed them nothing; they have fought gallantly, but the blood of their thousands has been shed in vain. Nor is there anything to disguise or palliate the defeat. The Japanese, on the other hand, have gained a moral supremacy that will bear fruit in future battles. They are assured by experience of better training, of more skilful leading; their vanity is satisfied in that they have exhibited their prowess to the world.

Comments on Liao-yang.—The situation presented to Marshal Oyama prior to the great battle was one of peculiar

perplexity. Admiral Togo's tactics on the 10th of August, and the failure of the great assault on Port Arthur deprived him of much-needed reinforcements. He believed the Russian troops to outnumber his own by 20,000, but on the other hand the courage of his troops was stimulated by uniform success. He had the choice of three alternatives—to advance to the attack, to entrench and await reinforcements, or to retire to cover the siege of Port Arthur. The second was too dangerous to be seriously considered, for however admirable the long thin line may be when employed in a resolute offensive, it is palpably weak in defence. A retirement to Feng-huang-cheng and to the Liao-tung, combined with a thorough destruction of the railway, would have been a safe move, but must have entailed the loss of all the advantages hitherto gained. The acceptance of either the second or third alternative would have accentuated the loss of prestige consequent on the repulse at Port Arthur, and it would have resulted in an indefinite postponement of the main decision.

By adopting the first alternative in accordance with his original purpose, the Japanese commander retained the initiative, avoided a change of plan, and acted in the manner best suited to the Japanese temperament. It was a daring decision, but Marshal Oyama must have realised that his chances of success were as great as they ever would be. The Russian forces would increase more rapidly than his, and had a higher limit. The balance could only be redressed by the maintenance of the moral superiority attained, and by skilled and forceful leadership.

Having resolved to attack, he had to consider the method Broadly speaking, he was opposed by two great groups, separated from one another by 14 miles of rough and roadless country, and facing the one south and the other east and south-east. If the latter could be defeated the fears

of the Russian commander for his communications might be renewed, and he might be induced to weaken his hold on the strong position of An-shan-chan. If this was Oyama's plan, it proved entirely successful. He was, however, somewhat favoured by fortune, seeing that a comparatively small success, obtained on the left of the 10th Corps, a unit that contained in its ranks a large proportion of reservists, sufficed to cause Kouropatkin to withdraw the eastern group and then the southern group just when Zarubaiev's force, composed of the finest Russian troops in Manchuria, was preparing for the first time, and full of joy at the prospect, to fight out a battle to the end.

The Japanese general scheme of attack succeeded so admirably that it is almost idle to suggest an improvement. Still, it seems curious that with the object of assisting Kuroki the 4th Army was not sent into the gap between the 2nd and 3rd Siberians. Such a movement might have forced Kouropatkin to dispatch the whole of his reserves towards the Hsi-ta-ho valley, and would thus have prevented the counter-attack at one time impending against Kuroki's right. Moreover, the deployment of the whole Russian army would, in case of its defeat, have rendered the ultimate retirement from the "outer" to the "advanced" positions a very hazardous operation. But improbable as was a Russian offensive southwards at this moment, Oyama would take no chances as regards the security of his railway line.

He displayed the same caution in this respect in the attack of the "advanced" position; but otherwise his plan for the 30th and 31st August was of a most daring description. Having, after months of severe fighting and tardy progress, achieved tactical concentration, he immediately divided his force in the presence of superior numbers. He divided or allowed its division, indeed, at the very

moment when the main body of his army had received a severe repulse; and he, moreover, pushed a large detachment across a river that might be considered as unfordable. It is difficult to gather how far the execution of this scheme was the result of circumstance, and how far of settled purpose. An advance by a detachment north of the Tai-tzu was clearly in Oyama's mind, but whether he left the realisation of his idea to Kuroki, or whether he himself insisted on its fulfilment, is not clear. Nor is it certain that the plan would have been carried out had it not been for the mistaken belief that the Russians were retreating. In any case, the existence of that belief furnished the best, if not the only, justification of the Japanese action. A skilfully planned feint at crossing might have been equally effective in retaining a large force of Russians north of the river, and then all three armies could have been used against the advanced position. That Kuroki escaped the fate of Mortier at Dürrenstein and Vandamme at Kulm was due to failures in leadership on the Russian side, and to incidents, such as the unaccountable abandonment of Hsi-kuan-tun by its garrison on the 1st September, upon which it would have been quite unsound to calculate. Enormous credit is, of course, due to the commander of the 1st Army and his gallant troops for their action and determined fighting. But that Oyama's operations ultimately succeeded furnishes yet another proof that a bad plan resolutely executed is better than a good plan, such as was that of the Russian commander, when this is carried out in wavering fashion.

It has been a matter for some discussion whether, at the opening of the battle of Liao-yang about the 23rd August, Kouropatkin could still have found the necessary time and space to have held one of the converging hostile groups and struck heavily at the other, and if so, against which

group would a blow have proved most effective. The opinion has already been expressed that the decisive direction for any great offensive movement was southwards along the railway. Considering the problem in the light of after events, it is clear that two things would have militated strongly against the success of the operation. In the first place, Kouropatkin would probably not have given a full-hearted impulse to the movement, and in the second place, the troops were insufficiently trained and unsuitably equipped for manœuvre in a particularly difficult country. The situation on the 1st September was markedly different. One of the strongest of the previous objections to striking at Kuroki no longer held good: namely, that a success against him could not have been followed up. Kuroki, defeated on the right bank of the Tai-tzu-ho, would have been annihilated.

Kouropatkin nearly won a decisive victory, but the spirit in which he entered upon his offensive is shown in his communication to the Czar, mentioned on page 216, which can hardly be said to breathe an offensive spirit. In his orders for the operation in question, he states, indeed, that he intends to attack the enemy. But in the detailed instructions to the corps commanders, the word "attack" is not even mentioned, and, later, when he appeared fully committed to the attack, he warned Stackelberg in the old way to avoid a serious engagement with superior forces. Had his great counterstroke succeeded, the Japanese must have retired. With the 1st Army annihilated and the 2nd and 4th Armies repulsed, no other course would have been open to them.

It has been suggested that the annihilation of Kuroki's force alone would have had the same effect, and that this could have been achieved for certain by withdrawing the whole of the Russian forces to the north of the river

on the 1st September and throwing them against Kuroki. The bridges could have been destroyed, and a couple of brigades only, with cavalry and guns, left to repel an attempt at crossing in the neighbourhood of Liao-yang. Such an operation would certainly have placed Oyama in an unpleasant predicament. No fords had been uncovered up to the 1st September. An attempt to bridge the river without first spending much time in a series of feints, intended to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage, was not likely to succeed. To have moved a large portion of the 2nd and 4th armies eastward to help Kuroki would have entailed a flank-march and a dangerous weakening of the guard to the main line of communications. These troops too would have been difficult to supply so far from the railway, and might only have reached the 1st Army in time to be involved in disaster with it. The execution of this plan by the Russians, however, would have entailed the abandonment of former plans, of the elaborate fortifications round Liao-yang, and of the city itself—the focus of thought and action for so many months past. To none of these things would Kouropatkin have lightly consented.

As the battle was actually fought, the Russians might count themselves fortunate in breaking off three successive actions and retreating without disaster. This was partly due to the stolid courage of the Russian soldier, partly to the screen afforded by the kao-liang, and partly to the assailants' lack of numbers and of mounted troops.

The cavalry, as usual in this campaign, failed to justify its existence. This was to some extent the fault of the Russian commander, for he posted a cavalry division in rear of the centre during the early stages of the battle. Except for Samsonov's detachment, which put up a fairly good fight at the Yen-tai mines, the casualties in the Russian cavalry on the hardest day of fighting

amounted to six wounded. Picture Stuart, Forest, or De Wet in command of Liubavin's detachment (4 battalions, 17 squadrons, 12 guns) acting against Kuroki's or Umezawa's flank and rear. Or picture some fifty squadrons acting, under any leader of note, on the right flank on the 30th and 31st August. True, the giant millet was a terrible obstacle. But it also furnished a screen to movement, and it was not by shock action, but by using the horse as a means of transport to the rifleman that a useful rôle could be played. As Kouropatkin says in his memoirs, "Until cavalry is educated to feel that it should fight as obstinately as infantry, the money expended on our mounted arm is thrown away."

MAP XII

THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG

23rd August to 5th September 1904



CHAPTER XV

CONCLUSION

Strategic envelopment.—Many of the points of interest in the campaign have been brought out in a running commentary on events as they occurred, but a certain number could not be adequately dealt with till their effect throughout the campaign had been studied, and amongst the most important are the cognate subjects of extension, depth, envelopment, counter-attack, and reserves, all of which must necessarily be treated together. The Japanese, as pupils of the Germans, naturally adopted the military principles of their tutors. By obtaining the mastery of eastern waters, and from the moment of its acquirement, they threw the Russians strategetically upon the defensive, and thus secured the initiative and a considerable freedom of action. They decided to make use of an enveloping base, possibly in the hope of eventually bringing about strategical and tactical envelopment. The advantages and disadvantages of this method of operation were clearly apparent in the course of the campaign. By the exertion of a continuous pressure on the enemy whenever supply difficulties permitted, they gradually drove the Russian forces back upon Liao-yang; and the direction of initial deployment enabled them finally to effect the desired envelopment. The main force, advancing along the railway in a defile between the mountains and the Liao-ho, must have been brought to a standstill by lines of strong defences, had it not been for the action of the 1st and 4th

Armies, which by continually turning the enemy's flanks, afforded compensation for the lack of manœuvring power of the 2nd Army. The Japanese were invariably successful, but their leaders had anxious moments; for opportunities occurred at intervals when, by a judicious use of interior lines, the Russian commander might have defeated one or other of their widely separated armies. Had they succeeded against well-led troops, their triumph would be quoted for all time as an example of the immense value of German methods. Practising a system said to require superiority of numbers and the exercise of continuous pressure, they had to be content, usually, with equality of strength. Moreover, owing to great natural hindrances, that varied in degree and in kind in each of the three groups, the pressure applied was neither continuous nor simultaneous. But the Russian operations were vitiated so greatly by the exercise in their direction of a dual control and by defects in the training and equipment of the troops, that it is possible to set too high a value on the methods adopted by Oyama and his subordinate commanders.

Extension, tactical envelopment, and counter-attack.—Although preponderance in skill was greatly on the side of the Japanese, considerable light was thrown on the much-vexed questions of extension versus depth, of envelopment versus penetration, and of large versus small reserves.

The Japanese pinned their faith on extension, on envelopment, and on the retention of small reserves. The front of an attacking division at Königgrätz was 500 yards, at Liao-yang it was 2900 yards. This extreme attenuation of line was made possible by the value of enveloping fire and by the holding power of the modern rifle. How great the effect of tactical envelopment proved is indicated in a telegram from Alexiev to the Czar, in which

the Viceroy refers to "the exaggerated fear of the envelopment of the flanks, thanks to which our successes are transformed into defeats, terminated by retreats." The long thin lines seem, however, often to have offered tempting opportunities for counter-attacks—a fact clearly expressed by the nervous strain of some of the Japanese orders. A few counter-attacks were made, indeed, but none actually succeeded. Gerngross at Te-li-ssu forced Oku to throw in his last reserve, and had he been properly supported the Russian General might have achieved great things. The counter-attack at Ta-shih-chiao never really got under weigh; the leading Russian battalion had apparently no room to deploy, and it was heavily punished. At Hsi-mu-cheng the failure of the counterstroke was due to the fact that the Japanese were given some hours to strengthen their ground before any attempt was made to recapture the lost positions. At Yu-shu-ling and Yang-tzu-ling the Russians indulged in talk of counter-strokes, and nothing more. Several instances, however, occurred at Liao-yang; for instance, Martinov, near Lang-tzu-shan, on the right of the 3rd Siberians, struck a most effective blow, and by doing so paralysed the whole Guard Division; but, like Gerngross, he was not supported, and a promising venture therefore came to nought. At An-ping the contemplated stroke against the Japanese right was abandoned. Counterstrokes projected and abandoned must be considered in the discussion, since some credit for their abandonment must be given to the system of the assailants.

On the 30th August, a false report of a great Russian movement from the centre sent a shudder from end to end of the Japanese line. On the 31st, there was Vassiliev's proposal, which was scouted, and also the imaginary movement against the Japanese left which kept their 4th Division

idle till late in the day. On the 2nd September, Rebinder moved out of the western face of the Liao-yang defences; he suffered heavily, but he nevertheless forced Oyama to send up four of his last battalions. Then there was Kouropatkin's great counterstroke which has already been fully discussed; it was delivered without sufficient energy or skill and failed, but it threw Kuroki on to the defensive and stretched the endurance of the Japanese 1st Army nearly to breaking point. Finally, there was Kuroki's own counterstroke against Orlov delivered with the 12th Brigade at a time when his own main body was acting on the defensive about Manju Yama.

Every endeavour then, if we except the last, met with failure, and a similar fate seems to have befallen most counter-attacks on a large scale in modern war. Austerlitz, Salamanca, and Chancellorsville furnish the most remarkable exceptions[1]—we are not, of course, here considering the question of mere local counter-attacks, such as our troops delivered at Busaco. Chancellorsville was a very peculiar battle in all its circumstances, and therefore it is to the two first-mentioned that we must look for guidance. Those battles were fought in small compass and under out-of-date conditions, but independent of these limitations two profitable lessons may be drawn from them. The stroke in each was made early, and it was delivered in a predetermined direction. When the first condition is not observed reserves are almost certain to be absorbed into the firing line; it is simple enough to hypothecate them to a definite task, and to say that they are not to be wasted in this way, but the course of most combats that are well contested proves their absorption to be almost inevitable. Nor is the cause far to seek. The side acting on the offen-

[1] Blücher's advance to Wellington's assistance at Waterloo can hardly be classed in this category.

sive generally enjoys superiority of force; but let us say there is equality. The assailants press on, gradually collecting larger and larger forces near the points of assault. Cries for reinforcements are heard from every point of the defenders' line. And it becomes manifest that unless the reserves are used to strengthen the line the enemy will break through. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, however, that the firing line has not been strengthened, and that it is still intact at the time when the assailant put in his last reserve. This, then, is the moment for the counter-attack.

But at this moment also, the assailants' guns have the range and fuze for every point of the line, and his infantry have established a strong firing line close to the position. The issue of the counter-attack from the position will be no easy matter. If there are obstacles without gaps, movement will be slow, and if there are obstacles with gaps, the troops will advance by defiles. Only a few hundred yards separate the combatants. Can ordinary formations be employed? An advance made in skirmishing order will soon be brought to a halt by the reinforced firing line of the original assailants; if the counterstroke be delivered in dense array it will afford a prominent target. It may be said, however, that the wrong moment has been chosen, and that the counter-attack should be delivered immediately after the failure of an assault. True enough, but how is that moment to be gauged in a long line of battle? The general reserve has to be marched to the point decided upon and has to deploy. "Concentrate the first day, deploy the second, and attack the third," said Kouropatkin—exaggerated slowness, no doubt, even if partly excused by difficult country, but indicative of the impediments to the launching of a counterstroke at the time and in the direction dictated by the varying fortunes of the day.

What actually is likely to have happened at this period of the combat is that the troops on the defending side who are manning those portions of the line upon which pressure has been brought, have either been reinforced and have then maintained their positions, or else they have not been reinforced and so have retired from the unequal contest. In the first case, but few troops remain for the counter-attack; in the second, the battle may be regarded as already lost.

There is another point. As the assailant advances, he will probably envelop both of the defender's flanks, including that behind which the general reserve is assembled. In doing so he will, in all probability, diminish the space allowed to the latter for manœuvre. This happened, it may be remembered, at Liao-yang when the 23rd Brigade captured Manju Yama and when the 12th Brigade captured Wu-ting Shan. The general reserve will then move to the counter-attack with both its flanks turned or, as likely as not, it will feel bound to take up a defensive position, and in either case the fulfilment of its task is improbable. Finally, when a counter-attack has been delivered and has succeeded against the troops in immediate opposition, does it spell victory or will it be that the other enveloping lines will move steadily forward, press on against the position, and cut off the counter-attackers? The last is the German view. There has been no test case. But, leaving out the question of relative fighting values, the result will depend to a large extent on the nature of the assailants' lines of supply. A successful counter-attack delivered towards a single line of supply will naturally be more disturbing than a similar attack delivered against one of two converging lines of supply. A leader will realise that the more deeply his opponent commits himself against the one line, the more effective should be the action of his own troops acting from the other line.

It was suggested above that the counter-attack ought to be delivered in a direction previously determined. The reason of this is that staff arrangements must have been worked out carefully if quickness and accuracy of stroke are to be attained; and this cannot be the case unless direction of movement be known. Generally speaking, therefore, counter-attacks have no very bright prospect of achieving their object. But they may prove successful if delivered early and in a given direction, provided—and the Manchurian battles show this clearly—that the staff arrangements be good. There is, of course, no golden rule in the matter; surprise, the possession of superior numbers, or other circumstances may justify an altered procedure; the gleaning of a few guiding principles is all that may be expected from the study of war. But it may then be asked, if counter-attacks lend such small promise of success, why make use of them? Why not merely move the general reserve into the firing line as required by the direction and force of the attack? The answer is that, however barren of victory an active defence may generally have proved, it has shown itself infinitely superior to a passive defence, which has hardly ever proved successful.

The offensive or the defensive.—"Why adopt the defensive at all? If the counter-attack has to be delivered so early, why not go the whole hog and make a general attack?" These are natural questions. Every soldier enters the campaign with the strongest predilection for the offensive. He has learnt that the secret of victory lies in attacking always, and he intends to put the precept into practice. But unfortunately, unless he be one of the world's great leaders, the decision will not rest with him; it will depend mainly on Preparation. If an army be caught mobilising, if its mobility be of a low order, or if it be badly staffed, it will be forced to adopt the defensive before a

shot is fired. Supposing it to be weak in numbers, undisciplined, ill-trained, or indifferently armed, it will be thrown on the defensive within half an hour of the opening of the first great encounter; or if it adopts a rash offensive it will suffer the fate of the Ottoman forces which advanced from Kirk-Kilissa. The great Napoleon managed to pursue the offensive through a long series of campaigns, but even he was driven in 1813 to form a defensive plan, owing to the inferior quality of his troops. It is idle, therefore, to dream of discarding the defensive as a form of war. Moltke's dictum notwithstanding, it is generally considered to be, even in the active sense, the weaker form; but it must be studied, so that such advantages as it possesses may be turned to full account when resort to it becomes inevitable. That it has advantages is evidenced by the bloody repulse of the Japanese at Port Arthur. By turning to account the natural features, by strengthening the ground, and so on, the number of troops required to man the defences may be economised, and a large portion of the force made available for the counterstroke.

Reserves.—The question of the use of small or large reserves in the attack is the old problem of prevention and cure. The retention of a relatively small reserve enables the assailant to place a large number of rifles in the firing line, and thus to bring a great and effectively directed fire to bear upon the enemy, tending to limit his freedom of action and to prevent him from delivering a counter-attack. The retention of a large reserve enables a leader to exercise a better control over the fight, to give a forward impulse to his firing line, and to deal effectively with a hostile counter-stroke. The Japanese employed the former method and, though they had many anxious moments, their system was justified by events. When the reserve is limited, it denies to the firing line the impulse from behind which is

so necessary to carry it forward. Moreover the Japanese leaders, by depriving themselves early in the battle of the small reserve originally retained, allowed the control of the fight to pass into the hands of subordinates, who, however, for the most part, vindicated the system with skill and energy. Reserves, of course, have other uses in the attack than that of repelling counterstrokes. With Napoleon it was "*on engage partout et on voit*" and, having decided on the decisive direction, he thrust in the massed reserve. Some hold to this theory still, modifying it to modern conditions by moving the reserves in more open formations.

The Japanese, when they had any reserves left, preferred rather to extend their enveloping lines than to drive home an attack in other places. French writers, who do not relish the uniform success of German doctrines in this particular campaign, point to the indecisive nature of the Japanese victories. There was, they say, no attempt at manœuvre; battles ended without pursuit and the enemy was driven back along his line of supply. The wonder is, however, not that the victories were not decisive, but that, with weight of numbers against them, and with such stolid fighters in the trenches, the Japanese gained victories at all. There could, in truth, be no better vindication of the German system than that it succeeded in this case with weak numbers and insufficient cavalry. Given superiority in these matters, the organisation of pursuit would not have presented the difficulties which faced the leaders of attenuated and exhausted lines on arrival in the captured positions. In most of their battles the Japanese won all out. But at the Yalu the case was different; there the victors were much superior in strength, and no excuse can be urged for the failure to pursue.

The Russian leadership.—Stress has been laid throughout

the book on the unfortunate influence exercised on the Russian armies by the system of dual control. The mischief is so obvious on the face of it, that there is no need to labour the point further. It must be borne in mind, however, in gauging the quality of Kouropatkin's leadership. Had he been given a free hand, he would have retreated right back to Harbin and, taking the offensive later, with superior numbers, might have achieved the reputation, not indeed of a Napoleon, but possibly of an Archduke Charles. His talent for organisation was shown repeatedly by the well-managed retreats of the Russians, and though his constant warnings to his subordinates not to engage in decisive action with superior forces were perhaps overdone, still it must be acknowledged that he achieved his object of avoiding decisive defeat in and prior to the great battle. He himself attempted too much and was a typical centraliser, issuing orders direct not only to corps commanders, but to commanders of the numerous detachments scattered over the country. The Russian Official Account shows that he entered into the tiniest details of supplies, boots, sanitation, etc. He wrote enormously long instructions for battle; "every scheme of attack or defence was worked out at great length with coloured sketches and even skirmishers shown on paper." The work, if not excessive for any one man, certainly immersed him so deeply in routine that his brain became unequal to higher matters. Picture him at Liao-yang, where there was no system of communication save by orderlies who lost their way, no sign of friend or foe save the bursting shrapnel, only an immense battle-field, badly mapped, in which his troops were swallowed up. He undertook to fight a battle on two fronts and to control a great counterstroke. Clarity of thought and a dominant mind could alone command the issues.

As to Kouropatkin's theories, they had their genesis at

Plevna, whence he drew his belief in entrenchments, in information that left nothing to the imagination, and in strong reserves and their sparing use. He always seemed to be afraid of passing too soon to the offensive before he had drawn full value from the defensive force of his position. He fell into the error of trying to be safe everywhere, with the result that there were too many detachments and that there was a weakening of the main forces for battle. It was a failing of Kouropatkin's that he would never act decisively until exact information as to the enemy's moves and intentions had come in. At the same time he was hampered by a lack of loyal co-operation between the subordinate leaders; there was no idea of marching to the sound of guns, partly because of jealousy between commanders, but mainly because commanders scarcely seemed to think of fighting until actually attacked. Nevertheless he was invariably calm and steadfast in disaster, and he was beloved by his men. An officer who visited him when Russian fortunes were at a low ebb, expecting to find him in despair, came away himself much encouraged. Few commanders at the end of an unsuccessful campaign would have penned that final order of his to the 1st Army at the close of the war: "I am the culprit for . . . I have been unable to use fully the incomparable qualities of our troops."

The Japanese leadership.—The character of Kouropatkin was to some extent reflected in every action of the Russian army. In dealing with Japanese leadership, on the other hand, the note is almost impersonal, so great was the influence of the general staff. The Japanese had a far clearer perception than the Russians of the correct distribution of work. The army commanders were of "noble birth, born in the days of the feudal system," autocratic, calm, and perhaps a little callous as regards human life. Around them their staffs worked out not only routine

matters, but also the higher problems, and they presented the results of their labours, as it were, on bended knee. A most loyal staff, giving all credit to their chiefs and working together without friction. The chief simply had to sign the order or to nod approval. It reads a simple part, but the responsibility rests with the chief, and the bearer of that burden ought not to be troubled with detail. As a system it has the merit of having produced two men—Kuroki and Oku—who will rank high among the great subordinate leaders, Davout, Ney, Lannes, Lord Hill, and Stonewall Jackson.

Notwithstanding all their preparation, the Japanese were attempting a task almost beyond their powers. They were therefore decidedly fortunate in not finding against them leaders of high capacity. Had they met a Suvarov, a Skobelev, a Gourkho, the desperate assaults of their infantry might have been delivered in vain. It was, however, the greatness of their task rather than their mistakes that exposed them to the chances of defeat. The dilatory handling of their initial land-operations has already been dealt with, but the slowness of their subsequent progress has been shown to have been largely due to difficulties of supply and transport. The correctness or otherwise of their decision to besiege Port Arthur, and at the same time to attack the Russian field armies, has been so widely discussed elsewhere that the well-worn arguments will not be reproduced. Suffice it to say that opinion has undergone a marked change in the matter. This pursuit of a double objective was at first regarded as a heinous strategical crime, and that it is now accepted as in consonance with the art of war is a proof of the violability of military maxims. Perhaps the two most questionable actions of the Japanese were the retention of the 7th and 8th Divisions at home when their services were urgently required at the front,

and the decision of Admiral Togo not to close with the Russian fleet on the 10th August, whereby a chance was lost of finishing the campaign by a decisive victory at Liao-yang.

Character and knowledge.—The relative value of character and knowledge in war has always been a much-debated point. Great writers are apt to exalt the latter. "Knowledge and human power," says Bacon, "are synonymous, since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect." And it barely admits of dispute that the habitual acquirement of knowledge fitted to the circumstance and daily action of the individual is a great sustenance to character. According to von Moltke, however, "Qualities of character are of more value in the field than those of intelligence," and the war in Manchuria bears out his contention. There was plenty of intelligence among the Russian leaders, but some lack of character. The Japanese commanders, on the other hand, possessed character and their staffs had the knowledge, and the combination worked admirably. It often occurs, however, that a leader strong in knowledge is weak in character, and that a man of character scorns to acquire knowledge, and it is neither easy to strengthen the man of learning nor to persuade the strong man to study. If one of the two has to lead, let it be the strong man, and let the wise man be of his staff—the combination of Blücher and Gneisenau. The selection requires care, because arrogance and an offensive manner are often believed to cover a strong character. Some of the Russian generals in Manchuria could be exceedingly offensive; the great Marlborough, Lee, and Kuroki were courteous to a degree. Resolution is the quality required, and it is more often concealed behind the mask of imperturbability than made manifest in the form of harshness.

The comparative value of the three arms.—The work of the cavalry has been commented on unfavourably throughout. The troopers on either side can only be said to have given rest to the other arms behind them and, as regards the Russians, by reason of their numbers, to have afforded protection to the line of communications. The Russian cavalry, as being the stronger force, was chiefly to blame for the discredit which the campaign brought upon their arm. That too many squadrons were usually employed in the mountains was the fault of general headquarters. But the cavalry failed equally in the plains. The impediments offered by the kao-liang were accepted as an excellent excuse for inaction; but before the crops had grown up no excuse could be urged except lack of training. Had the kao-liang been utilised as a screen for movement, much might have been achieved against the hostile flanks or rear. The power given to small detachments by the modern rifle was repeatedly emphasised by the course of the campaign. It is the possibility of the rapid transfer of this power from one part of the arena to another that renders cavalry in some respects as effective on the battle-field to-day as at any time in the past century. By threatening the flanks and line of communications it will strike at the most vulnerable point—the mind of the hostile commander—and may often force him to abandon a promising adventure. But the threat must be effective; the enemy must be attacked, important points captured and held; a mere show of hands will not suffice.

The organisation of the Japanese cavalry has been criticised on the grounds that too large a proportion was allotted to divisions. This allotment was necessitated by their method of forming impenetrable screens, consisting of mixed detachments of infantry and cavalry, behind which the armies rested or manœuvred. A test of the

soundness of the system was the embarrassment into which the Russian staff was thrown by the consequent hindrance to the acquisition of information. The transfer of a few Japanese squadrons to their independent cavalry might have nullified this advantage, without rendering the latter sufficiently strong to undertake any great enterprise.

As regards the work of the artillery, the possession of numerous mountain guns gave the Japanese a great advantage in the hills, and the superior field gun of the Russians profited the latter equally in the plains. In the early encounters the Russians suffered from ignorance of the method of using indirect fire; the Japanese gunners, on the other hand, appear to have used it too much, and consequently to have failed to give their infantry all the support possible. Close support in the attack was not practised by the Japanese except in the case of the mountain artillery; they broke away from German precept in this matter, and refused to regard the destruction of their batteries as an inspiriting spectacle for their infantry. The difficulty experienced by field artillery in affording close support, except in unusual conditions of terrain, points to the desirability, now accepted in our Field Service Regulations, of employing a few batteries of pack artillery with the field army even in warfare in the plains.

To deal with the performances of the infantry on either side would be but to repeat the history of the war. In no campaign has it been more clearly made manifest that the infantry is the principal arm in battle. Despite the meagre support of their guns, and unaided by their cavalry, the splendid infantry of Japan won deathless fame in their repeated assaults on the Russian trenches. Upon the infantryman falls the bulk of the labour, of the danger, of the loss, and, above all, of the re-

sponsibility. The guns may thunder and the squadrons charge, but if the infantryman fails all else will fail with him, and with the responsibility should go the honour. His place is on the right of the line. As for the gunner, his rôle is to support the infantryman in every circumstance and in every change of circumstance. In one way or another the latter must get forward and the gunner must help him to do it. It is not a question of co-operation, for that word expresses a false idea. The infantryman has one all-absorbing task before him—to reach the enemy. The modes of assisting him to get there are many and vary with the situation, and it is for the gunner to think them out, practise and perfect them. The infantryman will help him when he can.

Modern conditions.—The campaign in Manchuria is already becoming obsolete. In the past decade, Man has been lighting on the secrets of nature at an unexampled rate and subjecting them to control. Wireless telegraphy was in its infancy at the opening of the war, and submarines and air-craft bore no part in the conflict. No useful end would be attained by thinking out how the campaign would have been affected by these new engines of war, for it would have been carried out on vastly different lines. Had the Russians, for example, possessed a powerful air-fleet, the Japanese would either have postponed the struggle or must have evolved some new method of discounting the enemy's advantages. It may be of interest, however, to consider the general effect on the methods adopted by the belligerents in Manchuria of the acquisition on either side of a larger measure of information.

The Japanese or German system of a long line of columns has for its object, in the first place, the envelopment of the area in which the main hostile armies may be found, and, in the second place, the tactical envelopment of the

armies themselves. One danger to such a system clearly lies in the possibility of a false initial direction being given to the columns, for then not only will they fail to envelop the enemy, but they may be exposed to the blows of his massed formations at either end of an extended line. Every tactical and strategical advantage will thereupon be with the antagonist; and the ensuing disaster will be irremediable, for the long line of columns has but small power of manœuvre.

The Japanese were fortunate in the possession of an exceptionally well-organised secret service. They knew, moreover, that their adversaries could not move in force far from the railway line. They were unlikely, therefore, to make a mistake in their initial deployment. Far different might be the case on the Continent of Europe. The enemy will certainly endeavour to preserve the utmost secrecy as to his points of concentration, and will make use of every kind of misleading device. The Germans depended for information in 1870 on the foreign press, on their secret service, and on their cavalry, but their cavalry proved a broken reed, and their intelligence staff had to depend mainly on the secret service and the foreign press. The two last can no longer be relied on after the outbreak of war—witness the impenetrable veil that covered the recent operations of the Italian army and of the armies of the allied Balkan States. Prior to the introduction of air-craft, therefore, an army adopting the German system had to depend for information mainly on its cavalry, and it was clearly shown in Manchuria that the power of reconnaissance by mounted troops has not been augmented by the improvement in modern weapons. It may, then, justly be urged that novel means of obtaining information will be of enormous value to the system evolved by the Germans, in that it will enable them to adjust correctly the initial direction of their lines

of advance, upon which the success of the system largely depends.

Let us now turn to the other strategical form. Two nations face each other along a line of frontier, of which one relies, let us say, on the Japanese or German system, while the other trusts to the French system, that is, to the system adhered to by the Russians in Manchuria, but purged of its immobility and of its purely defensive attitude. The frontier is crossed by a number of main roads and railways, marking clearly the points of passage by the columns, and furnishing a rough indication of their lines of advance. What the commander of the other side chiefly wishes to know now is the strength of the individual columns, so that he may settle where to strike with effect; and the method usually recommended is the employment of a large advanced guard to attack some portion of the hostile line. Pivoted on the point of contact the "mass of manœuvre" is thrown against the enemy in the direction indicated as the most effective by the advanced-guard commander. But as the latter can only have gained information concerning the hostile troops immediately engaged, the army commander is no wiser than before as to the strength of the other columns which may be marching against his flanks on either side. And even should fuller information be forthcoming, he is not in a position to take advantage of it, because he must operate on a fixed pivot and consequently with a limited radius of action.

The advanced guard may, therefore, discover the composition of one or two of the hostile columns, but no more. The composition not only of these but also of all the other columns may, however, now be roughly established by the use of aircraft. This will be the gain to the French system, and it is, of course, of considerable importance. Kouropatkin often gauged the direction of advance of the Japanese columns,

but what puzzled him was their strength; had that been clear he might have avoided many mistakes. But this knowledge might not be quite of such advantage in European war. Each side hopes to gain the initiative, but only by rapid mobilisation and instant action can it be gained. Plans must, therefore, be elaborated beforehand for the concentration of the "mass of manœuvre" and its advanced guard in a given area, and for their movement against the nearest of the enemy's columns. It matters not what the composition of those columns may be; they are to be attacked whether the air-craft report them to be weak or strong. The only other course open to the exponents of the French system might be to concentrate far back from the frontier and, having gained information as to the strength of the enemy's columns, to manœuvre in the direction required under cover of a line of fortresses. This would be quite out of keeping with an intensely offensive spirit at the base of the system, for it would necessitate the locking up of large forces in defensive lines.

It would appear, therefore, that increased means of acquiring information will benefit the German system of strategy more than the French system. The use of wireless telegraphy will ensure the rapid distribution of the information acquired, and will thus tend to accentuate the effects produced by the employment of air-craft.

APPENDIX I[1]

THE JAPANESE ARMY IN 1904

		Numbers.	Term of Service.	Organisation.	Notes.
Standing Army.	Active Army.	150,000.	3 years; from 20 to 23 years of age.	13 divisions. 2 cavalry brigades. 2 artillery brigades.	Division = 2 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry regiment, 1 engineer battalion, and 36 guns, or about 13,400 men with 5500 non-combatants. 1 infantry brigade = 2 regiments; 1 regiment = 3 battalions. Cavalry brigade = 2 regiments each of 4 squadrons, or 1100 sabres. An artillery brigade = 36 guns.
	1st Reserve.	200,000.	4⅓ years; after completing service in Active Army.	Utilised to bring Active Army up to war strength.	The 1st and 2nd Reserves were liable to 60 days' training a year; actually they received about half that amount.

1. The form of this Appendix is borrowed from Colonel Ross' book, "An Outline of the Russo-Japanese War."

2nd Reserve (Kobi).	200,000.	5 years; after completing service in Standing Army.	In 13 brigades each of 3 regiments each of 2 battalions.	Some of these brigades had also 3 batteries of artillery, and a few Kobi divisions were formed later.
Conscript Reserve. 1st Term.	50,000.	$7\frac{1}{3}$ years; between 20 and 28 years of age.	Liable (for 1 year only) to make up deficiencies in Active Army.	90 days' training in 1st year and 50 days' in 3rd and 5th years.
Conscript Reserve. 2nd Term.	250,000.	Nominal only; $1\frac{1}{3}$ years between ages of 20 and 21.	Unorganised.	Untrained.
National Army. 1st Section.	270,000.	$13\frac{2}{3}$ years; after completing service in 2nd Reserve.	Unorganised.	No further training.
National Army. 2nd Section.	4,000,000.	All men between 17 and 20 years of age; and all not included in above categories between 20 and 40.	Unorganised.	Untrained.

APPENDIX II

THE RUSSIAN FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

Organisation.—The Russian army in the Far East was organised in two army corps, a cavalry brigade and fortress troops, and a third army corps was in process of formation. The organisation of these corps was, however, of a provisional and defective nature, and underwent so many changes that, for practical purposes, at the outbreak of hostilities we may consider the field army to have consisted of eight rifle brigades, seven of eight battalions and one of twelve battalions, to each of which a group of artillery was affiliated, twenty-nine sotnias of Cossacks, and six squadrons of dragoons. A ninth rifle brigade was being formed by companies drawn from each of the existing rifle battalions, and they in turn were to be replaced by companies drawn from units in Russia.

The two infantry brigades which had recently arrived from Europe were at peace strength, their mobilisation equipment and reservists were in Europe. The artillery which accompanied them had only four guns per battery, and they were of obsolete pattern.

Numbers.

1st to 6th Rifle Brigades (48 battalions, each 720 strong)	34,500
7th and 8th Rifle Brigades (20 battalions, each 850 strong)	17,000
East Siberian and Cossack Artillery (148 guns)	5,000

Cavalry (35 squadrons)	6,200
Engineers	2,700
Two Infantry Brigades from 10th and 17th Army Corps (16 battalions)	7,400
Two Artillery Brigades (24 guns)	800
Four reserve battalions (to be used as cadres for the formation of a division)	2,800
Fortress troops	7,700
Railway troops	11,000
Frontier guards (55 companies, 55 sotnias, and 26 guns)	24,000
A total of	119,100

Excluding frontier guards, fortress and technical troops, there were 88 battalions, 35 squadrons, and 172 guns.

Distribution.	Battns.	Sqns.	Guns.	Fortress Battns.
Kuan-tung Peninsula	20¼	6	24	2
Zone of concentration, S. Manchuria (including 4 squadrons and 6 guns at Feng-huang-cheng)	7½	6	22	—
Northern Manchuria	9	11	14	—
In the Maritime Province :				
(*a*) To remain in province	16	6	32	3
(*b*) destined for zone of concentration	30	6	60	—
In the Amur and Transbaikal districts	5	—	20	—
At Pekin	¼	—	—	—
	88	35	172	5

Deducting the troops to be left in the Maritime Province, the two Russian infantry brigades with their artillery, two battalions at Blagovetiensk,[1] many marches from the railway, and the four reserve battalions, there were available for field or fortress operations in Manchuria :—

50 battalions, 29 squadrons, 116 guns, and 2 fortress artillery battalions.

The frontier guards were distributed in small detachments along the railways.

Mobilisation and reorganisation.—In the case of Eastern Siberian units, mobilisation took place in two stages—local mobilisation and final mobilisation. The former consisted of drawing the necessary mobilisation equipments and calling out reservists residing in the country, who brought the battalions up to a strength of about 850. This was completed by the end of February, by which time the 9th Rifle Brigade was also formed. Additional reservists dispatched from Russia (about 150 per battalion) brought the units up to war strength. At the same time the rifle brigades were transformed into rifle divisions by the addition of a third battalion per regiment sent from Russia and an extra battery of artillery.

The highest effective was reached about the middle of May, when regiments numbered about 3000, including 300 non-combatants. The mobilisation of the two infantry and the two artillery brigades of the 10th and 17th Army Corps was completed early in April, and thirty-one more sotnias of Cossacks had by that time been furnished by the Cossack population. At the end of April the whole of the forces in the Viceroyalty had been mobilised and numbered 106 battalions, 66 squadrons, and 208 guns.

In the meantime the army corps organisation had assumed definite shape.

[1] In North-Eastern Manchuria.

The 1st and 9th Rifle Divisions formed the 1st Siberian Army Corps.

The 3rd and 6th Rifle Divisions formed the 3rd Siberian Army Corps.

The 5th Rifle Division and the two Russian brigades formed the 2nd Siberian Army Corps.

The number of squadrons and guns in each army corps varied very greatly.

The cavalry was organised in three cavalry brigades each of two regiments, and a cavalry division of four regiments.

Reinforcements.—The date refers to the arrival of the complete formation in the zone of concentration.

Siberian Cossack Division (four regiments), 28th May.

Orenburg Cossack Brigade (two regiments), 14th June.

4th Siberian Army Corps (24 battalions, 64 guns), 14th June.

Ural Cossack Brigade (two regiments), and two unbrigaded cavalry regiments, 23rd June.

10th Army Corps, 14th July.

Caucasian Cossack Brigade, 15th July.

17th Army Corps, 5th August.

5th Siberian Army Corps, 1st September.

An infantry brigade of the 1st (European) Army Corps, 1st September.

The strength of the Field Army in Manchuria was :—

On the 28th April, 102,800.

On the 14th May, 107,800.

On the 28th May, 133,000.

On the 14th June, 156,000 (113,600 infantry, 23,700 cavalry, 14,800 artillery, 3900 engineers).

On the 28th June, 157,000.

On the 14th July, 193,000.

These figures include about 13 per cent of non-combatants and leave out of account the frontier guards and units in garrison. They are drawn from the Russian field states, and their irregularity of gradation is due to the omission of certain units which had arrived, but which were only included in later states.

APPENDIX III

A CONSIDERATION OF A RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE 2ND ARMY ON THE 1ST JUNE

The distribution of the Manchurian army on the 14th May was as follows: —

	Battns.	Sqns.	Guns.
Eastern Detachment, Rennenkampf's and Madritov's cavalry	21½	28	44
Mitschenko's cavalry	—	9	6
Southern Advanced Guard (1st Siberian Corps)	27	12	84
At Muk-den	5½	—	—
On the Liao-ho (exclusive of Frontier Guards)	1	4	—
Communication duties	—	4	—
At Liao-yang	28½	3	84
Total	83½	60	218
Reinforcements, 14th–31st May	18½	24	32
31st May–14th June	16	14	48
Grand Total	118	98	298

Assuming the order to be issued on the 1st June, and concentration at Hai-cheng or Kai-ping to have taken place a fortnight later, the following redistribution might have taken place:—

	Battns.	Sqns.	Guns.
Eastern Detachment and Rennenkampf's cavalry	17½	20	44
Mitschenko's force, left flank guard	12	17	30
Right flank guard, Yin-kou and Kai-ping	9	5	16
Various duties	3½	8	—
In reserve at Liao-yang	16	7	48
Allowing for non-arrival of reinforcements owing to dislocation of transport due to concentration	8	7	24
There would remain for the striking force	52	34	136
	118	98	298

In all rather more than 50,000 combatants, against whom Oku could have brought about 35,000.

APPENDIX IV

LIST OF BOOKS CONSULTED

The Russian Official History.

The British (Naval and Military) Official History.

The German Official Account.

The Japanese Official History, Vol. I (extracts only as given in the "Army Review").

"Essais sur la guerre russo-japonaise. Revue Militaire Générale."

"A Staff Officer's Scrap Book." Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton, K.C.B.

"An Outline of the Russo-Japanese War." Colonel Charles Ross, D.S.O.

"The Russian Army and the Japanese War." Translation from the unpublished account by General Kouropatkin, by Captain A. B. Lindsay.

"My experiences at Nan-shan and Port Arthur with the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment." By Lieutenant-General N. A. Tretyakov. Translated by Lieutenant A. C. Alford, R.A.

"The Japanese in Manchuria, 1904." By Colonel E. L. V. Cordonnier. Translated by Captain C. F. Atkinson.

"The Reckoning" ("Rasplata"). Captain V. Semenov.

"Le Japon moderne—Son évolution." L. Nadeau (extracts only as given in "Army Review").

"The Re-shaping of the Far East." B. L. Putnam Weale.

"The Truce in the East and its Aftermath." B. L. Putnam Weale.

"Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War." Major W. D. Bird, D.S.O.

"Essay on 'Morale.'" By Colonel Drujinin.

"Conférences sur la guerre russo-japonaise faites. l'Académie d'état-major Nicolas à St. Pétersbourg."

"Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei." Freiherr von Tettau.

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
MAP I
The THEATRE of OPERATIONS
Distances:-
Harbin to Lake Baikal 1400 m.
Lake Baikal to St. Petersburg 3100 m.
La Perouse Strait lies 500 m.
N.E. of Vladivostock.
MONGOLIA
HARBIN
R. Sungari
Eastern Chinese Railway
To Khabarovsk
MARITIME PROVINCE
Kirin
MANCHURIA
VLADIVOSTOCK
Hsin-min-tung
Tie-ling
MUKDEN
Hsing-ching
Kou-pang-tzu
Hai-cheng
YIN-KOU
Sas-sa-chi
Kuan-tien-cheng
Chiang-syang
Mountainous
Shang-hai-kouan
LIAO-TUNG
Wiju
Yalu R.
Fusan
SEA OF JAPAN
Gen-san
An-ju
Ping-yang
Chi-nam-po
Bay of Korea
Kuan-Tung
Dalny
PORT ARTHUR
Tient-sin
GULF OF PECHILI
Wei-hai-wei
Seoul
Che-mul-po
KOREA
Mountainous
YELLOW SEA
Fu-san
Ma-san-po
KOREAN STRAITS
Sasebo
Nagasaki
-ho = River
-tung = Peninsula
-wan = Bay
-shan = Mountain
-ling = Pass
Scale of Miles
0 60 120 180 240


MAP II
MOUNTAINS and COMMUNICATIONS
in
SOUTHERN MANCHURIA
LIAO-YANG
Pen-hsi-hu
Kansha
Chiao-tou
Yu-shu-ling
N. Fen-shui-ling
An-shan-chan
Lang-tzu-shan
Ta-wan
Mo-tien-ling
Lien-shan-kuan
E. Fen-shui-ling
Sai-ma-chi
Yang-tzu-ling
Hai-cheng
Ho-tu-ling
Sai-ma-chi to Ai-yang-cheng
on road to Kuan-tien-cheng
12 miles
FEN-SHUI RANGE
Hai-ma-cheng
Phan-ling
Ta-shih-chiao
Ta-ling
Hsin-kai-ling
Feng-huang-cheng
Kai-ping
Hsui-yuen
Roads
Railways
Mountains
Rivers
Scale of Miles
10 5 0 10 20


Plan VII.
ACTION at CHIAO - TOU
18th.& 19th. July.
Reproduced by permission from a sketch made on ground by Captains G.L.Blair 36th.Sikhs, and Neville Wyatt R.F.A.
F
B
A
D
C
H
G
E
Hsi-ho
2 Cos.
cliffs
very steep
Hills rising to 950'
Japanese Main Attack 5½ Bns.
CHIAO TOU
Reserve ½ Bn.
Turning Column 2 Bns.
From 2nd Div. 2 Cos.
From Hsin-mu-chang
400
300
200
150
50'
30
Scale of Yards
500 0 500 1000
Heights in Feet.


Plan VIII.
The Battle of
TA - SHIH - CHIAO
24th. July 1904.
Ta-shih-chiao Stn.
Gen.Res.
Gen.Res.
Hill A
Tower Hill
Railway Hill
Rifle Hill
Kossagovski
Middle Hill
Tai-ping-ling
Chileiko
Tung-ta-ling
4th Div.
Nan-ta-ling
5th Div.
6th Div.
Ta-fang-cheng
3rd Div
Tang-chih
Mitschenko
Wu-tai-shan
From Kaiping
Many Villages not shown.
General Reserve
Scale of Miles
1½ 0 1 2 3 4 5
Russian Intrenchments
Russian Troops
Japanese Troops

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